Micro Places – Koper et al. (2013)
Short-term patrols with LPR devices reduced different crimes depending on how the LPRs were used
Micro Places – Morton, Luengen, & Mazerolle (2019)
Police partnerships with hoteliers to reduce drug and nuisance problems increased police engagement with hoteliers, hotelier reporting of crimes, and increased executed warrants. Effects decayed over time.
Micro Places – Rosenfeld et al. (2014) (Directed patrol + enforcement)
Directed patrol plus enforcement activities reduced total firearm violence, but produced no change in firearm robberies
Micro Places – Sherman & Rogan (1995)
Crack house raids reduced crime for about 12 days; crime reductions decayed quickly
Micro Places – Sherman et al. (1989)
Repeat Call Address Policing (RECAP) had no impact on calls at commercial addresses but reduced calls at residential addresses
Micro Places – Weisburd et al. (2021)
Assets Coming Together (ACT) program showed no difference in criminal incidents, but after adjusting for increased calls for service, it showed a significant reduction in crime
Micro Places – Wheeler & Phillips (2018)
Combination of automatic license plate readers and temporary roadblocks was associated with crime declines in some analyses and crime increases in others
Micro Places: Groff & Taniguchi (2019)
Citizen burglary notifications in high-risk areas did not reduce burglary in either of the two counties where it was tested but did produce a significant reduction when data from both counties was combined
Neighborhood – Johnson et al. (2017)
Target hardening in burglary-hit neighborhoods creates modest prevention effects in some places
Neighborhood – Banerjee et al. (2019)
Rotating sobriety checkpoints led to significant decreases in nighttime traffic crashes and deaths. However, there was some evidence to suggest that daytime crashes increased in these areas as well
Neighborhood – Blair et al. (2022)
A program enhancing coordination among local and state agencies led to significant reductions in unresolved and violent disputes at the community level, but not at the household level.
Neighborhood – Bogliaccini et al. (2022)
Police raids conducted in high-crime neighborhoods did not significantly impact violent crimes and had mixed effects on robberies.
Neighborhood – Josi et al. (2000)
Larceny and burglary drop in beats with increased traffic stops compared to routine patrol
Neighborhood – McCabe (2009)
One of two narcotics enforcement initiatives was successful in reducing crime
Neighborhood – Nunn et al. (2006)
Covert drug trafficking interdiction associated with an overall crime decline in target area, but an increase in drug-related calls for service
Neighborhood – Sedelmaier & Hipple (2016)
Data-driven foot patrol intervention with elements of POP was associated with decreases in crime in treatment areas, but similar decreases were observed in control areas
Groups — Circo et al. (2021)
Detroit Ceasefire did not have significant impacts on fatal and non-fatal shootings
Groups – Decker & Curry (2003)
Curfew and gun enforcement anti-gang initiative leads to a very limited significant crime change in target neighborhoods
Groups – Levchak (2021)
Pulling levers intervention targeting gun violence did not significantly impact murder, firearm robbery, or firearm assault rates
Individuals – Brame et al. (2015)
Court-imposed no-contact orders (NCOs) had no impact on victim safety or offender recidivism
Individuals – Brennan et al. (2018)
Early diversion program for low-risk female offenders did not significantly impact the probability of rearrest or the time to rearrest
Individuals – Broner et al. (2004)
Diversion program intended for adults with co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse disorders did not significantly impact criminal recidivism
Individuals – Davis & Taylor (1997)
Home visits after domestic violence failed to reduce repeat violence; Public education about domestic violence failed to reduce violence
Individuals – Davis et al. (2007)
No reduction in subsequent abuse for households that receive second responder within 24 hours or after 7 days
Individuals – Dunford (1992)
Arrest for domestic violence increased offense frequency at 12 months
Individuals – Giblin (2002)
Juveniles participating in CAN (police/probation partnership) were more likely to have new technical violations than were juveniles on regular probation
Individuals – Hirschel et al. (1990)
Arrest for domestic violence increases official recidivism
Individuals – Koppensteiner et al. (2019)
Second Responder Program did not have a significant impact on the number of domestic violence incidents recorded by police
Individuals – Pate et al. (1992)
Follow-up visits by detectives for spousal assault did not reduce subsequent victim-reported offenses, threats, or property damage
Individuals – Ridgeway et al. (2011)
Letter to gun buyers informing them about gun laws has no impact on likelihood gun will become crime gun
Individuals – Rose & Hamilton (1970)
Juvenile diversion and supervision program has no impact on juvenile recidivism
Individuals – Saunders et al. (2016)
Predictive policing intervention targeting individuals at high risk for gun violence did not significantly impact the likelihood of becoming a shooting or homicide victim
Individuals – Shanahan et al. (2017)
Cautioning strategy for cannabis offenses had no significant impact on self-reported cannabis use
Individuals – Small et al. (2019)
Removing firearms at the scene of IPV incidents was not significantly associated with subsequent IPV incidents
Individuals – Stover et al. (2009)
Domestic violence home-visit intervention (DVHVI) increased the likelihood of victims calling the police for subsequent incidents
Individuals – Stover et al. (2010)
Home visit program for domestic violence victims has no significant impact on reported violence
Individuals – Uchida & Swatt (2013) [Chronic Offender Component]
Targeting violent repeat offenders did not significantly reduce crime when implemented on its own.
Individuals – Williams-Taylor (2009)
Intensive supervision program for sex offenders has no significant impact on rates of general recidivism, sexual, violent, violent sexual or non-compliance recidivism
Jurisdiction – Beck et al. (2018)
High-intensity DUI enforcement in data-driven hot spots, along with media announcements promoting the intervention, did not lead to significant reductions in alcohol-related crashes
Micro Places – Buerger (1994)
Problem-oriented policing in high crime addresses leads difference in calls for service in commercial treatment vs. control addresses, but small decline in residential calls in treatment area
Micro Places – Groff et al. (2015) (Problem-Oriented Policing)
Problem-oriented policing did not lead to a reduction in violent crime, however likely due to weak implementation
Micro Places – Hunt et al. (2014)
Predictive policing found no statistical difference in property crime
Micro Places – Kyvsgaard et al. (2022)
Property marking program failed to reduce home burglaries
Micro Places – Phillips et al. (2016)
Targeted police raids within drug and violent crime hot spots did not significantly impact Part I crime
Micro Places – Ratcliffe et al. (2021)
The use of predictive policing software to target hot spots with police activity did not lead to significant reductions in violent or property crime
Micro Places – Santos & Santos (2016)
Offender-focused intervention within residential and property crime hot spots did not significantly impact overall crime or hot spot arrests
Neighborhood – Boyle et al. (2010)
Operation Ceasefire did not reduce gun violence as measured by gunshot wound admissions to the local trauma hospital.
Neighborhood – Guseynov (2010)
Initiative that concentrated resources and problem-solving activities on crime-prone areas did not have significant effects on crime.
Neighborhood – Novak et al. (1999)
No decline in burglary or robbery following proactive disorder enforcement
Neighborhood – Pace (2010)
Order maintenance unit had no effect on offenses
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Flint, MI]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Flint, Michigan, showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Guntersville, AL]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Guntersville, Alabama, showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Saunders et al. (2017) [Montgomery, MD]
Drug Market Initiative (DMI) in Montgomery County, Maryland showed no significant differences in crime rates compared to control areas
Neighborhood – Sviridoff et al. (1992)
Crackdown on crack market, but no change in violent crime rate
Neighborhood – Weisburd et al. (2008)
Risk-focused policing program targeting juvenile risk factors has no influence on self-reported delinquency
Individuals – Davis & Medina-Ariza (2001)
More elderly abuse incidents and calls to police reported in houses that receive home visit and education; those that receive home visits only call the police more, but don’t report more abuse
Individuals – Hovell et al. (2006)
Those that receive Family Violence Response Team treatment have a 1.7 times greater rate of re-abuse
Individuals – Klein (1986)
More formal arrest processing increased recidivism
Individuals – Uchida et al. (2019)
Focused deterrence program led to quicker recidivism for treatment participants
Micro Places – Sorg (2015)
GunStat program did not reduce violent crime during treatment period and was associated with significantly higher levels of gun crime during post-treatment period