Evidence-Based Policing Matrix
Research on Micro-Places
Micro-Places –Interventions which target very small geographic locations such as a block, street segment, alley, intersection, specific address or cluster of addresses.
KEY: Rigor: M=Moderately Rigorous; R= Rigorous; VR=Very Rigorous Y-axis: F=Focused and Tailored; G=General Z-axis: R=Reactive; P=Proactive; H=Highly Proactive Dots: Black=Effective; Gray=Mixed Results; White=No Evidence of Effect; Red=Backfire effect
Author | Intervention and Findings |
Result | Rigor | Y-Axis | Z-Axis |
Baker & Wolfer (2003) | Problem-oriented policing project in a park reduces fear and perceptions of drug use and vandalism | ![]() |
M | F | HP |
Bichler et al. (2013) | Problem-oriented policing, focusing on outreach to motel owners and operators, code enforcement, and permit ordinance to increase pressure on uncooperative motel operators | ![]() |
M | F | P |
Braga et al. (1999) | Problem-oriented policing in violent crime hot spots leads to reductions in violent and property crime, disorder and drug selling | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Braga & Bond (2008) | Focus on hot spots of crime leads to reductions in crime and disorder calls for service | ![]() |
VR | F | P |
Braga et al. (2012) | Safe Street Team problem-oriented policing project associated with a reduction in violent index crimes at treatment hot spots relative to comparison places | ![]() |
R | F | HP |
Bryant et al. (2015) | Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS) produced statistically significant decreases in robberies, commercial burglaries, and vehicle crashes | ![]() |
M | G | P |
Chaiken et al. (1975) | Increased police on the New York Subways at night led to reduced crime | ![]() |
M | G | P |
Corsaro et al. (2012) | Pulling levers intervention: Identification of drug and violence hot spots followed by notification and resource delivery to individuals convicted of nonviolent nonfelony crimes | ![]() |
R | F | P |
Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2004) | Blocks that received extra police protection experienced significantly fewer car thefts than the rest of the neighborhoods. | ![]() |
R | G | R |
Eck & Wartell (1998) | Property managers who have a meeting with police and threat of nuisance abatement report less crime, receiving letter somewhat effective in reducing crime | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Groff et al. (2015) -Offender focused | An approach focusing on known offenders led to a reduction in violent crime and violent felonies | ![]() |
VR | F | P |
Hope (1994) | Case studies of problem-oriented policing and drug-market locations. Forced closure or sale of property reduced drug dealing | ![]() |
M | F | HP |
Jim et al. (2006) | Community-oriented policing in a retail shopping center led to reduced perception of gang activity and fear of crime | ![]() |
M | G | P |
Kennedy et al. (2015) – Colorado Springs | Allocating police resources to high-risk areas, derived from risk terrain modeling (RTM) reduced crime in target areas | ![]() |
R | F | P |
Kennedy et al. (2015) – Glendale | Allocating police resources to high-risk areas, derived from risk terrain modeling (RTM) reduced crime in target areas | ![]() |
R | F | P |
Kennedy et al. (2015) – Kansas City | Allocating police resources to high-risk areas, derived from risk terrain modeling (RTM) reduced crime in target areas | ![]() |
R | F | P |
Kennedy et al. (2015) – Newark | Allocating police resources to high-risk areas, derived from risk terrain modeling (RTM) reduced crime in target areas | ![]() |
R | F | P |
Kochel et al. (2015) – Directed patrol | Directed patrol led to reduction in calls for service | ![]() |
R | G | P |
Kochel et al (2015) – Problem solving | Problem-oriented policing led to reduction in calls for service | ![]() |
R | F | HP |
Lawton et al. (2005) | Police officers on drug corners in Philadelphia led associated with significant localized intervention impacts for both violent and drug crimes. | ![]() |
R | G | P |
Mazerolle, Price et al. (2000) | The use of civil remedies and third party policing associated with reduced drug crime, especially in residential locations | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Mohler et al. (2015) | Predictive policing models led to reduction in crime | ![]() |
R | G | P |
Piza et al. (2015) | CCTV increased identification of criminal activity and a reduction of crime | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Ratcliffe et al. (2011) | Foot patrol associated with a significant decrease in crime in hot spots that reach a threshold level of pre-intervention violence | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Santos & Santos (2015) | Micro-time hot spots approach reduced theft from vehicles | ![]() |
R | F | R |
Sherman & Weisburd (1995) | Substantial increases in police patrol associated with reduction in total crime calls and more significant reduction in disorder at high crime hot spots | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Taylor et al. (2011)– POP | Problem-oriented policing in hot spots associated with a 33% drop in “street violence” during the 90 days after the intervention | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Telep et al. (2014) | Spending approximately 15 minutes at treatment hot spots to reduce calls for service and crime incidents | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Weisburd & Green (1995) | Crackdowns on drug hot spots reduced disorder; no effects on violence or property crime | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Weisburd et al. (2015) – Hot spots | Treatment patrol areas drawn from automatic vehicle location (AVL) systems experienced significant increases in unallocated patrol time and a decrease in crime | ![]() |
R | G | P |
White & Katz (2013) | Problem-oriented policing at convenience store locations led to a 40% decline in calls for service at target stores. | ![]() |
M | F | P |
Armitage & Monchuk (2011) | Secured by Design (SBD) program to encourage builders to design out crime shows effectiveness in street-level comparisons but not when comparing SBD developments to non-SBD developments | ![]() |
M | F | HP |
Hegarty et al. (2014) | Hot spots policing design using both visibility and visibility/activity, both of which reduced crimes and calls for service. | ![]() |
VR | G/F | P |
Koper et al. (2013) | Short-term patrols with LPR devices reduced different crimes depending on how the LPRs were used | ![]() |
VR | F | P |
Koper et al. (2015) | Crime declined in hot spots that received higher levels of dosage, but greater use of mobile computing technology at hot spots did not enhance outcomes | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
La Vigne et al. (2011)-Baltimore | Police monitored CCTV cameras reduce crime in one Baltimore site, but not the other | ![]() |
R | G | P |
La Vigne et al. (2011)-Chicago | Police monitored CCTV cameras reduce crime in one Chicago site, but not the other | ![]() |
R | G | P |
Morton et al. (2019) | Police partnerships with hoteliers to reduce drug and nuisance problems increased police engagement with hoteliers, hotelier reporting of crimes, and increased executed warrants. Effects decayed over time. | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Novak et al. (2016) | Foot patrol effect initially reduced violent crime, but this effect soon faded | ![]() |
M | G | P |
Piza & O’Hara (2014) | Saturation foot patrol produced reductions in violent crime, with evidence of both temporal and spatial displacement | ![]() |
M | G | P |
Rosenfeld et al. (2014) -Directed patrol plus enforcement | Directed patrol plus enforcement activities reduced total firearm violence, but produced no change in firearm robberies | ![]() |
VR | F | P |
Sherman & Rogan (1995) | Crack house raids reduced crime for about 12 days; crime reductions decayed quickly | ![]() |
VR | F | P |
Buerger (1994) | Problem-oriented policing in high crime addresses leads difference in calls for service in commercial treatment vs. control addresses, but small decline in residential calls in treatment area | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Groff et al. (2015) -POP | Problem-oriented policing did not lead to a reduction in violent crime, however likely due to weak implementation | ![]() |
VR | F | HP |
Groff et al. (2015) – Foot patrol | Foot patrol did not lead to reduction in violent crime | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Lum et al. (2010) | Use of license plate readers mounted on patrol cars in autotheft hot spot areas not associated with declines in auto crime or crime generally in two jurisdictions | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Rosenfeld et al. (2014) -Directed patrol only | The directed patrol intervention had no significant impact on any of the outcome measures. | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Taylor et al. (2011)– Directed patrol | Saturation/directed patrol in hot spots not associated with a significant decline in crime in the post-intervention period | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Weisburd et al. (2012) | Broken windows policing had no evidence of an effect in calls for service | ![]() |
VR | G | P |
Weiss & Freels (1996) | Aggressive traffic law enforcement had no impact on robbery or auto theft rates. | ![]() |
M | G | P |