**ABSTRACT**

Two principles should form the bedrock for effective policing in a democratic society. The first is that crimes averted, not arrests made, should be the primary metric for judging police effectiveness. The second is that citizens’ views about the police and their tactics for preventing crime and disorder matter independently of police effectiveness. Each principle is important in its own right and supported by research evidence. Neither has standing to trump the other and must be balanced on a case-by-case basis. In turn, these two principles should guide twenty-first-century efforts to reinvent American policing. Seven steps are essential to reinvention of democratic policing: Prioritize crime prevention over arrest. Create and install systems that monitor citizen reactions to the police and routinely report results back to the public and police supervisors and officers. Reform training and redefine the “craft of policing.” Recalibrate organizational incentives. Strengthen accountability with greater transparency. Incorporate the analysis of crime and citizen reaction into managerial practice. Strengthen national-level research and evaluation.

This is a tumultuous period for policing. Deadly use of force by police in Ferguson, New York City, North Charleston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, and other cities has led to protests, heated debates, riots,
and questioning of police tactics. Citizens and politicians have called for changes to make the police more accountable and transparent. President Obama in 2014 convened a special task force to make recommendations for the reform of policing in America, specifically concerning police legitimacy and community policing (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 2015).

At the same time, there have been upticks in crime in Baltimore, St. Louis, Los Angeles, and elsewhere. In combination, concerns over deadly force and upward trends in crime have reopened a recurring question about policing in a democratic society: How can police maintain the community’s trust and confidence while at the same time effectively preventing crime and keeping citizens safe? In difficult times, discourse often focuses on one objective while the other recedes into the background. Today, the focus is on citizens’ confidence in and trust of the police. At other times, especially when crime is on the rise or the threat of terrorism looms, the emphasis is on public safety. But both objectives are fundamental. Accordingly, in this essay we argue that neither goal should have standing to trump the other.

Reorienting police practices toward achieving and balancing both goals requires fundamental changes in the functions, values, and operations of law enforcement. Toward this end, we put forth a seven-point blueprint for reinventing American policing, guided by two principles that are grounded in decades of research and law enforcement experience:

**PRINCIPLE 1.** — *Crime Prevention—Not Arrests—Is Paramount:* Crimes averted, not arrests made, should be the primary metric for judging police success in meeting their objectives to prevent, control, and deter crime and disorder.

**PRINCIPLE 2.** — *Citizen Reaction Matters:* Citizen response to the police and their tactics for preventing crime and improving public order matter independent of police effectiveness in these functions.

Principle 1 follows from Cesare Beccaria’s observation 250 years ago that “it is better to prevent crimes than to punish them” ([1764] 1995, p. 103). Punishment is costly to all involved: society at large, which must pay for it; the individual who must endure it; and the police whose time is diverted from their crime prevention function. While arrests play a role in the crime prevention function of the police, arrests also signify
a failure of prevention; if crimes are prevented in the first place, so are arrests and all of the ensuing costs of punishment (Nagin 2013; Nagin, Solow, and Lum 2015).

Principle 1 does not imply that police should stop making arrests. An additional important function of the police is to bring perpetrators of crime to justice, as the police certainly cannot prevent all crimes. However, a steady accumulation of evidence over three decades suggests that proactive prevention activities are more effective in preventing crime than are reactive arrests. Proactive policing focuses on people, places, times, and situations at high risk of offending, victimization, or disorder. Proactive policing stands in sharp contrast to reactive approaches in that it tries to address problems before they beget further crimes through a wide variety of strategies that often do not emphasize arrest.

Principle 2 emphasizes that police in democracies are responsible not only for preventing crime but also for maintaining their credibility with all segments of the citizenry. The objective of maintaining trust and confidence means that citizen reaction to what the police do is critical to judging police effectiveness independent of their success in preventing and solving crime. Citizen trust and confidence may facilitate police effectiveness in preventing crime (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Meares 2013, 2015). However, trust and confidence are independent criteria for judging police performance. The overriding objective of policing should be to create a safe democratic society, not a safe police state.

An additional potential candidate principle to guide reinvention of American policing would enshrine the importance of lawful policing. We decided against declaring a third fundamental principle emphasizing lawfulness. Instead, we treat lawfulness as a constraint, namely, that police should not engage in practices that are illegal. Meares (2013) similarly discusses “rightful policing.” We treat lawfulness as a constraint rather than as a principle for several reasons. Viewing lawfulness that way makes it clear that illegal practices or policies should under no circumstances be condoned even if they otherwise advance pursuit of principle 1 or 2. Circumstances may require a balancing of principles, but this should not be achieved by resort to illegal practices or policies. However, we have other reasons as well. Police training, procedures, and metrics of success have been tailored to achieving legality but with little attention paid to their implications for advancing principles 1 and 2. Our proposals are designed to correct this inattention but without sacrificing legality.
In putting forth these two principles, we are aware of the difficulty of what must be done to achieve them. Each of the three core functions of police—preventing crime, bringing perpetrators to justice, and maintaining credibility and trust with the public—is significant in its own right, but all are highly interdependent. If police are ineffective in apprehending perpetrators, their preventive effectiveness may be eroded. At the same time, commitments of time and resources to apprehending perpetrators, particularly for minor crimes, may come at the expense of crime prevention. Maintaining trust and credibility within the community may be tied to the ability of the police to prevent crime and bring perpetrators to justice, but trust may be eroded when police spend too much time arresting individuals for minor crimes or stopping and frisking significant segments of the population. Some police-citizen encounters are hostile through no fault of the officer, including when police have to make arrests.

The difficulty in pursuing these two principles is compounded by policing’s complex organization and the many important responsibilities of police that are not directly related to crime control (e.g., traffic safety, responding to medical emergencies, dealing with disputes and conflicts, and assisting mentally ill and homeless citizens). Balancing the two principles means doing so within the context of these activities, not outside of them. How police perform in all of their responsibilities may influence their effectiveness in preventing crime and maintaining public trust and credibility.

Our seven-point blueprint for advancing both principles is summarized below. It is anchored in relevant research evidence. We begin in Section I with a discussion of the function and costs of arrest followed by critical analysis in Section II of the evidence on police effectiveness in preventing crime and maintaining order. Others have analyzed this research in detail (Sherman and Eck 2002; National Research Council 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Lum, Koper, and Telep 2011; Nagin 2013). We discuss it primarily to emphasize that police deployment should be grounded in proactive problem solving rather than in reactive response and arrest. In Section III, we discuss thought-provoking evidence on citizen reactions to police activity and strategies to improve trust and confidence. In Section IV, we discuss two controversial strategies that challenge our two principles: broken windows policing and stop, question, and frisk, especially in the context of relations between police and minority communities. We conclude with seven proposals for reinventing American policing.
Reinventing American Policing

PROPOSAL 1.—Prioritize Crime Prevention over Arrest: Police should focus their efforts, reforms, and resources on sentinel-like activities that prevent crime and thereby avert the need for arrests and their ensuing costs.

PROPOSAL 2.—Create and Install Systems to Monitor Citizen Reactions to the Police and Routinely Report Results: Police should routinely, systematically, and rigorously survey citizens on their reactions to policing in general and to specific tactics and regularly report results and actions that will be taken to foster favorable citizen responses and remediate negative responses.

PROPOSAL 3.—Reform Training and Redefine the “Craft” of Policing: Officers should be trained and socialized to believe that the fundamental goals of policing include not only arrests of perpetrators of serious crime but also prevention and maintenance of good community relations.

PROPOSAL 4.—Recalibrate Organizational Incentives: Organizational incentives, including rewards, promotions, and informal incentives, must be altered to incorporate measures of effective crime prevention and maintenance of citizen confidence and support.

PROPOSAL 5.—Strengthen Accountability with More Transparency: Police accountability must be made more transparent by increasing the availability of data and policies related to police-citizen interactions, particularly when they involve the use of force; communicating more effectively to the public about the outcomes of investigations into allegations of police misconduct; reassessing systems of discipline and review that impede the ability of agencies to learn from mistakes; and using improved data analysis for better supervision and management.

PROPOSAL 6.—Incorporate Analyses of Crime and Citizen Reaction into Managerial Practice: All law enforcement officials from patrol officers to chief executives need greater access to reliable analyses of crime locations and trends and the effectiveness of police tactics; this requires substantial increases in resources and in the standing of crime analysis units within police departments as well as expanded collection and monitoring of data on citizen reactions to the police.

PROPOSAL 7.—Strengthening National-Level Research and Evaluation: A robust infrastructure of research and its dissemination is essential if major advances are to be made.
I. The Function and Costs of Arrest

Arrest serves two important functions: bringing perpetrators of crime to justice and reinforcing the capacity of the police to deter crime through the threat of apprehension. The legal authority to arrest is a defining and dominant feature of the policing function (Bittner 1970; Reiss 1971). It is institutionalized in deployment and investigations, training, performance metrics and rewards, and organizational characteristics. Less well recognized by police and politicians is that arrests are costly for society as a whole, the person arrested, and the police themselves. Thus, our first principle follows Beccaria’s admonishment: by emphasizing crime prevention, we try to avert the need for arrest in the first place. Particularly for serious crimes with identifiable victims, prevention averts losses and suffering, avoids expense to society of the perpetrator’s punishment, and reduces costs associated with offenders’ reentry into society.

Police, however, cannot prevent all crime, which makes some arrests inevitable. Even so, it is important to recognize that most arrests are not for serious crimes. In 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) reported more than 11.3 million arrests. Of these, 4.3 percent were for “part I index” violent offenses (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and 13.8 percent were for part I index property offenses (burglary and thefts). These crimes are mostly felonies with identifiable victims. The FBI also collects arrest statistics for “part II offenses,” many of which are misdemeanors and ordinance violations that often have no identifiable victim. These arrests make up the vast majority of apprehensions, the most common of which are drug abuse and vice violations, a range of disorderly conduct, simple assaults, and a catchall category of “all other violations (nontraffic).”

The great majority of arrests are for less serious offenses because such arrests are open to greater discretion and often result from policy choices. But sound policy choices should be based on weighing of costs and benefits. Arrests for minor infractions do not come without costs. Time spent


2 Part II offenses include other assaults, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, buying, receiving and possessing stolen property, vandalism, carrying and possessing weapons, prostitution and commercialized vice, sex offenses (except forcible rape and prostitution), drug sales, possession and use, gambling, offenses against the family and children, driving under the influence, liquor laws, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, all other offenses (except traffic), suspicion, curfew and loitering law violations, and runaways.
processing an arrest takes police off the street and away from activities that might prevent serious crime. This translates into costs to future victims whose crimes may have been prevented with these resources. While we know of no formal studies of the time required to process arrests for minor infractions, we conducted informal surveys of one small and four medium-sized police departments that yielded consistent responses of between 2 and 4 hours spent by officers per arrest for minor offenses. In 2013, there were 9.2 million arrests for nonindex, part II offenses. Arrests for minor crimes, therefore, take a major bite out of officers’ time.

Police officers’ time and lost crime prevention opportunities, however, are only the beginning of the criminal justice costs associated with arrest. Few arrestees serve time in state prisons because of the low severity of the arrest charges, but many end up serving time in local jails, particularly before trial, including for cases ultimately dismissed. Most public and academic attention focuses on the causes and consequences of the fivefold increase in the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons since 1973. Less well recognized is the comparable growth in jail populations. In 1980, the jail population was about 182,000. By 2011, it was over 730,000. Adjusting for general population growth, the increase in the jail population was about the same as that for state and federal prisons. Nationwide this translates into billions of dollars per year of increased spending by local governments to pay for a half-million-person increase in the jail population.

The increase in arrests for drug possession was one driver of the growth in jail populations. Chauhan et al. (2014) report that about 50 percent of misdemeanor arrests in urban areas result in a conviction and about a third of convictions involve a sentence with incarceration. Between 1983 and 2002, the latest year for which a detailed survey of jail populations is available, the share of inmates in jails held for violent and property crimes declined from 69.3 to 49.4 percent. By contrast, the percentage held for drug offenses grew from 9.3 to 24.7 percent. While trafficking accounted for the largest share of drug offenses, possession was a close second. In 1983, possession accounted for 4 percent of the jail population. By 2002, that had grown to 10.8 percent. A more recent Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) sponsored survey suggests that the share of jail inmates incarcerated for drug offenses has remained at about 25 percent (Beck et al. 2013, table 9, p. 19).

The percentage of jail inmates held for public-order offenses remained steady at about 20 percent from 1983 to 2002, but the number of people
being held grew enormously because of the growth of the total jail population. Assuming that 20 percent of the jail population are incarcerated for public-order offenses, the jail population for drug and public-order offenses grew from about 66,000 in 1983 to about 327,000 in 2011. Corrected for the growth in the general population, that is a fourfold increase over three decades.

Other costs include the consequences of misdemeanor arrests for arrestees themselves. These include the costs of legal representation, bail, and time spent, possibly at the expense of work, attending legal hearings (Kohler-Hausmann 2013). Misdemeanor arrests also affect eligibility for student loans, public housing, and professional licensure (Natapoff 2012). A misdemeanor arrest record may also carry a stigma in the labor market (Uggen et al. 2014).

Balanced against the cost of arrests are two benefits of apprehension: bringing perpetrators of crime to justice and reinforcing police capacity to deter crime through the threat of apprehension. Concerning the first, crime clearance rates for serious crimes have remained largely unchanged for more than four decades despite significant fluctuations in the index crime rate (Braga et al. 2011). That stability reflects the reality that most crimes are solved by the apprehension of the perpetrator at the scene of the crime or by eyewitness identification (Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia 1977). Capture at the scene might be improved by more rapid responses to service calls, but efforts to do this have not been successful (Kansas City Police Department 1977; Spelman and Brown 1981). As for improvements in solution rates by better postcrime investigation, Eck (1992) concluded that “it is unlikely that improvements in the way investigations are conducted or managed have a dramatic effect on crime or criminal justice” (p. 33). For these reasons, innovations in policing for the purpose of increasing police effectiveness in bringing the perpetrators of crime to justice are not part of our blueprint. Advances in forensics and other technologies may ultimately produce significant improvements in solution rates, but we are skeptical of that happening anytime soon.

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1 Cronin et al. (2007, p. 12) reported that homicide clearance rates have declined steadily since the 1960s from 92 percent in 1961 to 61 percent in 2005. Further investigation of UCR data by Lum and Vovak (2014) indicates that clearance rates for assaults and burglaries declined only slightly from 1981 to 2011, from 61 percent to almost 60 percent for assaults and from 16 percent to 14 percent for burglary. Clearance rates for robbery incidents fluctuated steadily within the 30–35 percent range.

4 One optimistic example is systematic use of genetic evidence from rape kits to facilitate sexual assault investigations.
Concerning the second benefit of apprehension, arrest may be viewed by the police and citizens as providing a deterrent to the person arrested and to others. Criminologists refer to the former as “specific” deterrence and the latter as “general” deterrence. Concerning specific deterrence, there is some evidence that being arrested causes juveniles, especially those who are inexperienced offenders, to increase their perception of the risk of apprehension and thereby deter minor offending (Smith and Gartin 1989; Nagin 2013). There may also be a specific deterrent effect of arrest for certain types of domestic violence offenders (e.g., those who are employed) but not others (Sherman and Eck 2002).

Concerning general deterrence, the story is more complicated. In the early years of empirical deterrence research, investigators correlated or regressed crime rates on arrests per crime. These studies found evidence of deterrent-like effects but had fatal statistical flaws that made them uninterpretable (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978). Another flaw first pointed out by Cook (1977), and later elaborated on by Nagin, Solow, and Lum (2015), is that arrests per crime, like its close cousin the clearance rate, measures only apprehension risk for crimes that actually occur. Would-be offenders do not pick targets for crime randomly. Deterrence research shows that even though apprehension itself may not have strong deterrent effects, perceptions of apprehension risk figure heavily in offender decision making. Targets with a low risk of apprehension are preferred (Wright and Decker 1994; Nagin 1998). Thus, crime solution rates for chosen targets do not measure what the apprehension rate would have been for targets that were not selected because the risk of apprehension was deemed too high.

This distinction is important for evaluating police effectiveness in preventing crime. The targeted and proactive policing strategies discussed in the next section are intended to make crime targets less attractive by heightening apprehension risk. Nagin, Solow, and Lum (2015) illustrate that targeted, proactive policing can strategically alter apprehension risk across opportunities for crime in a way that reduces both crime and arrests.

Reductions in crime and arrests may be accompanied by a reduction in the clearance rate. This may occur because offenders are victimizing only the remaining small fraction of total criminal opportunities that are

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5 Among these were a failure to distinguish cause from effect and the presence of crimes in the numerator of the crime rate and the denominator of the arrest per crime ratio.
characterized by very low risk of apprehension. We emphasize the reduction in the clearance rate to reiterate that arrest-based metrics such as the clearance rate are flawed measures of police effectiveness in preventing crime.

Some circumstances, of course, require police to make an arrest, particularly if the arrestee is suspected of committing or is known to have committed a serious crime. Our point, however, is that there are significant costs to arrests and that their crime control effectiveness is often not demonstrable. We can avoid these costs and affect crime control by preventing crimes in the first place (Durlauf and Nagin 2011).

II. Preventing Crime and Disorder

Nagin (2013) distinguishes two distinct crime control functions of the police. The first requires police to act as “apprehension agents” for perpetrators of crimes. The second involves the police preventing crimes from occurring in the first place. In this role police can be described as “sentinels,” who provide guardianship for potential targets, thereby mitigating opportunities for crime. Much of the literature on how police prevent, control, and deter crime and disorder (consistently with principle 1) focuses on their sentinel role. One area of research addresses the effect of police numbers on crime rates. A second examines the effects of police deployment tactics on crime—especially in targeted geographic areas and on repeat offenders. The third concerns police efforts to reduce crime by proactive policing against disorder, sometimes called broken windows or zero-tolerance policing. We focus in this section on the latter two literatures because our proposals pertain to how police can best be used to honor principles 1 and 2 rather than on changing the number of police. The consistent conclusion of research on police numbers and crime is that increases in police presence decrease crime, and decreases in police presence are associated with crime increases (Sherman 1992; Apel and Nagin 2011; Nagin 2013). Police presence—an essential element of the sentinel role of policing—can affect crime rates.

A. Police Deployment Tactics to Deter and Prevent Crime

In this discussion, we draw heavily on reviews of this research by Sherman and Eck (2002), Weisburd and Eck (2004), Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau (2014), and the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix (Lum 2009; Lum,

Proactive targeting more effectively prevents crime than do traditional react, investigate, and arrest approaches. “Hot spots” policing provides one example of a targeted, proactive deployment strategy for which there is good evidence of effectiveness. Hot spots policing involves increased police presence at places in which crime concentrates. The idea stems from a striking empirical regularity uncovered by Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) when they found that only 3 percent of addresses and intersections (“places”) in Minneapolis produced 50 percent of all calls to the police. Numerous studies since then have found similar evidence of hot spots (e.g., Weisburd and Green 1995; Eck, Gersh, and Taylor 2000; Roncek 2000; Weisburd 2015) and their stability over time (Weisburd et al. 2004). The rationale for concentrating police in hot spots is to create a prohibitively high risk of apprehension by increasing the level of guardianship at a place with high levels of criminal opportunities.

Sherman and Weisburd (1995) conducted the first test of the efficacy of concentrating police resources on crime hot spots. In this randomized experiment, hot spots in the experimental group received, on average, a doubling of police patrol intensity compared with hot spots in the control group. Declines in total crime calls in experimental spots ranged from 6 to 13 percent compared to controls. In another randomized experiment, Weisburd and Green (1995) found that hot spots policing was similarly effective in suppressing disorder at drug markets without leading to displacement of crime elsewhere. These early studies triggered great interest in and many evaluations of hot spots policing.

Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau (2014) summarize findings from 19 experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations of hot spots policing. Seventeen were US-based, and half involved randomized experiments. Twenty of 25 tests from these evaluations found significant reductions in crime and disorder, leading them to conclude, “Hot spots policing strategies generate small but noteworthy crime reductions, and these crime control benefits diffuse into the areas immediately surrounding the crime hot spots” (p. 633). Subsequent evidence indicates that police do not have

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6 One important concern is that hot spots policing not prevent crime by displacing it geographically (Weisburd 2002; Weisburd et al. 2006). There is no evidence of such displacement to places adjacent to the locations of heightened enforcement. The evidence points the other way, to crime reductions in adjacent places without heightened police
to stay in hot spots all day; intermittent and unpredictable stays of 12–15 minutes may optimize their residual deterrent effects (Koper 1995; Telep, Mitchell, and Weisburd 2014).

What police do at hot spots matters for both prevention and community reactions. This is shown by the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix, in which Lum and her colleagues gather and annually update evaluations of police-involved interventions to deter and prevent crime that reach at least a moderate threshold of methodological rigor. Studies are then “mapped” into a three-dimensional visualization called the Matrix, which categorizes interventions along three common characteristics of police crime control activities: whether the intervention is proactive or reactive, its intended target (e.g., places, people, groups), and the level of focus or specificity. A detailed explanation appears in Lum, Koper, and Telep (2011) and Lum and Koper (2017).

The Matrix shows that the greatest concentration of statistically significant positive effects is for interventions that increase police presence at crime hot spots and are focused, tailored, and proactive. When police geographically target high-crime places and do so with tactics tailored to the problems at hand, they are more effective in preventing crime (Weisburd and Eck 2004; Braga and Bond 2008; Weisburd et al. 2010; Taylor, Koper, and Woods 2011; Braga, Welsh, and Schnell 2015).

Tailored and focused approaches often encompass proactive “problem-solving” or “problem-oriented” strategies. Originally articulated by Goldstein (1979, 1990), problem-oriented policing involves careful police analysis of crime problems with direction of police and other resources to resolving underlying factors that contribute to those problems. Eck and Spelman (1987) developed the “SARA” model, an acronym highlighting the process of problem solving (“scanning,” “analysis,” “response,” and “assessment”). Problem-oriented policing emphasizes the first “A”—analysis—as paramount for understanding patterns of opportunity for crime and assessing the effectiveness of responses.

Much of problem-oriented policing is based on the premise that crime can be averted by changing malleable features of the social or physical environment or people’s routines that contribute to criminal opportunities (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Brantingham and Brantingham 1993; presence (Bowers et al. 2011; Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2014; Telep, Mitchell, and Weisburd 2014)


Felson 1994, 1995). Changes might include improving lighting, closing problem bars, increasing closed-circuit television surveillance, or adjusting spatial and temporal patterns of police patrol. These approaches are wide ranging and may include the use of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1980, 1995, 1997) and “crime prevention through environmental design” (Jeffery 1971; Newman 1972; Crowe and Zahm 1994; National Crime Prevention Council 1997). These approaches require the police to play a role in understanding the causes and nature of criminal opportunities at places and then engage in “opportunity mitigation.” Such activities involve adjusting their levels or types of guardianship in a particular location or changing aspects of the environment, sometimes with the help of residents.

Tailored and problem-solving approaches can also include what Maze-rolle and Ransley (2005, 2006) describe as “third-party” policing in which police collaborate with regulatory authorities to alter or eliminate malleable features of the social and physical environment that facilitate crime. Buerger and Mazzerolle (1998) describe third-party policing as “police efforts to persuade or coerce organizations or non-offending persons, such as public housing agencies, property owners, parents, health and building inspectors, and business owners to take some responsibility for preventing crime” (p. 301). Police might seek or legally coerce the cooperation of hotel and apartment managers, business owners, city facilities and services, or community groups to make changes in the social or physical environment to reduce crime opportunities. Law enforcement can collaborate with private security officers, who in some places concentrate in sufficient numbers to disrupt opportunity structures that promote crime (Cook and MacDonald 2011). These efforts might include developing formal partnerships with security entities in business improvement districts (MacDonald et al. 2009) or informal partnerships with security personnel in stores, bars, or malls.

Finally, proactive approaches can involve targeting problem people, a strategy sometimes described as “focused deterrence,” which has its origins in Operation Ceasefire, a Boston-based intervention designed to prevent gun violence among rival gangs (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996; Kennedy 2011). Tactics involve a “pulling all levers” approach. Some levers involve deterrence strategies such as threatening repeat

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7 See a myriad of strategies at the Center for Problem Oriented Policing (http://www.popcenter.org/).
offenders with harsh sanctions and providing high levels of formal supervision. Others involve nonpunitive elements such as making social services available and messaging about the problems and consequences of gang involvement. Pulling all levers thus requires police to collaborate with multiple nonpolicing agencies (Braga et al. 2001; Braga, Kennedy, and Tita 2002). A review of 10 focused deterrence studies that targeted “hot people” concluded that nine significantly reduced crime (Braga and Weisburd 2012). The authors, however, were cautious about the strength of the overall findings because of weaknesses in the study designs. Like other problem-solving strategies, focused deterrence approaches vary depending on the types of offenders and crimes being addressed. More recent studies support focused deterrence. Braga, Hureau, and Papa­christos (2014), Groff et al. (2014), and Papachristos and Kirk (2015) found significant effects of focused deterrence on violent crime.

Many forms of proactive and problem-oriented policing that have been shown to be effective involve police operating as sentinels rather than as apprehension agents, with a focus on “hot” places or people. In hot spots where crime opportunities are abundant, the police may be the sole sentinels, as these places often lack effective guardianship by residents. Reactive arrest is not the only—or even the most efficacious—option. Police can affect crime when they act in ways that mitigate crime opportunities at places or with individuals, thus discouraging motivated offenders from acting on criminal opportunities in the first place.

B. Broken Windows Policing and Stop, Question, and Frisk

Being proactive, however effective it may be, raises important concerns. Being proactive necessarily involves making discretionary decisions about groups to focus on, problems to tackle, and behavior of police that can introduce bias, inequity, illegality, or questionable practices. At the beginning of this essay, we stressed that honoring principles 1 and 2 requires that police not engage in practices that are illegal. Proactive approaches could also lead to more, not fewer, arrests.

One area of proactive policing in which police roles as apprehension agents and sentinels become blurred is cases in which police make large numbers of arrests, usually for minor crimes such as disorderly conduct or drug possession, with the ultimate goal of preventing serious crime. Sometimes this approach is used at crime hot spots. While maintaining order and reducing public nuisance have been a long-standing function of the police, a seminal article by Wilson and Kelling (1982) tied this
function to the prevention of serious crime. Wilson and Kelling likened disorder and public nuisance to a “broken window” that attracts further acts of vandalism or crime. They argued that when left unchecked, disorder and public nuisances may likewise set the stage for serious crime. What has come to be called “broken windows” or “zero-tolerance” policing is premised on this theory that proactive policing against disorder and public nuisances pays larger dividends in prevention of serious crime. While Kelling and others have argued that policing disorder can involve problem-solving strategies and not just making large numbers of arrests (Kelling and Coles 1996; White, Fradella, and Coldren 2015), the latter form of broken windows policing has been widely adopted and has been the subject of much controversy. We thus single it out for special attention.

Beginning in the early 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, zero-tolerance policies became increasingly popular with police departments, the general population, and elected officials. Their popularity in the United States led to their diffusion to the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Jones and Newburn 2007; Martinez 2011) and can be seen in the increase of arrests for minor crimes since 1980. Clearance rates for serious crimes have remained largely unchanged for decades, and arrest rates for part I index crimes have consistently followed crime rate patterns more generally. Figure 1 illustrates this for robbery. Observe the close correspondence between the offense rate and the arrest rate. Similar patterns can be shown for homicide, assault, burglary, and larceny.

Figure 2 shows the correspondence between the combined violent and property part I index crime rate and the arrest rate for all crimes not in this index. There is not a close correspondence between the arrest rates for nonindex offenses and for part I crimes. While the two rates have tracked each other since 2000, from 1980 to about 2000, the nonindex arrest rate rose even though the total index crime rate fell. The reason is that there has been enormous growth in arrests for several classes of less serious crimes over the past three decades.

Arrests rose disproportionately for drug possession. The arrest rate for drug possession or use doubled from 1980 to 2012. Two other cat-

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8 We exclude arrests for part II sex offenses, crimes against family and children, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, weapons offenses, and runaways from our calculation, as these might be considered more serious crimes, or in the case of runaways, a special category of incident. These make up 6–8 percent of arrests for part II offenses.
egories of nonindex arrests also grew substantially. The simple assault arrest rate increased by 77.6 percent, which might be explained, in part, by an increase in mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence. A much larger, catchall category labeled as “all other offenses (except traffic)” increased by 40.7 percent.

Fig. 1.—Robbery rate and arrest rate for robbery (multiplied threefold) per 100,000 population, 1980–2012. Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, various years.

Fig. 2.—Total index (part I violent and property) crime rate and total arrest rate for all part II offenses, 1980–2012. Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, various years. The asterisk signifies that the following part II offenses are excluded: sex offenses, crimes against family and children, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, weapons offenses, and runaways.
Another indicator of the increased emphasis on arrests for nonindex crimes is an increase in the ratio of part II arrests to part I arrests. Figure 3 shows the ratio of the part II arrest rate (as adjusted in fig. 2) to the part I arrest rate. In 1980, the ratio was 3.4. By 2006, it was 5.6. Since then it has declined to 4.6 but remains well above the 1980 level. The increase in emphasis on policing against certain categories of nonindex crimes coincided with the drop in the part I index crime rate beginning in the early 1990s. This has resulted in a drop in the share of total arrests attributable to index crimes from 22.4 percent in 1980 to 17.8 percent in 2012.

The relevant question is whether this type of proactive policing is useful in carrying out the prevention function of the police compared with other preventive alternatives. There is no uncertainty about the association between disorder and crime; places that have more disorder also have more serious crime. What is uncertain is whether the correlation of crime and disorder across places and over time is a reflection of a common set of underlying causes such as poverty, social disorganization, or even ineffective policing, or whether the relationship is causal—specifically, that disorder leads to serious crime.

Empirically distinguishing these alternative explanations is difficult. It is practically and ethically impossible to subject communities to different levels of disorder in order to observe whether manipulation of disorder affects levels of crime. If such a manipulation were possible, we could ob-

![Fig. 3.—Ratio of adjusted part II arrest rate to part I arrest rate. Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, various years.](image-url)
serve whether crime rates dropped in communities in which disorder decreased and rose in communities in which it increased. Because such an experiment is impossible, elaborate statistical methods instead must be used to analyze nonexperimental data to try to sort out the degree to which disorder breeds crime.

Such analyses have yielded diverse conclusions. Skogan (1990) concluded that there was a causal relationship, but Harcourt (2001) reexamined Skogan’s data and concluded that there was no significant relationship. Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found that the association between crime and disorder, including for homicide, vanished once neighborhood characteristics were taken into account. They concluded, “Rather than conceive of disorder as a direct cause of crime, we view many elements of disorder as part and parcel of crime itself” (p. 638). They also observed that “attacking public order through tough police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime” (p. 637). More recently, Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008) in a number of field experiments seem to find a link between disorder conditions and crime, especially when disorder conditions are allowed to spread or linger. Yang (2010), using a longitudinal approach, questioned a direct and consistent link between disorder and crime. Even James Q. Wilson acknowledged the lack of evidence in an interview in which he stated, “I still to this day do not know if improving order will or will not reduce crime. People have not understood that this was a speculation” (quoted in Hurley [2004]).

Some tests of the effects of policing interventions against disorder provide indirect evidence. These studies come in two forms. One analyzes nonexperimental data by statistically relating crime rates to misdemeanor arrest rates. Kelling and Sousa (2001) used precinct-level data for New York City to examine whether higher rates of misdemeanor arrest were associated with lower levels of crime after taking account of other characteristics of the precinct. They concluded that aggressive misdemeanor arrests substantially reduced serious crime. Corman and Mocan (2002), who also analyzed New York City data, reached a similar conclusion. Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo (2007) found only a modest effect. Fagan and Davies (2003) and Harcourt and Ludwig (2005) found no evidence of an effect.

The Harcourt and Ludwig study is notable because it includes an analysis of the data used by Kelling and Sousa (2001). They concluded that the substantial crime prevention effect identified by Kelling and Sousa
may have been no more than regression to the mean. The largest increases in misdemeanor arrest rates occurred in precincts with the largest increases in violent crime in the 1980s and that subsequently experienced the largest decreases for reasons unrelated to intensive misdemeanor policing. The Harcourt and Ludwig critique pertains to all the studies based on nonexperimental data: the misdemeanor arrest rate may be driven by the overall crime rate, which makes it difficult to distinguish whether the association reflects cause, effect, or neither.

We add one more important shortcoming of these studies: they do not account for other innovations in policing that might have contributed to crime reduction. The data used by Kelling and Sousa and by Harcourt and Ludwig cover a period of numerous innovations in policing heralded by the “Compstat” era ushered in by William Bratton. Even if policing was a major factor in crime reduction in New York City, as argued, for example, by Zimring (2012), the studies cannot reliably account for the distinctive contribution of aggressive misdemeanor arrest policing because these other innovations were not taken into consideration.

This then brings us to the hot spots policing experiments in which order maintenance policing and aggressive arrests for misdemeanors may have played a part. Many of these experiments did not explicitly manipulate or detail what police did when patrolling hot spots. Rather, they focused on measuring the effects of changes in the “dosage” of police presence. For example, in the first hot spots experiments by Sherman and Weisburd (1995), police presence was doubled at the hot spots assigned to heightened police presence. What police did while there was left to their discretion. Two experiments, Braga et al. (1999) and Braga and Bond (2008), however, do include aggressive misdemeanor arrest policing as part of a plethora of proactive police activities to reduce crime at hot spots. Both found crime prevention effects. This conclusion could be interpreted as demonstrating the effectiveness of broken windows policing. The difficulty with this interpretation is that in both of these experiments the proactive policing treatment also included other sentinel-

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9 In this context, regression to the mean refers to the police responding to a random increase in crime at a specific location by increasing the intensity of misdemeanor arrest activity at that location. If crime subsequently subsides at that location, the decline may be in whole or in part attributable to crime returning to its normal level rather than to increased police activity.
style policing activities designed to increase guardianship or mitigate opportunities in ways that did not emphasize arrest as the active ingredient. Thus, these experiments cannot tell us the contribution of aggressive misdemeanor policing per se to the overall reduction in crime and social disorder and improvements to quality of life in public spaces.

More speculative inferences, however, are possible with mediation analysis, which can be used to examine how each component of the total package of treatments might moderate the effects of the treatment (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). Using this method, Braga and Bond (2008, p. 578) concluded that “the strongest crime-prevention gains were generated by situational prevention strategies rather than by misdemeanor arrests or social service strategies” (see also Braga, Welsh, and Schnell 2015). In an experimental study comparing problem-oriented policing with directed patrol, Taylor, Koper, and Woods (2011) found that problem-oriented policing created significant effects with no increase in field stops. Haberman (2015) found in Philadelphia that certain types of offender-based enforcement activities at crime hot spots (pedestrian and traffic stops, quality of life arrests, and felony arrests) may have increased violent crime at those places.

Most recently, Braga, Welsh, and Schnell (2015) conducted a systematic review of high-quality research evaluating disorder policing. They conclude that the strongest effects were generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places and that aggressive order maintenance strategies targeting individual disorderly behaviors did not generate significant crime reductions. The bottom line is that policing tactics that emphasize arrest for misdemeanors do not appear to be as effective as tactics designed to enhance guardianship or mitigate opportunities without arrest.

Another proactive policing approach sometimes associated with broken windows policing is “stop, question, and frisk” (SQF). While it may be used as a device for policing against disorder, its officially sanctioned purpose is to apprehend individuals who are suspected of having committed, or about to commit, a crime. SQF was the source of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that laid out the constitutional standard required for its use: police officers have to have a “reasonable suspicion” that the person or persons being stopped had committed a crime or was about to do so and that the individual
was armed. In theory, SQF is distinct from broken windows policing in that its focus is not on preventing disorder.

However, SQF has been coupled with broken windows policing in both practice and critique. Because broken windows policing developed into a zero-tolerance attitude toward criminal behavior, SQF became one avenue by which police, particularly those on foot and outdoors, interacted with individuals to achieve that zero tolerance (sometimes this strategy is called “field interviews” or “pedestrian stops”). In practice the tactic has been used to search not just individuals suspected of being armed but also those suspected of carrying drugs. In addition, SQF may have the effect of keeping some people off the streets more generally. Thus, it is not surprising that SQF’s continued use and justification under the Terry standard remains controversial from both legal and social perspectives. In contemporary America, this controversy has been most conspicuous in New York City.

The vast majority of SQFs do not result in arrests (New York State Office of the Attorney General 2013). However, proponents argue that SQF serves a preventive function. Most of the research is based on data from New York City. Results are mixed, but more studies conclude that it is effective than not. For example, Smith and Purtell (2007, 2008) found that SQF seemed to be effective citywide in reducing robbery, murder, burglary, and motor vehicle theft, but not on assault, rape, or grand larceny. However, in their critique of Smith and Purtell’s study, Rosenfeld and Fornango (2014) found no significant effects of SQF on burglary or robbery and marginally significant negative effects when burglary rates were lagged 2 years after stops rates. On the other hand, in three studies of stop and frisks in New York City, Weisburd and his colleagues find evidence of a deterrent effect when examining their use of crime hot spots. Weisburd, Telep, and Lawton (2014) found that SQFs in New York City were concentrated at crime hot spots during a time of declining police numbers. While they do not attempt an analysis of SQF’s effects on crime, they argue that a mountain of evidence shows that increasing police presence at crime hot spots is effective in preventing crime and accordingly that use of this strategy at crime hot spots may have led to the crime drop. In a follow-up analysis, Weisburd et al. (2016) reexamine the NYPD data after being given access to specific locations of SQFs. They find a deterrent effect of SQFs on crime at the microgeographic level (see also Wooditch and Weisburd 2016).
However, all of these studies are based on nonexperimental data and are vulnerable to problems inherent in the use of such data. In some circumstances these vulnerabilities can be overcome; see Nagin and Weisburd (2013) for examples. In our judgment, only Weisburd et al. (2016) successfully satisfied standards laid out by Nagin and Weisburd (2013) for credible causal inference. They concluded that SQF was effective in preventing crime. However, even this study does not account for other policing tactics used in conjunction with SQF that might contribute to crime prevention but without the noxious effects of SQF.

In pointing out ambiguities in the evidence on the effectiveness of broken windows policing and SQFs, we are not suggesting that aggressive policing tactics involving stopping and questioning citizens and, when appropriate, arresting them have no place in policing. To the contrary, our point is that aggressive policing of this type should target serious crime problems and high-risk repeat offenders rather than be employed across the board. A case in point is police tactics to reduce firearms violence (Koper and Mayo-Wilson 2006). In these gun studies, various aggressive enforcement approaches were used, from traffic and pedestrian stops to car checks. Unlike zero-tolerance approaches that use arrest for minor offenses indiscriminately, these tactics were tailored to mitigate opportunities for firearms carrying in crime hot spots and were found to have positive effects (Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995; McGarrell et al. 2001). Rosenfeld, Deckard, and Blackburn’s (2014) study of police efforts to reduce gun crime in St. Louis found similar effects.

The more important point about broken windows and zero-tolerance policing and SQF is that they often engender negative reactions from citizens and are viewed by many in minority communities as oppressive and contributing to police-community tensions (Straub 2008). Wilson and Kelling (1982, p. 35) anticipated such a possibility in their original Atlantic Monthly article. They observed that

the concern about equity is more serious. We might agree that certain behavior makes one person more undesirable than another but how do we ensure that age or skin color or national origin or harmless mannerisms will not also become the basis for distinguishing the undesirable from the desirable? How do we ensure, in short, that the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry? We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question. We are not confident that there is a satisfactory answer except to hope that by
their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority.

If aggressive enforcement is needed or must be used, can it be done with the support of the community? The Kansas City gun experiment suggests that such methods can be effective in preventing serious crimes but that advanced notification and explanation are important to gaining community support (Shaw 1995; Sherman, Shaw, and Rogan 1995). However, the reaction of citizens to these forms of aggressive policing has grown increasingly negative. As we write this essay, demonstrations and rioting in response to high-visibility deaths of black men at the hands of generally white police officers, and negative reactions to SQF generally, demonstrate this.

III. Maintaining Trust and Confidence of Citizens
The mandate to maintain trust and confidence of citizens, like the mandate to prevent and address crime, is not explicitly established in law, the Constitution, or standard police operating procedures. Both mandates arise from the view that police in advanced democracies are responsible for the public’s well-being and welfare. That welfare extends beyond “security” into many other cherished values, including personal freedoms, civil rights, protection against majority tyranny, and the ability to pursue happiness. Democratic governance cannot allow police unfettered authority to achieve security; rather, police must do so in a manner that not only is within legal bounds but also is acceptable to citizens. Police must be accountable, transparent, open, responsive, reliable, and fair (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1997; Mastrofski 1999; Skolnick 1999; Skogan 2004).

The ability of the police to maintain trust and confidence can be gauged in different ways, but none is as immediate and obvious as citizens’ reactions to police activity. Citizen reaction can take various forms, including complaints, lawsuits, negative survey responses, protests, noncompliance, resistance, and defiance to commands. Accounting for people’s reactions to police activity is important for many reasons. Citizen trust and confidence in the police matter in their own right in democracies and, like crime prevention, must be gauged as a performance metric. Further, citizens who distrust the police or are skeptical of their effectiveness in preventing crime may not report situations that might lead to crime.
They might also choose not to identify perpetrators of crime, act as witnesses, or cooperate with investigations. If police are perceived as overly oppressive, this is a real cost even if police tactics are effective in preventing crime. Police tactics and strategies should be judged in terms both of citizen reactions to policing activities and of their effectiveness. Neither should be seen as trumping the other.10

The BJS Police–Public Contact Survey (PPCS) data and Gallup polls on attitudes toward the police are two important measures of citizen reactions to police services.11 The PPCS focuses on individual encounters. Gallup polls provide a more global understanding of citizen satisfaction with policing. Both measures convey a consistent and important story: Police enjoy high levels of overall satisfaction, but levels of satisfaction are consistently lower among black and Hispanic communities, and especially among younger minority males who have greater contact with the police.

The Gallup Organization (2014) reports that a majority (56 percent) of adults over the period 2011–14 had “a great deal/quite a lot” of confidence in the police. However, differences between the attitudes of whites and blacks were stark, as table 1 shows. Among whites the police received the third-highest ranking among 17 institutions; only the military and small businesses ranked higher. Among blacks, police drop to seventh. Both groups have far greater confidence in the police than in the criminal justice system generally. Only 27 percent of blacks or whites have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the criminal justice system, and 40 percent of blacks and 30 percent of whites have very little or no confidence in the criminal justice system (see also Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008).

The BJS data mirror the Gallup data. Langton and Durose (2013) found that 86 percent of persons involved in traffic stops believed that the police behaved properly and treated them with respect. Only 10 percent believed that police behaved improperly. In the case of street stops, these two percentages were, respectively, 66 percent and 25 percent.

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10 Police engage in many non–crime control activities such as traffic safety and responding to medical emergencies. Many if not most citizens interact with the police in the course of police performing these functions, not their crime control function. How police conduct themselves in performing these non–crime control functions may heavily influence citizen confidence and trust in the police.

There are, however, large differences across racial groups. Regardless of the reason for the traffic stop, black (67 percent) and Hispanic (74 percent) drivers were less likely than white drivers (84 percent) to believe the reason for the stop was legitimate. For street stops, only 37.7 percent of blacks compared with 77.6 percent of whites believed that “police behaved properly.” Similar findings of differential perceptions of police behavior across races are found in the 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008 PPCS surveys (Durose, Schmitt, and Langan 2005; Engel 2005; Durose, Smith, and Langan 2007; Eith and Durose 2011; Langton and Durose 2013).

Many factors might account for these consistent and significant differences. Part is attributable to well-documented historical mistreatment and discrimination of minorities, especially African Americans, by the police and government. But it is not just history; large racial differences in police contact rates persist to the present day. Studies examining both specific jurisdictions and national-level data show that blacks and Hispanics are stopped, ticketed, and searched at higher rates than whites (Gaines 2006; see also Fagan and Davies 2000; Walker 2001; Lundman and Kaufman 2003; Reitzel and Piquero 2006; Warren et al. 2006), even when they are at no greater risk of carrying contraband (Engel and Calnon 2004). Brown and Frank (2006) found that blacks were more likely to be arrested than cited in traffic stops, no matter the race of the officer (see also Brown 2005). Evidence for disparities in traffic stops (Smith and Petrocelli 2001; Lange, Johnson, and Voas 2005; Petrocelli 2006) has led to statewide investigations and further research (Farrell and McDevitt 2006; Gaines 2006; Warren et al. 2006; Ridgeway et al. 2009). Whether these differences reflect race-based discrimination or the disproportionate involvement of disadvantaged minorities in crime remains contested. One thing, however, is certain: there is a widespread impression among Af-

### TABLE 1

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<th>Confidence in Police, Percentages</th>
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<td>A Great Deal/Quite a Lot</td>
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ican Americans that the police treat them less fairly than whites, an assessment that is also shared by a sizable minority of whites (CBS News 2009).

Another dimension of citizen confidence in the police is whether people distinguish their overall confidence in police from their evaluations of specific police tactics. At least in New York City this seems to be the case. A poll by Quinnipiac University in 2013 reported results on the approval of New York City residents of police use of SQF. Only 45 percent of all residents approved and, not surprisingly, only 25 percent of black residents. However, approval for the overall performance of the New York City Police Department was materially higher. Among all residents, 57 percent approved of their performance. Approval was markedly lower among blacks (37 percent) but was higher than their support for SQF. Whether these gaps appear in other cities that use SQF is unknown. However, these statistics suggest that citizen approval of specific tactics is distinct from their overall approval of police performance and that measuring both can help agencies better target policy changes.

Some research indicates that changes in policing and police policy can affect citizen trust and confidence. Some of this research is at the individual level, describing how changes in police behavior affect a person’s perceptions or beliefs about the police or legal authority. For the most part, this research tests the procedural justice theoretical perspective that emphasizes the importance of people perceiving that they have been treated fairly and with dignity even if the outcome is not to their liking. Scholars of procedural justice posit that people’s perceptions of the fairness of justice interventions can contribute to the legitimacy and compliance that they afford the justice system (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Leventhal 1980; Tyler 1988, 1990). Concerning policing, advocates of procedural justice argue that citizen perceptions of their fair treatment are important with regard to detecting, deterring, and preventing crime (Paternoster et al. 1997; Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2004, 2006; Tyler and Waksal 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008). A recent review of the literature on procedural justice and legal compliance by Nagin and Telep (forthcoming), however, concluded that while much research demonstrates an association between perceptions of procedurally just treatment and legal compliance, very little research establishes a connection between actual treatment in this regard and legal compliance. The distinction is important because policy can directly af-
fect actual treatment only in accord with procedurally just treatments, not perceptions of just treatment.

Research on procedural justice tends to focus on one-on-one police-citizen interactions. However, research on whether tactics affect perceptions, attitudes, and reactions of entire communities is scarcer (see Nagin and Telep, forthcoming), including how one-on-one interactions affect aggregate community perceptions. We might naturally look to the evaluations of community policing for some hints, but a systematic review of community policing interventions by Gill et al. (2014) found a surprisingly small number of studies (25) with even moderate methodological rigor. This is surprisingly small given the hundreds of millions of dollars the US Justice Department’s Office of Community Policing invested in community policing. Much of this money was spent on hiring police officers, not on research and evaluation of the effects of community policing or on implementing and monitoring community policing.

Gill et al. (2014) conclude that community-oriented activities improve citizen perceptions of police but that the effects of these strategies on crime control are small and inconclusive. One example is an evaluation of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy program in Chicago, which indicated that shifts away from traditional policing to more community- and problem-oriented approaches seemed to be associated with increased public satisfaction (Skogan et al. 2002; Skogan 2006). Increases were seen in both white and black/Latino populations, but the gap in satisfaction was not narrowed. In some crime categories there were reductions but not in others, and comparison areas were not necessarily comparable.

Gill et al. (2014) make two other important points. The first is that community policing is an ill-defined concept, and its outcomes are difficult to measure. The aim is to establish and then maintain community support for the police, yet how to achieve this is uncertain. They document considerable differences across studies in effect sizes related to community confidence and trust measures. One explanation for this heterogeneity is that the treatments, namely, what police do to win over citizens, differ widely across studies.

Their second important point is that community policing was not initially conceived of as a strategy for reducing crime. This may seem odd today, but as they observe, “[community-oriented policing] emerged from a desire to broaden the mandate of the police at a time when their effectiveness at controlling crime was in doubt” (Gill et al. 2014, p. 403). While
we do not doubt that police can prevent crime through community policing, we embrace without reservation the broadened mandate of the police to win and maintain community confidence independent of police effectiveness in preventing and controlling crime.

Finally, it is important to point out that for citizen reactions to matter, police have to be willing to take citizen reaction seriously and incorporate those reactions into their strategic plans and actions. This willingness is tied to officers’ views about citizens and the community—the flip side of the police-citizen perceptions coin. However, much more research has been conducted on public perceptions of the police than on police perceptions of the public. Some studies are tangentially relevant, for example, those examining officers’ perceptions of how much the public supports them (e.g., Greene 1989) or officers’ attitudes toward community-oriented policing (Adams, Rohe, and Arcury 2002; Lord and Friday 2008). Some have asked police officers about their perceptions of particular groups (Koper et al. 2013). But few studies have asked police questions about the public similar to those asked of citizens about the police.

So what is the bottom line? Overall citizens generally trust the police, especially compared with the rest of the criminal justice system, but large differences exist between racial and ethnic groups. Blacks in particular and to a lesser extent Hispanics have materially lower levels of confidence in the police than do whites. Most importantly, some research suggests that decisions on police tactics and strategies may worsen or improve citizen reaction, trust, and confidence. More testing about which tactics create what effects is needed. Finally, we have less knowledge about how police use citizen reactions to improve trust and confidence or on the effects on reform efforts of how police perceive people or specific groups of people.

IV. Race and Policing
We wrote this essay in the aftermath of the lethal shooting of a black teenager, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, by a white police officer; the death of a black man, Kevin Garner, by strangulation at the hands of the New York City police while being arrested; the shooting of an unarmed black man in the back by a North Charleston police officer; the retaliatory killing of two officers in an ambush in New York City; the death of Freddy Gray in Baltimore City after his arrest and transport in a police prisoner van; and the shooting of an unarmed black motorist by a University of Cincinnati police officer. These events provoked in-
tense discussion and protest about police mistreatment of minorities in
general and of African Americans in particular. Such reactions, however,
are not new—just episodic. The black community has consistently ques-
tioned police use of excessive force and its discriminatory application.
Perhaps these events have brought the issue of race and policing in Amer-
ica to a critical bursting point that will result in a sustained and effective
response. We hope this will be the case.

The events described above mostly involved police acting in ways
that were problematic and in some cases illegal, but the problem is far
deeper. Even if the police act legally, their strategies and tactics can still
deply alienate minority communities. This paradox is not just a US
problem or even a policing problem, but a democratic dilemma (Dahl
1956). Thus, inherent in thinking about how to balance effective crime
prevention with maintenance of citizens’ respect and confidence is a sen-
sitivity toward, and critical understanding of, the intersection of mar-
ginalized communities and policing. Put differently, police agencies
have to consider the consequences of their efforts for minority and poor com-
communities, the very communities they most interact with. This may re-
quire replacing zero-tolerance arrest or sweeping SQF policies with other
policies.

We cannot offer a specific prescription for achieving this balance. It
must be struck in the context of specific circumstances. We do, however,
have several suggestions. The most fundamental is embodied in recom-
modation 1.2 of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
(2015): “Law enforcement agencies should acknowledge the role of po-
licing in past and present injustice and discrimination and how it is a hur-
dle to the promotion of community trust.” To move forward, acknowl-
edgment, acceptance, and forgiveness are needed to overcome individual
and collective hurt and anger.

Our second suggestion is that all parties must acknowledge that both
crime prevention and maintenance of citizens’ trust and confidence are
important. It is our impression, for example, that in the heated debate
about the NYPD’s use of SQF, this seemingly obvious point was over-
looked. One side argued that SQF was effective in preventing crime and
applied in a nondiscriminatory way, and the other side argued that it was
ineffective and discriminatory. Two points were strikingly absent. The
first is that citizen reaction per se was not emphasized as being important
in its own right independent of whether SQFs or equivalent tactics were
being conducted in a fashion that was legal. The detrimental impact on
police standing in minority communities needed to be acknowledged by supporters of SQF as independently important. Such an acknowledgment would have opened the door to a discussion of the possibility that SQF or other aggressive policing tactics might be effective in preventing crime but were also being used in a fashion that deeply alienated communities of color or were being used unconstitutionally. Such a mutual recognition might also have led to a more nuanced discussion of when SQF and aggressive policing can and should be used, such as in circumstances at high risk of violence and firearms crimes.

A related point is lack of recognition that there are viable alternatives to tactics such as SQF to prevent crime. The strength of the belief in the crime prevention returns of tactics such as SQF reflects the underdevelopment and underdeployment of a broader policing tool kit that will advance crime prevention but at less or no cost to police-community relations. Police have chosen to define their craft and built institutional and organizational norms in ways that overemphasized arrest as the key metric of success.

Only with acknowledgment that citizen reaction is independently important and that there are viable and multiple alternatives to crime control can police, in consultation with the community, begin to devise policies that prevent crime and are less alienating of minority communities.

V. Reinventing American Policing
Throughout this essay we have maintained that police in modern democracies have three important functions, each independently important: to find and bring perpetrators of crime to justice, to prevent and deter crime and disorder, and to maintain the trust and confidence of citizens. Success in achieving each of these functions is interconnected in ways that may make them complementary or competing.

Crime clearance rates for serious crimes have remained largely unchanged for more than four decades despite large changes in the index crime rate. In our judgment, opportunities for significant improvements in crime solution rates and in the first function of policing are unlikely in large part because most apprehensions occur at the scene of the crime or shortly thereafter based on eyewitness identification. Thus, our proposals focus on the latter two functions of policing. Our proposals for reinventing American policing are animated by the two principles dis-
cussed at the outset of this essay. First, crime prevention—not arrests—is paramount. Second, citizen reaction matters.

Balancing between these two principles will require fundamental adjustments to the practice and expectations of American policing. Seven important changes are needed. The first two are strategic recommendations for the police that echo the principles, followed by five specific recommendations in their support.

**Proposal 1.**—*Prioritize Crime Prevention over Arrest:* Police should focus their efforts, reforms, and resources on sentinel-like activities that prevent crime and thereby avert the need for arrests and their ensuing costs.

Arrests are costly to all involved—society, the police, and the person arrested. Even for arrests for serious crimes it is important that police broaden the organizational response by considering this question: Is there anything that we, the police, could have done to prevent this crime from happening in the first place?

Crime prevention can be achieved when police proactively tailor their deployment and actions to specific problems and when they target places, times, and people where/with/whom crime tends to concentrate (Sherman and Eck 2002; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Lum and Koper 2017). At a minimum, police should increase their presence in places and at times where crime concentrates during uncommitted times when they are not responding to calls for service. They should proactively make contact with serious repeat offenders and probationers to create a deterrent effect. Use of uncommitted time to increase their presence has the potential for materially reducing crime. Uncommitted time can account for 25–80 percent of an officer’s shift (Famega 2005; Famega, Frank, and Mazerolle 2005; Weisburd, Telep, and Lawton 2014).

However, such targeting can run the risk of generating large numbers of arrests or summonses for minor crimes. Tactics that emphasize arrests for misdemeanors such as drug possession, disorder, and public nuisances are likely a by-product of the widespread adoption of one type of proactive, sentinel-like activity—zero-tolerance policing. There is, however, no quality evidence that arrest-based policing against minor crimes and disorder is the best way to prevent serious crime. There is, however, a great deal of evidence that police can be effective in preventing crime
when they focus on high-risk places and people and use problem-solving approaches tailored to specific circumstances, sometimes with help from other stakeholders.

For example, police, in cooperation with others, can help to adjust the physical or social environment of a high-crime place to mitigate criminal opportunities. This can include facilitating situational crime prevention that alters the physical environment, for example, with better lighting, or initiating civil remedies such as license revocation, citations, or zoning orders.12 Guardianship tactics that increase police visibility at hot spots can accompany opportunity-mitigation tactics. One way to increase visibility is to strategically manage uncommitted time that focuses that time on increasing police presence at problem places or surveillance of problem people.

Redirecting police deployment toward proactive and tailored strategies that target high-crime places, times, or people will require significant changes. It will require deemphasizing the importance placed on traditional react-investigate-and-arrest approaches and better management of uncommitted time. Prioritizing crime prevention will also require fundamental changes in “standard” operating procedure and deployment models and what officers believe to be “good policing” (Lum 2009; Lum and Koper 2017). It will be necessary to raise the status and importance of patrol officers who are in the best position to carry out sentinel-like activities (Bayley 1996). It will also be necessary to rethink the justifications for the acquisition of technology, as police officers are often more receptive to technologies that facilitate arrest, not prevention, and subsequently judge the “effectiveness” of a technology according to arrest-based values (Koper, Lum, and Willis 2014; Lum, Koper, and Willis 2016). Finally, supporting proactive approaches will require police to regulate their choices, given the risk that advocating for proactivity can result in activities that degrade citizen trust in the police and alienate minority communities. All of these changes will require major innovations in training and culture, organizational incentives, accountability systems, and managerial infrastructure. Prioritizing crime prevention over arrest also requires an ongoing research effort on effective crime prevention strategies for the police and others.

12 See examples given by the Center for Problem Oriented Policing (http://www.popenter.org/). See also Weisburd et al. (2010).
PROPOSAL 2.—Create and Install Systems to Monitor Citizen Reactions to the Police and Routinely Report Results: Police should routinely, systematically, and rigorously survey citizens on their reactions to policing in general and to specific tactics and regularly report results and actions that will be taken to foster favorable citizen responses and remediate negative responses.

This proposal involves two important components, both in support of principle 2. The first is that police should routinely, systematically, and rigorously survey citizens on their reactions to the police in general, to specific tactics they use or might use, and on daily interactions between police officers and citizens. The second component is that the results of such surveys, and actions taken because of survey results, be regularly reported to both citizens and officers. This proposal echoes recommendation 1.7 of the 2015 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.

While the first component is not entirely novel, the practice of systematically investigating citizen reactions to the police remains underdeveloped. Some agencies survey or interview citizens on an ad hoc basis, but the surveys are typically not sufficiently rigorous that results can be said to be representative of the targeted population. More commonly, data are collected from surveys handed out in community meetings or from citizens who respond at will to an online survey instrument. Data collected in this fashion may give a misleading impression of public perceptions of the effectiveness and credibility of the police and do not provide a basis for tracking how citizen perceptions and assessments change over time.

The second component—that police regularly report the results of the polls to both citizens and officers—is novel. The purpose of feedback should not just be informational. The feedback should include changes in police strategies and tactics made in light of polling information developed in conjunction with officers and citizens. Providing officers and managers with results also creates the feedback loops that Sherman (1998) argues are crucial to the implementation of evidence-based policing.

A demonstration of the feasibility of regularly surveying a representative sample of the population is provided by the Quinnipiac University survey of New York City residents’ perceptions of the NYPD. The poll has frequently been used for a variety of political and social topics since 1988. With regard to policing, the poll has questioned residents about their overall satisfaction with the performance of the NYPD and also
about more specific issues such as support for SQF and perceptions of mistreatment of minority groups. The number of residents polled is sufficiently large to provide reliable estimates across demographic groups defined by age or ethnicity or across New York’s five boroughs. Because the polls are regularly conducted, the polling information provides a basis for tracking public reactions over time.

The Quinnipiac poll is not sponsored by the NYPD. Even if it were, the NYPD is not a typical US police department. Still we think it feasible for smaller departments to systematically and regularly collect data from key constituencies. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) in North Carolina conducts annual surveys of residents.\footnote{Nancy Burnap, Ph.D. and Research Strategies, Inc. For more information, see http://cecbp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/matrix-demonstration-project/surveying-communities/cmpd/} This survey uses a random-digit dial sample and telephone interviews of adults living within the department’s service area. The objectives include measuring perceptions of the department’s performance in terms of effectiveness in both preventing crime and treatment of citizens. Similarly, a number of UK forces carry out public satisfaction surveys to gauge trust, confidence, and police performance (Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko 2009; Bostock Marketing Group Research 2014).\footnote{See also http://www.met.police.uk/about/performance/confidence.htm.}

The Quinnipiac and CMPD polls are designed to survey representative samples of their jurisdictions. An alternative strategy is to identify a diverse set of segments of the community and regularly survey those segments. Such segments might be defined by membership in civic or religious groups (e.g., members of a specific set of churches), enrollment in school (e.g., students in specific grades at specific schools), status as recipients of services provided by governmental or charitable organizations (e.g., food banks), or those who have had specific interactions with the police (e.g., victims, offenders, those who call 911, those who have been stopped by the police). The idea is not to survey a representative sample of the entire community but rather to survey representative samples of distinct segments of the community whose lives may be affected by what the police do. For larger departments such polls could supplement the general population survey. For smaller departments without

\footnote{Nancy Burnap, Ph.D. and Research Strategies, Inc. For more information, see http://cecbp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/matrix-demonstration-project/surveying-communities/cmpd/}
the resources to conduct population surveys routinely, targeted polls such as these could serve as a substitute.

An example is the National Police Platform’s Public Satisfaction Survey (Rosenbaum et al. 2011), which has the goal of building “evidence-based police organizations that are responsive to community input” (p. 10; see also Rosenbaum, Lawrence, et al. 2015). Rosenbaum and his colleagues argue that, unlike general surveys, these types of surveys can be more easily carried out over time, gaining a more local and longitudinal measure of police performance with regard to the quality of residents’ interactions with police officers.

As a prelude to initiating any survey strategy, it is important to conduct pilots in a small number of departments with support from funding organizations such as the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), Bureau of Justice Statistics, or the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The aims would be to build survey templates and guides, to test procedures for selecting and reaching a diverse set of community segments, and to devise a base set of analyses to be reported along with developing the required statistical software. Following the pilots, it would be important to set up a central office to provide technical support to police departments that deploy such surveys. The Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Institute of Justice, and the COPS Office support training and technical assistance, infrastructure building, and research on police operations. So too they should allocate adequate resources to target understanding of community reactions as a measure of police performance.

The flow of information should be two-way: from the public to the police and from the police back to the public. Citizen reactions often concern not only police activity but also an agency’s openness to sharing and discussing findings with the public from surveys, investigations, or special commissions. Systematizing and investing in this feedback loop can improve openness, transparency, and legitimacy, all hallmarks of democratic policing.

The results of such surveys should also be reported to rank-and-file officers and supervisors. Without such information, police officers rely

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15 For already existing examples, see the “Community Survey” demonstration for the Matrix Demonstration Project at the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University (http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/matrix-demonstration-project/surveying-communities/).
solely on their individual encounters with citizens to form judgments about citizen reactions. Information on citizen perceptions needs to be incorporated into training, incentives, and infrastructure to have meaningful influence on police performance.

Agencies should also regularly conduct parallel surveys of officers about their perceptions of citizens. Such perceptions are likely linked to officer receptivity to changing their behavior and tactics in interactions with citizens and thus are important to training and supervision.

**PROPOSAL 3.— Reform Training and Redefine the “Craft” of Policing:**

Officers should be trained and socialized to believe that the fundamental goals of policing include not only arrests of perpetrators of serious crime but also prevention and maintenance of good community relations.

Specific actions are needed to reorient policing to achieve the changes implied by our governing principles of prevention and citizen trust and confidence. Perhaps the most fundamental involve training and more generally how the “craft” of policing is defined. We are not so naive as to believe that training is a panacea for reform efforts. However, training is one important part of the socialization of officers and shapes and challenges their beliefs about the goals and functions of policing. Training occurs at various stages in an officer’s career and includes academy training for entry-level recruits, formal “in-service” and professional training for active officers and supervisors, and informal training and guidance during the field training probationary period or within the everyday social life of patrol and investigative units.

The content of police training is heavily influenced by state agencies that control curriculum and testing certification. However, much of that content is closely linked to what agencies, trainers, supervisors, and fellow officers define as the “craft” of policing, which is shaped by beliefs and expectations about the function, purpose, and method of good policing. The police craft is not immutable. If officers are trained and socialized to believe that reactive policing and arrest are the primary purposes of policing and its measure of success, then the craft of policing will emphasize and reward the skills and statistics associated with arrest. Similarly, if officers are trained and socialized to believe that prevention and community relations are important goals of policing, then the craft will be shaped by these expectations.
Training must be reoriented to make the reduction of calls for service coequal to the reaction to calls for service. Such training requires teaching officers how to structure their discretion during uncommitted time, especially in proactive and tailored ways that are effective in achieving prevention. Officers must be trained to conduct sentinel-like policing so as to expand their tool kit and view of what “good policing” entails. Such training should also include open discussions of the relative costs and benefits of reactive arrests versus proactive prevention. Training that focuses on prevention also should include education about the nature of crime particularly as it relates to environmental and criminal opportunity theory and the interpretation and use of outputs from crime analysis.16

The craft must be redefined to view both prevention and citizen trust and confidence as independently important. Training must also incorporate knowledge gained from citizen surveys and more generally from research on citizen reactions to the police on how to engage citizens in ways that reduce the risk of a hostile reaction while still maintaining officers’ authority. Related to this, traditional diversity training is usually the only training recruits receive on issues of race and policing. As emphasized by FBI Director James Comey in a highly publicized speech titled “Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race” (http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race), this training should be expanded to include discussions about what is known about how and why police and citizens have differential perceptions of their encounters, how implicit bias may affect such encounters, and how such knowledge can be used to mitigate the risk of hostile encounters. As emphasized by Tyler and Fagan (2008) and Meares (2015), training should incorporate not only technical procedures in lawfully carrying out arrests but also training on procedural justice prior to and during arrest. How officers treat offenders may be just as important with regard to community reactions and the offender’s own recidivism as the arrest itself.

Some may be skeptical that reforms in training or for that matter changes in organizational culture and incentives can materially alter police behavior. Rather, the critical ingredients shaping police behavior

16 For more discussion of translating research into training components, see Lum and Koper (2017) and the Matrix Demonstration Website training modules located at http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/matrix-demonstration-project/.
might be the attitudes, personalities, and aptitudes of those who enter into the policing profession. While we generally support the idea that recruits who are amenable to both the principles we espouse are to be preferred, research does not always support the contention that characteristics of police recruits strongly affect outcomes once on the job. The National Research Council (2004) report on policing examined the evidence and found no conclusive evidence that characteristics such as education, gender, or membership in an underrepresented minority group were associated with particular outcomes in policing such as less use of force. The report also found no conclusive evidence that police forces are disproportionately composed of individuals with authoritarian personalities. However, this research is based on existing and traditional definitions and approaches to the craft of policing. Perhaps findings might be different if expectations and functions of policing were altered. Nonetheless, our point is this: How police define their craft and the institutional structures (training, supervision, rewards, technologies, management, etc.) that develop around that definition will likely have major effects on the actions and behaviors of officers regardless of who initially enters police service.

**Proposal 4.**—*Recalibrate Organizational Incentives:* Organizational incentives, including rewards, promotions, and informal incentives, must be altered to incorporate measures of effective crime prevention and maintenance of citizen confidence and support.

Strengthening accountability to prevention and to citizens requires altering organizational incentives in ways that reflect, translate, and institutionalize the two principles into practice (Lum et al. 2012; Lum and Koper 2017). Rewards, promotions, incentives, informal “pats on the back,” and the rhetoric of leaders about their view of “good policing” shape the expectations and tendencies of both leaders and the rank and file. Officers are often looking to advance themselves, whether by transferring to a detective or specialized unit or by applying for promotion to a higher rank. The institutional metrics used to determine their success in achieving these personal goals will affect their conduct as police officers. Agencies have official systems of performance review including annual reviews of officers and detectives by their first-line supervisors and informal systems of reward (e.g., praise by supervisors and their colleagues) that may shape officer behavior.
The system of rewards, incentives, and promotions reveals what the agency values and the activities and outcomes it prioritizes. If officers or groups of officers are formally or informally rewarded for making arrests and citations, then those things become valued in policing and also work their way into definitions of “good policing.” Similarly, if performance indicators at the precinct level focus on the clearing of specific cases or short-term crime trends, then commanders will concentrate on activities that satisfy those concerns. To the contrary, if officers are rewarded for preventing and reducing crime and calls for service, improving police-citizen interactions, innovating in patrol during uncommitted times, or sustaining long-term crime prevention effects, then they will be incentivized to carry out those activities.

Recalibrating promotions and rewards requires changing standards, tests, and interviewing practices for promotion to detective units, supervisory positions, and higher positions of leadership. At present, officers testing for promotion to supervisory positions such as sergeant or lieutenant are asked about their knowledge of the proper handling of common supervisory problems, standard operating procedures, or how they might command a homicide scene or critical incident. To shift an agency toward the two principles, officers should also be asked to document instances of using problem-solving techniques, describe specific ways in which they use their uncommitted time, and convey their knowledge and use of crime analysis and surveys of community reaction. They should also be tested for their knowledge of evidence-based strategies known to reduce crime and improve community trust and confidence and to produce evidence of how they translate this knowledge into their everyday work and discretion. Promotions to higher ranks would similarly test for this type of knowledge and action. We recognize that this would be a major, and in some cases difficult, change for police agencies, especially those in which police unions tightly control and monitor promotion standards and processes. But without changing how individuals are promoted, there will be little incentive for new and existing leaders to adopt reforms or alternative forms of policing (for more discussion, see Lum and Koper [2017]).

In addition to formal opportunities to reward and incentivize, informal incentives need to be recalibrated. Medals and citations are rarely given for preventing crime or improving citizen-officer interactions. Instead, praise emphasizes success in apprehensions, an important function but not the only function of effective policing. Supervisors and col-
leagues should also praise effectiveness in reducing calls for service or improving community relations. How to change these informal rewards we leave to policing professionals to consider, but these informal tokens are important for incentivizing police to prioritize crime prevention over arrest and building trust and confidence of citizens over simply carrying out proper procedure.

Finally, recalibrating organizational incentives implies an adjustment in how “good leadership” is defined. Leadership under the two principles would take a form very different from leadership under a traditional policing approach. Excellence in leadership requires a willingness and ability to broaden an agency’s crime prevention tool kit, expanding the capacity to incorporate citizen reaction into strategies and tactics, and shifting toward a dynamic learning environment.

**PROPOSAL 5.**—**Strengthen Accountability with More Transparency:** Police accountability must be made more transparent by increasing the availability of data and policies related to police-citizen interactions, particularly when they involve the use of force; communicating more effectively to the public about the outcomes of investigations into allegations of police misconduct; reassessing systems of discipline and review that impede the ability of agencies to learn from mistakes; and using improved data analysis for better supervision and management.

Police accountability encompasses a vast and complex array of legal, procedural, and organizational issues that go far beyond the scope of this essay and our expertise. We therefore limit our recommendations to one dimension of accountability—transparency.

We proposed that results of citizen surveys, and actions taken in response to surveys, be reported to both the public and line officers. This recommendation is reflective of our view that accountability is advanced by making public data that do not violate personal privacy or jeopardize public safety. Other types of data that should be made available to the public and reported to a central federal depository, probably the BJS, are the circumstances and consequences of all instances in which police discharge their weapons. If the suspect, a bystander, or a police officer is killed, much more detailed data should be reported. This recommendation corresponds closely with recommendation 2.2.2 of the 2015 President’s Task Force. Departmental policies should be made readily
available to the public particularly as they relate to police-citizen interactions and disciplinary policies and procedures that relate to those interactions.

Beyond making data and policies related to police-citizen interactions available, it is important that police do a better job of communicating to the public the outcomes of investigations into allegations of police misconduct. This recommendation poses a real challenge because aspects of these investigations are often confidential. Sometimes confidentiality is appropriate, but sometimes it is questionable, having more to do with union policies, labor contracts, or other legal restrictions that needlessly hide disciplinary processes and outcomes from public exposure. Such actions can inflame negative reactions and degrade trust and confidence in the police. We do not wade into the debate over which of these restrictions are excessive or inappropriate, but we emphasize that the public is also a party to allegations of police misconduct and thus to the greatest extent possible should be privy to the outcomes of investigations of misconduct. Such reports should be timely and, if necessary, should be made on an ongoing basis. More generally, annual reports should be produced reporting summary information on outcomes of all investigations into officer misconduct.17

This brings us to the importance of transparency within police organizations. The police organization itself is often blind to the outcomes of investigations into misconduct. The closed and secretive nature of internal affairs may be seen as protecting officer privacy, but it also impedes constructive processes of change based on learning from mistakes. Supervisors who are directly responsible for managing and changing the actions of officers and detectives are left in the dark about the results of disciplinary issues that they may have detected and raised. In this regard, the 2015 President’s Task Force report’s recommendation 2.3 is particularly important. It encourages the creation of an additional non-punitive peer review of critical events. The purpose is to improve practices and policies not to assign blame or mete out punishments.

Transparency also requires that the public perceive that the information reported on a serious incident is the product of an independent and impartial investigation. Here again the 2015 President’s Task Force

offers an especially valuable recommendation (2.2.2) that investigations into police shootings that result in injury or death or in-custody deaths be investigated by parties independent of the department.

**PROPOSAL 6.—Incorporate the Analysis of Crime and Citizen Reaction into Managerial Practice:** All law enforcement officials from patrol officials to chief executives need greater access to reliable analyses of crime locations and trends and the effectiveness of police tactics; this requires substantial increases in resources and in the standing of crime analysis units within police departments as well as expanded collection and monitoring of data on citizen reactions to the police.

Implementing our proposals requires that all law enforcement officers from patrol level to the chief executive have access to high-quality crime analysis and analysis of citizen reactions. By “analysis” we do not just mean “statistics.” Whether robberies increase from 10 to 15 from last week to this week is less meaningful than analysis that examines their geographic and social patterns, unpacks the underlying opportunity structure that led to the robberies occurring, and evaluates the interventions the police take to reduce robberies. Similarly, while documenting the number of complaints an agency receives is important, analysis of how agency policies affect and mitigate complaints and what might be causing repeated acts of misconduct is also essential.

Although analytical units are becoming more prominent in law enforcement agencies, they are usually understaffed and regarded as outsiders working primarily for the chief executive (Santos 2014). The consequence is that they typically have little operational influence (Lum 2013; Koper, Lum, and Willis 2014; Santos 2014). Analytic units need to be strengthened and analytics need to be institutionalized in long-run decision making and managerial practices.

The targeted preventive interventions that we advocate require that officers from the chief to the rank and file have access to and understand analyses that locate concentrations of crime, identify high-risk people, and better illuminate underlying issues that contribute to crime problems. Such analysis is required to carry out Sherman’s (2013) “triple T”: targeting, testing, and tracking the success of tailored tactics. Analysis can also serve to create greater transparency and accountability for strategies and tactics and their outcomes. Regarding community relations, the charge of such units must be broadened to include measuring
and tracking citizen reactions. The importance of accurately measuring citizen reaction through rigorous surveying, interviewing, and other quantitative and qualitative approaches requires staff with expertise in research methods and in constructing and conducting surveys and analyzing survey data.

Merging the centrality of both crime and community survey analysis into the core functions of policing will require a significant increase in the ratio of analysts to officers and active interaction and collaboration between them. However, incorporating analysis into managerial practices does not stop at beefing up resources for analysis in agencies. It requires adjusting supervisory and managerial decision making around not simply reacting to short-term crime spikes or internal or external crises, but using that information to become more strategic about reducing crime and improving trust and confidence of citizens over the long term. The bottom line: without the backing of strong analysis of crime and community reaction, police will be flying blind on managing their efforts to advance the changes we propose.

**PROPOSAL 7.—Strengthening National-Level Research and Evaluation:** A robust infrastructure of research and its dissemination is essential if major advances are to be made.

A strong and continually developing knowledge base on how police can prevent crime and maintain citizens’ trust and confidence is essential. Although much research has been developed in the last four decades on both, critical gaps remain. For example, while we generally understand that targeting hot places and people can yield benefits, recent research indicates that some approaches may be more effective than others. We have little knowledge of the community reactions some of these approaches engender and how negative reactions can be mitigated by modification of tactics. We also have a great deal to learn about how technology might advance or inhibit increased emphasis on prevention and community reaction (Koper, Lum, and Willis 2014). Sherman (1998, 2013) argued that strengthening the knowledge base on effective policing requires not only improvements in internal analysis and evaluation but also an expansion of the national infrastructure for evaluating effective practice in policing. Lum and Koper (2017) proposed that adjusting training, organizational incentives, and infrastructures requires developing and evaluating ways in which such knowledge can be institutionalized into everyday police
practices so that they become second nature and part of how the craft of policing is defined. They argue that this requires investing in mechanisms that translate knowledge into operational forms, helping agencies build the capacity to develop their own knowledge, and building exchanges between researchers and practitioners to facilitate receptivity, translation, and institutionalization of research and scientific processes. Weisburd and Neyroud (2011) argue that police must come to “own science.” By this they mean that police must not only value and understand science but also play a leadership role in its production.

Important activities are already under way for creating the research infrastructure that we advocate. National-level programs such as the National Police Platform (Rosenbaum, Tanksley, and Cordner 2013; Rosenbaum, Alderden, et al. 2015), the Smart Policing Initiative by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Matrix Demonstration Projects (Lum and Koper 2017), and the 2015 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing are examples. International efforts such as the College of Policing in the United Kingdom and the Scottish Institute for Policing Research also reflect these goals.18

Appeals such as this, particularly from researchers, are routine and are just as routinely ignored. However, decades of research and research-practitioner partnerships in policing have brought us to the conclusions and proposals set out in this essay. As with medical research, we are only at the beginning stages of finding solutions to some of the toughest problems we face in policing, crime prevention, and police-citizen relations. National funding of research on policing and crime prevention more generally is minuscule compared, for example, to money spent on dental research.

VI. The Future
Police are not impervious to change; in the past three decades, innovative leadership has fundamentally changed American policing. However, we are under no illusions that the changes we propose will come quickly or easily. They will require a major shift in the culture of American po-

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licensing as it relates to what is valued and rewarded, both formally and informally, in how police are trained and evaluated, and in the organization of police departments. They will require major investments in time from the police research community and in dollars from funding agencies. We are optimistic that police can continue to reinvent themselves.

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