Individuals – Clayton et al. (1996)
No significant impact of D.A.R.E. on cigarette, alcohol, or marijuana use one year after and over five year follow up
Individuals – Davis & Taylor (1997)
Home visits after domestic violence failed to reduce repeat violence; Public education about domestic violence failed to reduce violence
Individuals – Davis et al. (2007)
No reduction in subsequent abuse for households that receive second responder within 24 hours or after 7 days
Individuals – Dunford (1992)
Arrest for domestic violence increased offense frequency at 12 months
Individuals – Ennett et al. (1994)
D.A.R.E. has no significant impact on smoking, alcohol use, or heavy drinking immediately after, 1 year after, and 2 years; after program
Individuals – Giblin (2002)
Juveniles participating in CAN (police/probation partnership) were more likely to have new technical violations than were juveniles on regular probation
Individuals – Hirschel et al. (1990)
Arrest for domestic violence increases official recidivism
Individuals – Koppensteiner et al. (2019)
Second Responder Program did not have a significant impact on the number of domestic violence incidents recorded by police
Individuals – Pate et al. (1992)
Follow-up visits by detectives for spousal assault did not reduce subsequent victim-reported offenses, threats, or property damage
Individuals – Perry et al. (2003)
D.A.R.E. has no significant impact on any of the outcome measures (self-reported tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana use; violence, victimization)
Individuals – Ridgeway et al. (2011)
Letter to gun buyers informing them about gun laws has no impact on likelihood gun will become crime gun
Individuals – Ringwalt et al. (1991)
D.A.R.E has no significant impact on smoking, alcohol use, or use of inhalants
Individuals – Rose & Hamilton (1970)
Juvenile diversion and supervision program has no impact on juvenile recidivism
Individuals – Rosenbaum & Hanson (1998)
D.A.R.E has no significant overall impact on using drugs, cigarettes, or alcohol
Individuals – Saunders et al. (2016)
Predictive policing intervention targeting individuals at high risk for gun violence did not significantly impact the likelihood of becoming a shooting or homicide victim
Individuals – Shanahan et al. (2017)
Cautioning strategy for cannabis offenses had no significant impact on self-reported cannabis use
Individuals – Shapland et al. (2008) (London – Burglary)
Restorative justice conference had no effect on burglary offenders
Individuals – Shapland et al. (2008) (London – Robbery)
Restorative justice conference had no effect on robbery offenders
Individuals – Shapland et al. (2008) (Northumbria – Juveniles)
Restorative justice conference had no effect on juvenile offenders
Individuals – Sherman et al. (2000) (Juvenile Property Offenders)
Restorative justice conferences did not reduce offending of juvenile property offenders
Individuals – Sherman et al. (2000) (Juvenile Shoplifting Offenders)
Restorative justice conference had no effect for juvenile shoplifting offenders
Individuals – Small et al. (2019)
Removing firearms at the scene of IPV incidents was not significantly associated with subsequent IPV incidents
Individuals – Stover et al. (2009)
Domestic violence home-visit intervention (DVHVI) increased the likelihood of victims calling the police for subsequent incidents
Individuals – Stover et al. (2010)
Home visit program for domestic violence victims has no significant impact on reported violence
Individuals – Uchida & Swatt (2013) [Chronic Offender Component]
Targeting violent repeat offenders did not significantly reduce crime when implemented on its own.
Individuals – Williams-Taylor (2009)
Intensive supervision program for sex offenders has no significant impact on rates of general recidivism, sexual, violent, violent sexual or non-compliance recidivism
Jurisdiction – Beck et al. (2018)
High-intensity DUI enforcement in data-driven hot spots, along with media announcements promoting the intervention, did not lead to significant reductions in alcohol-related crashes
Micro Places – Bennett et al. (2017)
Mobile police van employing elements of hot spots policing and procedural justice did not significantly impact reported crime or community perceptions of police
Micro Places – Buerger (1994)
Problem-oriented policing in high crime addresses leads difference in calls for service in commercial treatment vs. control addresses, but small decline in residential calls in treatment area
Micro Places – Gerell (2016)
Actively monitored CCTV intervention did not significantly impact violent crime
Micro Places – Groff et al. (2015) (Foot patrol)
Foot patrol did not lead to reduction in violent crime
Micro Places – Groff et al. (2015) (Problem-Oriented Policing)
Problem-oriented policing did not lead to a reduction in violent crime, however likely due to weak implementation
Micro Places – Hunt et al. (2014)
Predictive policing found no statistical difference in property crime
Micro Places – Kyvsgaard et al. (2022)
Property marking program failed to reduce home burglaries
Micro Places – Lum et al. (2010)
Use of license plate readers mounted on patrol cars in auto theft hot spot areas not associated with declines in auto crime or crime generally in two jurisdictions
Micro Places – Phillips et al. (2016)
Targeted police raids within drug and violent crime hot spots did not significantly impact Part I crime
Micro Places – Ratcliffe et al. (2021)
The use of predictive policing software to target hot spots with police activity did not lead to significant reductions in violent or property crime
Micro Places – Rosenfeld et al. (2014) (Directed patrol only)
The directed patrol intervention had no significant impact on any of the outcome measures.
Micro Places – Santos & Santos (2016)
Offender-focused intervention within residential and property crime hot spots did not significantly impact overall crime or hot spot arrests
Micro Places – Schaefer et al. (2019)
Directed patrol at both city and suburban hot spots did not impact crime incidents or calls for service
Micro Places – Taylor et al. (2011) (Directed patrol)
Saturation/directed patrol in hot spots not associated with a significant decline in crime in the post-intervention period
Micro Places – Weisburd et al. (2012)
Broken windows policing had no evidence of an effect in calls for service
Neighborhood – Beck (2010)
DDACTS intervention did not lead to significant changes in crime incidents, calls for service, or traffic accidents
Neighborhood – Beck et al. (2022)
Neighborhood policing initiative had no significant impact on violent and property crime.
Neighborhood – Bennett (1990)
Lower socioeconomic status areas that tended to be higher in crime had less surveillance and less effective neighborhood watch programs
Neighborhood – Blair et al. (2021)
Community policing strategies did not reduce crime and victimization.
Neighborhood – Boyle et al. (2010)
Operation Ceasefire did not reduce gun violence as measured by gunshot wound admissions to the local trauma hospital.
Neighborhood – Guseynov (2010)
Initiative that concentrated resources and problem-solving activities on crime-prone areas did not have significant effects on crime.
Neighborhood – Kelling et al. (1974)
No difference in crime by beat based on the number of police cars assigned to random patrol.
Neighborhood – Mares & Blackburn (2021)
Acoustic Gunshot Detection System (AGDS) did not lead to crime reduction
Neighborhood – Mazerolle et al. (2003) [Shopfront Model]
The establishment of a police office in a community hub (e.g., shopping center, mall) did not lead to decreases in reported crime.
Neighborhood – McGarrell et al. (2001) [Directed Patrol]
General deterrence approach to directed police patrol, which focused on maximizing vehicle stops and enforcing traffic violations, did not reduce violent crime.
Neighborhood – Novak et al. (1999)
No decline in burglary or robbery following proactive disorder enforcement
Neighborhood – Pace (2010)
Order maintenance unit had no effect on offenses
Neighborhood – Pate et al. (1985) (Houston)
Monthly newsletter with crime data failed to reduce victimizations of recipients
Neighborhood – Pate et al. (1985) (Newark)
Monthly newsletter with crime data failed to reduce victimizations of recipients
Neighborhood – Pate et al. (1987)
Community block watch has no impact on crime
Neighborhood – Police Foundation (1981)
No difference in crime by number of foot patrol officers assigned
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Flint, MI]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Flint, Michigan, showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Guntersville, AL]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Guntersville, Alabama, showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Montgomery, MD]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Montgomery County, Maryland showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Sviridoff et al. (1992)
Crackdown on crack market, but no change in violent crime rate
Neighborhood – Tebes & Fagan (2022)
Significant reductions in stops and frisks did not increase felonies or violent misdemeanors while decreasing non-violent misdemeanors and reducing high school dropout rates
Neighborhood – Weisburd et al. (2008)
Risk-focused policing program targeting juvenile risk factors has no influence on self-reported delinquency
Neighborhood – Weisburd et al. (2015) – Beat level
Knowledge of where police officers patrolled did not affect directed patrol at the beat level
Neighborhood – Weiss & Freels (1996)
Aggressive traffic law enforcement had no impact on robbery or auto theft rates.
Neighborhood – Wycoff & Skogan (1993)
No decrease in victimization after increase in police-community meetings in target district
Individuals – Davis & Medina-Ariza (2001)
More elderly abuse incidents and calls to police reported in houses that receive home visit and education; those that receive home visits only call the police more, but don’t report more abuse
Individuals – Gottfredson et al. (2020)
Increase in school resource officers (SROs) led to an increase in drug and weapon-related offenses
Individuals – Hovell et al. (2006)
Those that receive Family Violence Response Team treatment have a 1.7 times greater rate of re-abuse
Individuals – Klein (1986)
More formal arrest processing increased recidivism
Individuals – Sherman et al. (2000) (Drunk Driving)
Restorative justice conference led to possible backfire effects (with caveats) in rehabilitating drunk drivers
Individuals – Sloboda et al. (2009)
Negative program effect for adolescent substance abuse prevention program on use of alcohol and cigarettes and no effect for marijuana use.
Individuals – Uchida et al. (2019)
Focused deterrence program led to quicker recidivism for treatment participants
Micro Places – Devlin & Gottfredson (2018)
Schools with resources officers associated with significantly higher rates of both recorded and reported crime
Micro Places – Sorg (2015)
GunStat program did not reduce violent crime during treatment period and was associated with significantly higher levels of gun crime during post-treatment period