Translational Criminology

Promoting knowledge exchange to shape criminal justice research, practice, and policy

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CEBCP Mission Statement
The Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP), housed within the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University, seeks to make scientific research a key component in decisions about crime and justice policies by advancing rigorous studies in criminal justice and criminology through research–practice collaborations and proactively serving as an informational link to practitioners and the policy community. Translational Criminology advances this mission by illustrating examples of how research is converted into criminal justice practice.
FROM THE DIRECTORS

Congratulations and thanks to all who participated in, and contributed to, the CEBCP’s 2019 Annual Symposium. This year’s symposium—our largest yet—had over 375 registrants from 190 organizations, representing 34 states and Canada. We covered research on some of the most pressing topics in criminal justice, including mental health crises response; identity theft; mass violence; crime hot spots; the opioid epidemic; criminal justice technologies; school resource officers; and crime networks and investigations. The symposium also highlighted panels focused on translating, implementing, and institutionalizing research into practice, and practitioner-led efforts in evidence-based policing and data collection. We look forward to seeing everyone again next year. The tentative date for the 2020 CEBCP Symposium is Monday, June 29, 2020.

Two central goals drive our annual symposium and anchor all that we do here in the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. Our aim is to not only engage in rigorous and impactful research, but to also translate, disseminate, implement, and institutionalize research into practice and policy. All CEBCP activities, including our efforts to train new scholars, are sharply centered on these goals. Our symposia, congressional briefings, and workshops bring together key stakeholders from multiple perspectives on topics that need more basic and evaluation research, or that require ideas for translation and implementation. These synergistic activities are also where many research-practitioner partnerships develop, and where our students learn about the collaborative and wide-ranging nature of our field. The Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy and the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame Inductions recognize and reward those very special individuals who have taken the often difficult road toward these goals. Translational Criminology itself is a vehicle in which researchers and practitioners can showcase their partnerships and examples of their evidence-based crime policies and practices.

This issue is filled with descriptions of these efforts. Ed McGarrell (a Distinguished Achievement Award recipient) and his colleagues dig into the importance of nonfatal shooting data to better inform violence prevention. Allison Redlich and Samantha Luna share their efforts to build research evidence for criminal discovery policies. Cynthia Lum and Christopher Koper summarize their recent work on understanding the evidence base for body-worn cameras. Colleagues from New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services share the research-driven practices they are implementing under the leadership of Michael Green, one of this year’s Distinguished Achievement Award winners. Two police officers—Jeremiah Johnson and Mia-Marie Magnusson—showcase their ongoing efforts and commitment to both generate and implement research in their agencies. A large collaborative, known as Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY), writes about its community crime-prevention efforts in Seattle. And Dana Hunt, from Abt Associates, has an op-ed about what more is needed from a research and practice standpoint to continue to fight the opioid epidemic. We showcase the stories of our award winners, who personify and epitomize the values of evidence-based crime policy.

In this issue, we also recognize, in memoriam, Jeremy Richman, a champion of improving the use of research in practice in the very difficult area of mass violence. His efforts and spirit drive home how difficult and challenging this world can be. This year, the CEBCP, through the leadership of Christopher Koper (principal fellow of the CEBCP) and Daniel Nagin (CEBCP advisory board member), has been focusing on bringing to light the evidence and the evidence gaps surrounding mass violence. With colleagues from around the United States, and with the support of the National Science Foundation and the Harry F. Guggenheim Foundation, the CEBCP supported a research workshop and congressional briefing on this topic, the result of which will be published in the American Society of Criminology’s flagship policy journal, *Criminology & Public Policy*, in 2020.

Finally, we have some wonderful news to share. Two of our graduate research assistants received their PhDs this spring—Sangjun Park and Amber Scherer. Park, who wrote his dissertation on examining the law of crime concentrations across all policing jurisdictions of an entire country, has accepted a tenure-track assistant professor position at Southern Utah State. Scherer examined the investigative practices of robbery units across the United States and will continue as the HIDTA-GMU coordinator and research associate with the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA. Our deputy director, Professor Charlotte Gill, was also awarded the Rising Star Award by the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia (SCHEV). These are just a few examples of the great team of faculty and students we have here at the CEBCP.

Again, we thank all of you who have supported the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy throughout the years!

Cynthia Lum
Director and Editor of *Translational Criminology*

David Weisburd
Executive Director
1. Christine Sim, George Mason University Criminology, Law and Society graduate student 2. Awards 3. Professor Laurie Robinson presenting the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy to Michael Green 4. Captain Tim Hegarty, from the Riley County (Kansas) Police Department 5. Chief Howard Hall (middle) and Assistant Chief James Chapman (left) receiving the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame Award from Police Foundation President Jim Burch (right) 6. Dean Ann Ardis of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences welcomes symposium participants 7. Professor Jerry Ratcliffe from Temple University
The Importance of Nonfatal Shooting Data to Inform Violence-Prevention Policy, Practice, and Research

BY EDMUND F. MCGARRELL, NATALIE KROOVAND HIPPLE, BETH M. HUEBNER, AND MALLORY O’BRIEN

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Although firearms violence in the United States has declined since its peak in the early 1990s, gun crime remains high. Firearms violence is largely concentrated among a small number of communities and microplaces within neighborhoods (Weisburd, Eck, Braga, Telep, & Cave, 2016; Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012), and among young men of color and persons involved in gang activity (Papachristos, 2009; Rosenfeld, Bray, & Egley, 1999). Homicide remains the leading cause of death for young African American men (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2019). The costs of gun-related violence are significant. Nationally, annual health care costs related to treating firearms injuries are estimated at more than $600 million (Howell & Abraham, 2013).

Much of the research on firearms violence has focused on homicide data. These data are considered highly reliable and are widely available through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. Nevertheless, homicides are rare events and do not capture the full scope of gun-related crime. Emerging research suggests that more than 85 percent of shooting victims survive, and that there are more than 1 million shooting survivors living in the United States today (Kalesan et al., 2017). The prevalence of gun crime highlights the importance of understanding nonfatal shootings—shootings that harm one or more persons but where the victim does not die.

With these issues in mind, the authors embarked on a four-city study of gun homicides and nonfatal shootings that was funded by the National Institute of Justice. Specifically, we examined patterns of gun homicides and nonfatal shootings in the Midwestern cities of Detroit, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. The goal of the study was to improve data collection on gun violence and to facilitate a better understanding of nonfatal shootings, including the spatial and network dimensions of gun violence.

Definitional and Logistical Issues for Capturing Nonfatal Shootings

Most law enforcement agency records management systems (RMS) do not readily capture nonfatal shootings. Similarly, in most cases agencies are unable to easily extract data about nonfatal shootings, including simple counts, from their RMS. The two major national crime reporting systems, the UCR and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) do not include a specific category for nonfatal shootings. The absence of a federal reporting requirement for nonfatal shooting incidents may be one reason for the lack of widespread record keeping or tracking by an agency’s RMS. According to UCR and NIBRS definitions (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013a, 2013b), nonfatal shooting incidents are categorized as
aggravated assaults along with stabbings, and so on. They can be "lost" or subsumed under other crime incidents because of the Hierarchy Rule. For example, an armed robbery in which the victim is non-fatally shot will be categorized as an armed robbery. Conceptually, the conversion to the NIBRS system should facilitate tracking of nonfatal shooting incidents. NIBRS allows for multiple crime types per incident and captures additional data on each incident, including whether a firearm was used and if there was an injury. However, even with an aggravated assault involving a firearm and an injury to the victim, the injury categories such as "possible internal injury," "apparent broken bone," or "apparent minor injury," do not clearly specify whether the incident involved a nonfatal shooting.

Additionally, definitional issues arise in terms of when an incident should be documented as a nonfatal shooting. Some law enforcement agencies, though we are unsure how common the practice is, count a shooting intended to strike another person as a nonfatal shooting (i.e., a shot was fired), despite the fact that the bullet did not hit the intended victim. More commonly, agencies that make an effort to collect data on nonfatal shootings seem to concentrate on incidents that include an actual injury to a victim. Yet, even here, the questions of what constitutes a gun (e.g., Is an air rifle or BB gun included?) and what constitutes a nonfatal shooting injury (e.g., What if the injury is from shrapnel such as flying wood or glass and not a bullet?) create classification challenges. These facts created measurement issues across the four surveyed cities, so we developed a mechanism for counting nonfatal shootings that a broad range of agencies could adopt.

In consultation with our partnering police agencies, our team recommends the following three criteria for identifying a nonfatal shooting incident: criminal intent, a weapon with a powder discharge, and a penetrating wound from a firearm (Hipple & Huebner, 2018; Huebner & Hipple, 2018). This definition, like criminal homicide, excludes self-defense and self-inflicted shootings. It also focuses on weapons that are the subject of most federal and state regulations and defined by 18 U.S. Code § 921(a)(3). Focusing on incidents with physical gunshot wounds increases reliability because these events are more likely to come to the attention of law enforcement.

**What We Learned through Inclusion of Nonfatal Shootings**

Several important findings have emerged from this project. First, work by Hipple and Magee (2017) in Indianapolis, Indiana, suggests that nonfatal shootings occur at a ratio of approximately four nonfatal shootings to each gun homicide, and these findings have been replicated in the other study sites (Hipple, Thompson, Huebner, & Magee, 2019). Second, the findings also highlight the similarities and differences between fatal and nonfatal shootings. For example, Hipple and Magee (2017) found differences in terms of victim age, wound severity, and shooting motive between fatal and nonfatal shootings in Indianapolis. On average, gun homicide victims were about four years older than nonfatal shooting victims and suffered from more serious gunshot wounds. In incidents where the motive was known, incidents related to drugs, retaliation, or revenge were more likely to result in a homicide when compared with other known motives. The results suggest that nonfatal shootings are a unique analytic case.

The data-collection efforts also allowed us to consider a number of individual, incident, and community-level factors associated with nonfatal shootings. Using data from Indianapolis and St. Louis, we considered how victim characteristics, circumstances of the crime incident, and the nature of the injury influence initial victim cooperation with the police in nonfatal shootings (Hipple et al., 2019). In total, 43 percent of victims did not cooperate with the investigation, and individuals involved in interpersonal disputes or drug-related incidents were less likely to cooperate with the police when compared with robbery-motivated gun crimes. Substantial differences also emerged by race. White victims were more likely to cooperate when the injury was serious, but injury seriousness was unrelated to cooperation for nonwhite victims.

The inclusion of nonfatal shooting data also significantly enhances the study of the spatial patterns of firearms violence. Including nonfatal shooting data provides more reliable estimates of spatial patterns. Using the combined fatal and nonfatal shooting data reveals that firearms violence is concentrated at the microlevel, consistent with prior research (Weisburd et al., 2016; Weisburd et al., 2012). For example, Magee (2018) found that fatal and nonfatal shootings in Indianapolis occurred in less than 2 percent of the street segments in Indianapolis during a three-year period. These patterns call for deeper analysis of the role of factors such as gang disputes, drug markets, domestic violence, or problem places that drive this spatial concentration.

**Implications for Policy**

Despite the prevalence and serious costs of gun crime in many cities, definitional, process, and technological limitations of data collection around shootings inhibit the development of evidence-based responses to the problem. These data-collection challenges limit research and crime analysis potential for understanding the drivers of gun crime, restricts the ability to connect information across cases, and hinders the development of evidence-based prevention. We can draw a parallel to public health whereby epidemiologists would be limited to only studying health issues resulting in death without having an understanding of the relative risk of death given a base population of nonfatal outcomes. Our point of emphasis is that nonfatal shooting data should be used along with homicide data to better understand patterns of lethal and near-lethal gun crime.

Data should drive effective policies, criminal justice and public health responses, and prevention. Consistently defining, collecting, and analyzing nonfatal shooting data, coupled with homicide data, are integral first steps. The research products developed as part of this project provide a primer for scholars, practitioners, and students interested...
in learning more about, and collecting additional data on, gun crime.

A focus on nonfatal shootings also provides an opportunity to examine criminal justice system processes in terms of responses to firearms violence. Beginning with the criminal justice system’s response to the crime scene, nonfatal shootings do not receive the same attention as their fatal counterparts. This study, consistent with limited research on the issue (see Cook, Braga, Turchan, & Barao, forthcoming) finds that arrest clearance rates for nonfatal shootings are considerably lower than for homicides. Absent reliable data on nonfatal shootings, it is difficult to develop accountability mechanisms for assessing criminal justice system responses to these incidents.

As part of this project, we worked with the local police department in three of the four sites to implement or continue nonfatal shooting reviews to encourage better data systems and data-driven responses to gun violence. Milwaukee, Wisconsin has convened homicide reviews since 2006 and had already implemented biweekly nonfatal shooting reviews. Detroit, Michigan, and Indianapolis used the Milwaukee process (city.milwaukee.gov/hrc) as their model and tailored their reviews to the needs of the participating agencies and the local context. The reviews are labor intensive and dependent on the commitment and leadership of the law enforcement agency and its partners, as well as collaboration within and between participating agencies. Reviews are one mechanism to sharpen data collection on gun crime, but systematic, routinized data-collection processes would facilitate more efficient and effective responses to gun crime overall. See Hipple, McGarrell, O’Brien, and Huebner (2017) for a primer on this process.

In conclusion, the results of this work suggest the need for more data on nonfatal shootings to understand the complex nature of firearms violence. In addition to the benefits related to basic firearms violence research and crime analysis, comprehensive data support more meaningful evaluation studies of violence prevention strategies. In the past, firearms violence evaluations have often faced a difficult choice between being restricted to homicide data, resulting in reliance on rare events in all but the largest cities, or including aggravated assaults and robberies, the majority of which do not involve a firearm.

References


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Building the Evidence Base for Criminal Discovery Policies

BY ALLISON D. REDLICH AND SAMANTHA LUNA

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The turning over of evidence, or discovery, is an integral part of the U.S. adversarial justice systems. Recently, there has been a push for reforms in this area, in large part because of wrongful convictions. In numerous high-profile wrongful conviction cases, the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense.1 One such case is that of Michael Morton, who spent nearly 25 years in a Texas prison before being exonerated of his wife’s murder (Morton, 2014). Unbeknownst to Morton and his defense attorney, the prosecutor, Ken Anderson, withheld evidence pointing to Morton’s innocence. Years later, after DNA was tested and found to not match Morton (but rather matched a convicted felon who murdered another woman after Morton’s wife), a Public Information Act request revealed an eyewitness account of the crime that did not implicate Morton as the perpetrator. Three noteworthy outcomes ensued. First, Morton was awarded $1.9 million (plus a monthly annuity of $12,000) in compensation for his wrongful conviction. Second, the prosecutor, Anderson, who had since become a judge, was criminally prosecuted, sentenced to 10 days in jail, and disbarred. Although prosecutors enjoy full immunity from civil suits, they are very rarely held criminally responsible. Third, Texas overhauled their discovery policy. In the 2013 Michael Morton Act, Texas mandated an “open-file” discovery policy, such that prosecutors in essence open their files, allowing defendants nearly full access.

Several other states have experienced wrongful convictions like that of Michael Morton’s and are now engaged in heated debates over discovery reform. For example, in October 2018, the New York City Bar Association organized an event on this topic, stating that, “whether New York should amend its criminal discovery practices, and in what manner, has become perhaps the most hotly debated topic in our criminal justice system.” And after two failed attempts at reform in 2014 and 2017, the Supreme Court of Virginia in September 2018 approved discovery-related changes that will require defendants have access to police reports and other documentation.

The Modeling Decision-Making in the Legal System (MoDiLS) laboratory in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University has conducted research investigating the process of discovery from a psycho-legal perspective. One aspect of this research is to examine decision-making, such as prosecutors deciding how much evidence to turn over and under what conditions, and—in an ongoing study—defendants deciding to take a plea when more or less discovery has been made available. Another aspect is to address controversial facets of discovery to help inform policy debates. In particular, one controversy concerns discovery responsibilities in the context of guilty pleas. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in United States v. Ruiz that exculpatory impeachment evidence (i.e., evidence that speaks to the credibility of witnesses), such as knowledge that a witness was drunk, need not be turned over to the defense during plea negotiations. The majority’s reason was that such information is important to the fairness of a trial but not the voluntariness of a plea. This ruling has generated much confusion and criticism (e.g., Alkon, 2014). Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted and extended the Ruiz decision to the traditional form of exculpatory material (Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 2018). Because guilty pleas account for about 95 percent of convictions in the United States, it is essential to understand how discovery policies impact attitudes and behaviors.

In one study, led by Professor Jenia Turner of the Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University (Turner & Redlich, 2016), we surveyed prosecutors and defense attorneys about their pre-plea discovery practices. Two neighboring states—Virginia and North Carolina—with very different discovery policies were selected. Since 2004, North Carolina has had an open-file discovery policy; in contrast, until recently, Virginia had a very restrictive policy. Virginia prosecutors do not have to share police or witness reports with the defense, though—beginning

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1 Per the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland (1963), exculpatory evidence (evidence that points to a defendant’s innocence) must be turned over to the defense before trial. The Supreme Court extended this decision, in Kyles v. Whitley (1995), to include evidence that is not necessarily in the prosecutor’s possession; in large part, this decision was meant to deter police from not handing over evidence to the prosecutor (and thereby allowing the state to claim ignorance of the exculpatory material).
July 1, 2019, when the new rules go into effect—they will. Working with several state associations, we were able to survey 637 prosecutors and defense attorneys. Our questions focused on the reported turning over of specific types of evidence pre-plea and the perceived advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery. In general, we found that in North Carolina (the open-file jurisdiction), significantly more evidence was provided to the defense, though there were some exceptions (e.g., witness criminal records) and stark perceptual differences between prosecutors and defense attorneys. For example, whereas almost all North Carolina and Virginia prosecutors (97 to 99 percent) claimed to always turn over factually exculpatory material, only 35 to 46 percent of defense attorneys perceived that prosecutors did the same. And although legal actors from both states identified benefits and drawbacks, none of the legal actors actually practicing open-file (i.e., North Carolina) claimed that such discovery policies had no advantages, and 30 percent believed there to be no disadvantages, views that diverged from those not practicing it (i.e., Virginia). Overall, Turner and Redlich (2016) concluded that open-file discovery results in more informed, efficient, and fairer processes.

MoDILS has also conducted laboratory experiments to examine discovery. We describe our most recent one here. The experiments utilized a paradigm developed by Lucas, Graif, and Loviglia (2006). Lucas et al., provided mock prosecutors with a set of case materials, instructed them that their role was to seek a conviction, and asked them to make discovery decisions. They manipulated whether the crime was an assault or a murder. Lucas et al., hypothesized that more severe crimes would increase the importance of obtaining a conviction, which would, in turn, increase misconduct—or the withholding of exculpatory evidence. Their hypotheses were supported; in brief, those prosecuting a murder rated the importance of a conviction as higher and were more likely to withhold exculpatory evidence than those prosecuting the assault.

Using this basic paradigm and materials, and with funding from the Charles Koch Foundation, we examined the influence of two discovery policies on prosecutor behavior—open-file and the Supreme Court decision in Ruiz. Again, using the same base materials, we (Luna & Redlich, 2019) manipulated whether participants were told they worked in an open-file jurisdiction and whether they were told about the Ruiz decision (both were clearly defined for participants). Our primary dependent measures were the amount of discovery turned over and exculpatory evidence withheld, and the plea-trial decision. We hypothesized that participants in the open-file conditions would turn over more discovery (including exculpatory evidence) and those in the Ruiz conditions would turn over significantly less than their counterparts. Our hypotheses were supported. Mock prosecutors in the open-file condition turned over, on average, 16 more items of evidence, and significantly more exculpatory items. In contrast, mock prosecutors in the Ruiz conditions turned over nine fewer pieces of evidence and withheld significantly more exculpatory evidence. A point of importance is that whether participants offered a plea or opted for trial (a decision made postdiscovery) did not alter the effect of the Ruiz manipulation. That is, whereas exculpatory material should not be withheld in the context of trial (and is considered misconduct to do so), it may be reasonable to expect exculpatory material to be withheld in the context of pleas, especially per the Ruiz decision and the information given to participants.

An additional question we investigated was whether mock prosecutors were aware that they were withholding exculpatory evidence, and why or why not. We found that the majority, about two-thirds, did not acknowledge withholding important information. Among those who claimed not to have withheld important evidence, the most cited rationale reflected that it was unethical or unfair not to turn over evidence. Excluding those who truly did not withhold the exculpatory evidence, it would appear that those who claimed not to have withheld but actually did were unable to recognize the exculpatory information as important to the defense. However, among the third of participants who admitted to withholding important evidence, almost three-quarters of the rationales indicated that they did so because they wanted to win a conviction or that turning the evidence over would have hurt their case.

In conclusion, states are increasingly seeking to reform their criminal discovery policies. The research conducted by the MoDILS lab described here addresses two policies, one intended as a reform (open-file policies) and the other that has sparked intense criticism and can be construed as an antireform (the Supreme Court decision in Ruiz). To our knowledge, neither policy had been subjected to empirical study indicating that it may be premature to adopt or abandon either policy. The results from our research, while preliminary and in need of replication with actual prosecutors and defendants, provides an important first step in growing an evidence base to address the problems and proposed solutions with criminal discovery. For more about the MoDILS research on this topic and others, please visit our website at themodilslab.wixsite.com/modils.

References
The Evidence Base for Body-Worn Cameras: What Law Enforcement Leaders Still Need to Know

BY CYNTHIA LUM AND CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER

Cynthia Lum is a professor of criminology, law and society and the director of the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) at George Mason University.

Christopher S. Koper is an associate professor of criminology, law and society and principal fellow of the CEBCP at George Mason University.

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) are one of the most rapidly spreading technologies in policing today. As of 2016, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that 60 percent of local police departments and 49 percent of sheriffs’ offices in the United States were using BWCs for all of their officers. The U.S. federal government has facilitated this trend by providing tens of millions of dollars for BWC acquisition and training since 2015.

The adoption of BWCs in the United States has been propelled by a crisis of legitimacy in policing, caused largely by controversial police shootings and the perception of aggressive crime control techniques, particularly in communities of color. Advocates of BWCs believe that the use of these cameras can reduce unjustified use of force by police, promote accountability for police misconduct, discourage unfounded or frivolous complaints against police, and improve community-police interactions more generally. However, some have also worried that BWCs might encourage de-policing, encroach on individuals’ privacy, discourage crime reporting and cooperation from community members, or have other unintended effects. There are also questions about the best uses and policies for implementing BWCs. Widespread adoption of BWCs occurred in the absence of much evidence to guide police on these issues.

Researchers have now developed a substantial body of research on BWCs in just the last few years. In the most comprehensive review to date on BWCs, we (and coauthors Megan Stoltz and Amber Scherer) reviewed 70 studies that have examined more than 110 outcomes associated with this technology for Criminology & Public Policy. These studies have been conducted in a variety of settings, including small and large agencies in the United States and other countries.

In general, research findings indicate that officers seem supportive of BWCs, particularly as they gain more experience with the technology. Increasingly, officers value BWCs as a tool for their protection (against false or exaggerated accusations of wrongdoing), for evidence collection of criminal wrongdoing, and to increase the accuracy of their reporting. It may be fair to say, however, that BWCs have not produced dramatic changes in police behavior, for better or worse. Although early findings indicated BWCs reduce the use of force by officers, more recent findings have been mixed, perhaps as a result of variations in agency policies regarding how the devices should be used (For example, whether or not they should be activated at all times.). A more encouraging finding is that BWCs seem to reduce complaints against officers. The question remains, however, whether and to what degree these changes reflect community members’ reporting behaviors (they might be less inclined to file minor or unfounded complaints), changes in officer or citizen behaviors toward one another, or improvements in police-community relationships. Indeed, it is not clear from available evidence that BWCs improve community members’ satisfaction with police encounters, as might be expected if BWCs were having substantial effects on police behavior. In summation, BWCs may curb some of the worst police behaviors but have little impact otherwise.

Similarly, fears of de-policing (sometimes referred to as the “Ferguson Effect”) from the use of BWCs have also not been realized. Arrests seem as likely to increase as to decrease with the use of BWCs, perhaps suggesting that adoption of the cameras leads to more formal and legalistic responses to citizens but only in some contexts. Otherwise, BWCs do not seem to have discouraged proactive field contacts or officer-initiated activities. But police proactivity is complex; community members might want some types of police proactivity to decline (for example, indiscriminate stop, question, and frisks or the use of misdemeanor arrests for
As the evidence base grows, the field should also gain a better sense of BWCs on the behavior of community members. While most studies for example, support for BWCs can be contingent on a community member's age, race, and experience with the police (i.e., younger and nonwhite individuals may see fewer benefits of BWCs). Additionally, community satisfaction with the police seems to be determined by the way officers treat and interact with people, not necessarily whether an officer is wearing a camera. (In fact, studies suggest that people who have encounters with police cannot consistently remember if officers were wearing BWCs.) Studies also indicate varying results of the impact of encounters with police cannot consistently remember if officers were wearing BWCs, although this support comes with important caveats. For their part, community members are also generally supportive of police using BWCs, but this may not necessarily translate into more positive views of police. BWCs also might exacerbate an already challenged relationship between the community and the police, especially if community members expect the cameras to be used to increase police accountability and transparency, but officers primarily use them to increase the accountability of community members. Indeed, studies have found that BWC footage is most often used to prosecute individuals for crimes they commit and can be useful in increasing the probability of pleas, convictions, and criminal charging.

Overall, then, perhaps anticipated effects from BWCs have been overestimated. If true, this should not be surprising, given the mixed, modest, and sometimes unintended effects that technologies have more generally in policing. However, several caveats are in order. Although the number of BWC studies is large overall, the number of evaluations for any particular outcome is still often small, and findings are thus subject to change. As the evidence base grows, the field should also gain a better sense of contextual factors (e.g., agency policies, uses of BWCs, and community contexts) that might be associated with desired and undesired outcomes.

Finally, the research evidence is still lacking on many important questions about BWCs. For example, one question that has yet to be studied is whether BWCs can reduce criminal justice disparities, in particular those disparities resulting from implicit or explicit biases. It is also unknown whether BWCs affect the legality of police actions (for example, adherence to Fourth Amendment standards), whether BWCs affect community members’ willingness to report crime and cooperate in police investigations, or whether there are differential impacts of BWCs on different groups of people or officers. Perhaps most importantly, the effects of BWCs on police organizations are still unknown. If BWCs are to produce substantial changes in police behavior and performance, these changes are most likely to come through their effects on processes and systems in police organizations, particularly those pertaining to training, deployment, supervision, and accountability. Determining how BWCs affect the processes and outcomes of internal police investigations is particularly central to assessing whether BWCs achieve the purpose that was arguably the main driver of their adoption (i.e., improving transparency and accountability in the investigation of serious police misconduct, particularly surrounding the use of deadly force). These changes will come slowly, if at all, and will require long-term attention from the field. Nevertheless, they may be the most consequential for community-police relations and police legitimacy in the long run.

Given this evidence base, agencies should carefully consider and have meaningful conversations with their communities and officers about whether to adopt BWCs and what expectations and concerns community members and officers have about them. If agencies do decide to adopt BWCs, they should consider the purposes for which BWCs are being adopted, consult research and policy guidance on BWCs, and consider how they might evaluate their own outcomes with BWCs. Any technology, including BWCs, should be adopted with an eye toward how that technology might advance practices that are known to be evidence-based. Although more research is needed, law enforcement agencies might consider how BWCs might be used for training, mentorship, and coaching.

In the meantime, agencies will almost certainly continue to adopt BWCs. Given the ubiquity of personal video and audio recording devices, more and more police agencies are likely to conclude that they need to have their own recording of events for community-police encounters with negative outcomes. A growing expectation among the public that the use of BWCs is a marker of a responsive, transparent, and legitimate police organization is also likely. This will put considerable technical and financial strains on police (and prosecutors) that will also need further attention in cost-efficiency analyses. Nevertheless, the behavioral changes in the field may be modest and mixed, at least in the short run.

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The Evolution of New York’s SNUG Street Outreach Program

BY LEIGH BATES, TERRY SALO, AND MICHAEL WOOD

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**How SNUG Began**

In 2009, the New York State Senate added funding to the state budget to support street outreach programs that would steer at-risk individuals away from gun violence. Ten local programs received funding to provide outreach, prevention, and intervention services, using the CeaseFire public health approach in Chicago as a model for that work. CeaseFire and its related “pulling levers” approach have been shown to be an effective strategy in reducing gun violence. New York’s program was named SNUG (“guns” spelled backward), and the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) of New York State was designated to administer the funding for the program. While the grant awards supported direct services in communities across the state, the funding was not allocated for overall administration, support, and oversight, a fact that would adversely affect early implementation efforts.

At the onset, DCJS and many of the jurisdictions involved lacked familiarity with CeaseFire and had to learn about the model quickly. CeaseFire’s core components of community mobilization, youth outreach, public education, faith-based leader involvement, and law enforcement participation became the basis for each SNUG site’s program objectives. Coalitions consisting of community residents, organizations, schools, faith leaders, and police were formed to plan antiviolence strategies and mobilize communities.

As DCJS began implementation, it was clear that grantees would need assistance to establish viable programs and run them effectively. The model called for using credible messengers to detect, interrupt, and intervene in high-risk disputes before violence could occur. Recruiting, hiring, and training suitable staff were daunting tasks, and CeaseFire staff worked closely with DCJS to provide training and assistance to nonprofit community organizations receiving the grants to achieve this objective. SNUG began operations in New York in 2010, with each

1 Specific information about the Chicago program can be found at cureviolence.org/post/resource/evaluation-of-ceasefire-chicago. Additionally, information about the impacts of CeaseFire and other pulling levers strategies can be found at www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=11.

**Research and Practice**

Five of the 10 SNUG programs that began in 2010 received funding to continue operating for a second year. It was at this point that DCJS contracted with a research team from the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) to obtain objective feedback on program implementation and what could be done to improve operations. DCJS tasked the research team with evaluating the program’s fidelity to the CeaseFire model and making recommendations for improvement.

Focusing their analysis on the SNUG sites that were continued for a second year, the researchers made several recommendations, most significant of which was to limit the program to locations in the state with the highest levels of gun violence. When SNUG began, data had not been used to identify the locations initially receiving funding. To implement decision making that was more data-driven, the next SNUG grant solicitation identified a minimum rate of shooting incidents per capita that would qualify communities for funding through the program.

Two other key recommendations from the RIT evaluation were less easy to implement. First, the report recommended that DCJS enhance statewide oversight and management of the SNUG programs. The program was new, the model unconventional, and local programs were operating with limited oversight and new staff, many of whom had been incarcerated at one time or had little work experience.
Deputy Commissioner Michael C. Green was appointed to lead the veteran team members, would be key in the development of the SNUG Harvard University. during JustLeadershipUSA’s Emerging Leaders training at Francis Stone and Ta’Isha Gist, program managers with SNUG, gained from working in a hospital setting, coupled with the expertise of social work program a few years later.

Many steps were taken to strengthen the program during this period. DCJS established statewide guidelines for hiring decisions, which included formal, multiagency hiring panels and oversight of applicant interviews. While programs continued to hire formerly incarcerated individuals for street-outreach work, job applicants were now required to have at least 18 months of time living crime-free in the community before being considered. Being under parole or probation supervision was not a prohibition to being hired, but approval was required by the supervising agency.

As the new SNUG model took shape, DCJS developed and implemented a comprehensive gun violence reduction program in the state’s urban centers outside of New York City known as the Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative. GIVE funded personnel, such as prosecutors, crime analysts, and field intelligence officers, as well as overtime and equipment, and provided technical assistance and training at no cost to help participating agencies implement evidence-based strategies as designed. Through the GIVE initiative, district attorney offices, probation departments, sheriff offices in 17 counties upstate and on Long Island, and 20 police departments received more than $13.3 million annually to reduce shootings and homicides.

To receive funding, agencies were required to submit a comprehensive violence reduction strategy that incorporated evidence-based strategies—hot-spots policing, focused deterrence, crime prevention through environmental design, and street outreach—and principles of problem-oriented policing and procedural justice into all elements of the plan. Use of data and intelligence and coordination with a state-supported network of Crime Analysis Centers are also key elements of those comprehensive strategies.

Including street outreach as one of GIVE’s primary violence reduction strategies provided DCJS the opportunity to integrate SNUG into these local efforts to reduce gun violence. Using this new GIVE framework, DCJS fostered and facilitated working relationships between local law enforcement and SNUG sites. Clark worked with police departments to explain the benefits of the SNUG model and establish protocols for police and SNUG interactions. Most recently, each SNUG site produced a short video, designed to be shown during roll call, to educate police officers about the program and introduce them to SNUG staff who work in the zones they patrol.

**Establishing SNUG as a Program Model**

By 2016, GIVE and SNUG were both well established, but DCJS continued to rely on assistance from Chicago Cure Violence (formerly CeaseFire Chicago) for training and database administration. The evolution that SNUG underwent, however, resulted in fundamental differences between New York’s program and the Cure Violence model, which led to challenges with training and implementation. To address this, DCJS hired Damon Bacote as the SNUG training director and developed its own training program to ensure all street-outreach staff were equipped with the skills and resources necessary to work under New York’s model. A trained social worker who also had experience as a SNUG program manager, Bacote uniquely understood the challenges of managing a street-outreach program.
Working together, Clark and Bacote developed two training programs that incorporated concepts unique to the New York model: a 40-hour course required for all new SNUG employees and a 32-hour course for new SNUG supervisors. With the implementation of this training program, SNUG became a self-sufficient program. Transitioning away from Cure Violence, however, required DCJS to develop a database to replace the Cure Violence system that had been used to track program activity and monitor operations since its inception in 2010.

DCJS hired an independent contractor to build and maintain a SNUG database specifically for New York, and Clark and Bacote worked closely with the developer to ensure the new system had appropriate data collection and reporting capabilities to monitor implementation and program effectiveness. DCJS also worked closely with each SNUG program and police departments that patrol those locations to collect and monitor shooting data.

By 2017, the transition was complete. New York’s independent model was named SNUG Street Outreach, with staff uniforms, signs, and public education materials all featuring a new logo to brand the program and reinforce its independence.

**Strengthening the SNUG Team**

In addition to training and database administration, many other steps were taken to promote team building and program success. Clark and Bacote conducted monthly site visits to all programs, traveling hundreds of miles each week to provide technical assistance and oversight. Additionally, a group email list was created so the two could communicate frequently with program managers, who also could communicate with each other. Monthly videoconferences with all sites participating were held, which contributed to further development of the program and team.

One of the most impressive tools for developing program cohesion was the SNUG biannual conference. Attended by staff from all sites, the two-day conference featured workshops on a variety of topics and provided the opportunity for professional development. Staff also had the chance to meet face-to-face, allowing them to share stories, ideas, and challenges so they could learn from each other. DCJS commissioner Green regularly attended these conferences to hear first-hand from program staff about the challenges they faced and to reinforce the agency’s commitment to the important work they do. The topic of trauma—and the challenges it presents—was first discussed by the SNUG team at one of these conferences.

Trauma is everywhere in street-outreach work, most obviously in dealing with the aftermath of a shooting or homicide. The work itself is focused on individuals and situations with the highest risk of shooting violence. As credible messengers, staff also have experienced gun violence on a personal level long before joining the ranks of SNUG. The discussion of these issues led to the creation of a trauma training program specifically designed for SNUG workers. Based on a DCJS-developed training program for police officers and executives, the trauma training program was offered in three locations around the state, allowing all SNUG employees to participate. Key components of the course included post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) awareness, getting help, mindfulness, identifying signs of stress, and meditation techniques for self-care.

**The Next Chapters in the NYS SNUG Street Outreach Model**

The next chapter in SNUG’s evolution, with a focus on trauma and victim services, is currently being written. DCJS is partnering with the New York State Office of Victim Services (OVS) to add a comprehensive social work component into the program. OVS administers federal funding for victim assistance, among other responsibilities, and has provided DCJS with funding that will allow each SNUG site to hire licensed social workers and case managers who will assist participants, victims of violence and their families, and SNUG staff with addressing the trauma they have experienced. This new social work component will have its own director and staff to ensure it has the same support, training, and oversight that have been critical to SNUG. In addition, licensed social workers will work at regional trauma hospitals to closely coordinate with the SNUG programs and facilitate access to clinical and hospital-based services. DCJS also has contracted with a research team from the University at Albany School of Public Health to assist with program implementation and evaluation, the results of which will be used to inform the program’s future growth.

The SNUG Street Outreach Program has played a key role in reducing gun violence and saving lives in 11 communities in New York. Examination of law enforcement data shows that shootings have decreased 12 percent across all SNUG jurisdictions since 2009, with 2018 showing the lowest reported number of shootings in a decade. Initially unfamiliar with the concept of street-outreach work, DCJS used evaluation, experience, and evidence to create a unique program that is a critical component in the most comprehensive gun violence prevention programming in the country. Incorporating trauma and victim services will further strengthen the SNUG Street Outreach Program, and DCJS will continue to evaluate the model and use research to inform program improvements.
Michael C. Green is Executive Deputy Commissioner of New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Service.

I started my career in criminal justice in 1987 as a prosecutor in Rochester, New York. Two years later, I was assigned my first murder case, and for the next 22 years, I prosecuted homicides. I went to the scenes of hundreds. I helped a mother whose son was killed establish a support group for survivors and listened to their heartbreaking stories.

That experience has had a profound effect on the way I approach my work. Early in my career, no one talked about evidence-based policing or crime policy. We researched case law, but we never researched solutions to the larger problems we were trying to solve—we simply tried cases, over and over again.

I recall one murder case I tried where the courtroom was packed and emotionally charged. As I walked out of the courtroom after the verdict, the first question I was asked by the press was if I was happy. It seemed like such a ridiculous question; there was nothing to be happy about. Yes, justice was done, but one young man was dead and the other was heading to prison for at least 25 years. I recall thinking there had to be more we could do.

While at the district attorney’s office, I had the good fortune of meeting John Klofas, a criminologist from Rochester Institute of Technology, and he introduced me to the idea of evidence-based work through SACSI (the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative) and his in-depth study of homicides in Rochester. When I was elected district attorney, John worked with me to do an independent analysis of policy changes I made to measure the impacts those changes had over time. The idea of evidence-based work had a strong appeal to me. I knew things would not change if we continued to do the same thing we had been doing for years.

Seven years ago, I accepted the position as the head of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), working for Governor Cuomo. This appointment provided a tremendous opportunity to encourage the use of evidence-based practices across the criminal justice system in New York. At DCJS, we administer a large portfolio of grant funds, which provided the opportunity to incentivize the implementation of this work.

For example, we transformed a $13.5 million funding stream that was not initially tied to evidence-based practices and created the Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative, which requires communities to use evidence-based strategies to address the problem of gun violence. Not only did we provide funding, but we also engaged leading people in the field of evidence-based crime policy to provide training and technical assistance to our local partners.

Another example is our Street Outreach initiative, known as SNUG. Embracing evidence of what works, we took a small, unorganized program and created a comprehensive street outreach program that operates in 11 cities and is supported by a $7.5 million state investment. We used feedback from an evaluation to establish a solid support structure around the program: a state coordinator, state training director, and our own SNUG Street Outreach training program. In partnership with the state’s Office of Victim Services, we recently added a state social work director who will oversee certified social workers and case managers embedded at each site, in recognition of the importance of trauma-informed services for SNUG participants and employees.

We also administer a $25 million alternatives-to-incarceration funding stream. We support programs that embrace evidence-based practice, making sure the right people are connected with the right evidence-based programs and services, and that the organizations and programs are structured to support positive outcomes.

We support evidence-based work in other ways. Working with George Mason University and the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, we sponsored a college-level course for police executives from across the state. We are transforming the 700-hour curriculum for the basic training course for police officers and including exposure to evidence-based practice. In connection with New York’s work to raise the age of criminal responsibility, we have provided extensive training and support to the 58 probation departments across the state on
evidence-based practices to better serve justice-involved youth. We administer a research consortium and online knowledge bank to support evidence-based work across the state. We support a network of crime analysis centers to assist with the work.

The transition from where we were when I started in this field to where we are today has not been easy. But at DCJS, we are committed to driving and supporting that change. While we still have a long way to go, we have made great progress. New York is the safest large state in the country by index crime rate. We also have the lowest incarceration rate of any large state. The number of people under probation supervision has declined dramatically. In 2017 and 2018, there were 549 and 560 homicides each year in a state of 19.4 million people. These are the lowest numbers New York has recorded since we started keeping track in 1975. Index crime and violent crime are also at all-time lows.

While there are many factors that influence these numbers, there is no doubt that the exposure to evidence-based crime policy has played a part in the success. A good example is the City of Newburgh. Five years ago, Newburgh had more than 50 shooting victims in a single year. As part of our GIVE initiative, Newburgh engaged in a focused deterrence, or GVI (group violence intervention), strategy. The number of shooting victims has plummeted in the wake of that implementation: 17 in 2017 and last year, fewer than 10.

I am truly honored by this award. To David, Laurie, Cynthia, and Chris; thank you so much. While I question whether I personally deserve this recognition, I do believe that the collective work of dedicated professionals at DCJS and our partners throughout the criminal justice system in New York is worthy of this recognition.

I have been very fortunate to have the support of many people. We couldn’t do this work without the support of Governor Cuomo and my partners in state government. Many in the field of evidence-based crime policy have unselfishly helped with our work. Our success would not be possible without our local partners across the state. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, none of this work would be possible without the great staff I have at DCJS. I have some amazingly talented and dedicated people on our team who share my passion for this work and are as good at what they do as anyone in the country. A special thanks to all of them.

At DCJS we believe we have an obligation to only implement and support work that has been proven to be, or is highly likely to be, impactful based on evidence. The stakes are too high not to. For some, it is a matter of life and death. For families and communities, it is a matter of despair or hope. We can and do make a difference!
Jersey City in the early 1990s was quite a different place to what it is these days. In a relatively small geographic area, it was not hard for us to identify more than 50 open-air drug markets that were stable markets from one year to the next. We didn’t think about it at the time, but I can see now that the experiments of the early 1990s, primarily led by David Weisburd and his long-time friend and colleague Lawrence Sherman, were groundbreaking, pioneering endeavors.

The experiments were innovative in design, theoretically rich, and complex in all aspects of negotiating with our policing partners. For me, as a young PhD student, it was like being thrown into the deep part of a thunderous ocean: If you didn’t swim, you would sink. I learned so much as a student of David’s about the craft of building the evidence base.

I would also like to acknowledge the people who have gathered together for the 2019 Symposium. The topics being addressed in this year’s symposium are of critical importance, not just to policing in the United States, but across the globe, including in my home country of Australia.

We know, for example, that mentally ill people represent about a quarter of all arrested offenders in Australia. Police in Australia are overwhelmed with the resource implications for transporting mentally ill people to emergency rooms, and they are constantly the first responders to a range of increasingly complex presentations.

In the area of traffic enforcement, my team at the University of Queensland just completed a rapid review from the Global Policing Database (see www.gpd.uq.edu.au) of the evidence pertaining to road policing. We know from that review that there have been more than 300 quasi-experimental, randomized field trials and systematic reviews that inform the evidence base on road-policing operations. David Weisburd and his team are presenting on research exploring the role of collective efficacy and health in crime hotspots. Our research in Australia—specifically the Australian Community Capacity Study (accs.project.uq.edu.au) involving six waves of more than 10,000 residents in community surveys since 2006—shows that policing agencies can be instrumental in encouraging collective efficacy when they foster a sense of effectiveness and when they use inclusive and partnership-oriented strategies that encourage perceptions of police legitimacy.

The role of police in schools is another topic for the symposium and also a matter of great policy interest in Australia: In Queensland alone, the police spend $10 million every year funding their presence in schools. The results from our proof-of-concept trial, called the Ability School Engagement Partnership Program—or ASEP for short—suggest that police investments would be best allocated in a manner that allows police to move across clusters of schools—perhaps servicing eight to 10 schools at a time—working in partnership with the schools to directly engage with young people and their guardian to explain the truancy laws in a procedurally just manner and thereby harmonize a young person’s learning opportunities for legal socialization.

And finally, the session this morning on mass violence is a policing issue that challenges the entire world. The recent experiences in Christchurch, New Zealand, are sobering. What we know, however, is that the legislation enacted in 1996 in Australia—that is often referred to as the Aussie Gun Buy-Back Program—had a significant and sustained impact on reducing gun-related homicides and serious injury. This is the type of evidence that can save lives.

What is clear to me is that evidence-based crime policy transcends jurisdictional boundaries: We build a global evidence base that can be translated and tested by police all over the world. I know that the work of the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy is shaping much of the policy and practice not just in North America but also across the southern parts of the globe. Of course, not all interventions work in all countries. But many of them do.

So, thank you for bestowing on me the Distinguished Achievement Award from the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. I am sincerely grateful and honored to accept this award.
The Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame

The Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame recognizes innovative law enforcement practitioners who have been relentless champions of generating and institutionalizing the use of research, analysis, and evidence-based practices in their agencies. Since the hall’s inception in 2010, 43 individuals have been inducted. Nominations for the 2020 class are now being accepted (see cebcp.org/hall-of-fame).

James Chapman

James “Jimmy” Chapman is currently the assistant chief of police for administration in the Roanoke County (Virginia) Police Department (RCPD), where he has served in many capacities for 24 years. Together with Chief Howard Hall (also inducted), Assistant Chief Chapman is recognized for supporting a major Strategies for Policing Innovation initiative to implement and evaluate a program to improve the police response to community members experiencing a mental health crisis. This new approach aimed to address a particularly underserved population—those who have called the police because they are in crisis but do not meet the criteria to be taken into emergency custody. Both Chapman and Hall were instrumental in leading the development of a response protocol in collaboration with a 24-hour mobile crisis response team, in which a mental health professional would take over crisis calls once officers stabilized the situation. The project required the sustained leadership, assistance, and commitment of both Hall and Chapman for the intervention and evaluation to be successfully implemented. Assistant Chief Chapman has also collaborated with the local community service board, as well as Mental Health America, to launch the first crisis intervention team (CIT) assessment center for the county.

Kenneth Clary

Captain Ken Clary has served for more than 25 years in the Iowa State Patrol and is the commander for Area C, which covers a quarter of the state and 28 counties. Clary is recognized for developing and institutionalizing an innovative and evidence-based initiative known as the Fatality Reduction Enforcement Effort in the Iowa State Police to combat fatal vehicle crashes on rural roads and communities, a major concern across most states in America. Clary used research evidence from place-based criminology, deterrence and opportunity theory research, problem-oriented principles, and police legitimacy to create the only existing program of its kind to reduce fatalities on rural roadways using a nonpunitive, preventative-based approach. In 2018 he piloted the program with a group of troopers who carried out nearly 10,000 implementations of the intervention as part of their daily activities. As of 2019, all of Clary’s state troopers are now carrying out the tactic as a normal part of their patrol, and they are on track to perform more than 40,000 implementations by the end of this year. Clary is especially recognized for institutionalizing the program into the regular deployment of his patrol officers, one of the most difficult achievements of evidence-based policing. Clary is a National Institute of Justice LEADS Scholar.

Andrew Fletcher

Andrew Fletcher is chief of the South Simcoe Police Service in Ontario Canada, where he has served since 2015. Before South Simcoe, Fletcher served for more than 30 years with the Halton Regional Police Service in Ontario, Canada. Fletcher is recognized for his extensive commitment to advancing evidence-based policing in both the South Simcoe Police Service, as well as with the Ontario Chiefs of Police and the Canadian Society of Evidence-Based Policing. His efforts in South Simcoe have focused on committing his agency to assessing and evaluating the agency’s mental health crisis response team program; designing and supporting research studies to test other interventions in his agency to determine their effectiveness; and also to developing core skills with his leadership team to more effectively use evidence-based approaches in their daily work. His efforts also extend beyond his agency. Due to his leadership in the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police, the OACP has become a full partner in the Canadian Society of Evidence-Based Policing. He has been working with other agencies to develop research efforts to evaluate supervised injection sites and has challenged programs that lack empirical support and that research has shown are ineffective. Fletcher is a recipient of the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal.
Howard Hall

Howard Hall has served as the chief of the Roanoke County (Virginia) Police Department (RCPD) since 2012. Prior to joining the RCPD, Chief Hall served for 26 years at all ranks and across multiple units in the Baltimore County Police Department, where he retired as captain in 2012. With Assistant Chief Chapman (also inducted), Hall is recognized for his efforts in supporting a major Strategies for Policing Innovation initiative to implement and evaluate a program to improve police response to community members experiencing a mental health crisis, as described previously. Hall and Chapman’s efforts are especially notable because only a few rigorous experimental studies exist that have tested police responses to those experiencing a mental health crisis. Hall’s sustained leadership, dedication to, and mentorship of others within this research-practitioner partnership were instrumental in ensuring the project was a success. Chief Hall is also recognized for his long-term commitment to evidence-based policing across two agencies. While at the Baltimore County Police Department, he led the implementation of data-driven approaches to policing, in particular, the Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS) model for traffic safety and crime prevention. He has served as a mentor to other officers and analysts in both agencies to sustain and institutionalize evidence-based practices.

Karin Schmerler

Karin Schmerler is one of the nation’s premier crime analysts, and she supported the Chula Vista, California, Police Department for 18 years. Before her policing service, she served as deputy and acting assistant director of the Program and Policy Support and Evaluation Division of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) at the U.S. Department of Justice. Schmerler is recognized for her extensive contributions to advancing problem-solving approaches in the field. In one example of many from within the Chula Vista Police Department, she coordinated the Bureau of Justice Assistance Strategies for Policing Innovation (SPI) initiative in her department, focusing on reducing repeat domestic violence calls and crime. Using a problem-oriented policing framework, she carried out an in-depth analysis of domestic violence, was central to the coordination of the department’s response, and also collaborated with researchers to ensure that impact evaluations of her agency’s efforts were undertaken. The Chula Vista Domestic Violence SPI initiative resulted in a significant decline in domestic violence incidents. She has also developed widely-used guides for the COPS office and the International Association of Crime Analysts on reducing disorder and nuisances at high-crime motels, as well as on problem-solving more generally. She is twice the recipient of the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing.

Jason Potts

Jason Potts is currently a lieutenant and patrol commander with the Vallejo Police Department (California), where he has served for more than 18 years. Potts is recognized for not only advancing evidence-based policing both in his agency and nationally, but also for his extensive efforts in building the evidence base for policing through the multiple research experiments that he has developed and led. He has completed two randomized controlled trials in his department that are focused on advancing knowledge of daily police operations. The first tested the effectiveness of automated license plate readers, finding that LPRs can improve an agency’s ability to detect stolen vehicles and identify stolen plates. He also led another experiment focused on the deterrent effects of flashing blue and red police lights on auto burglaries and theft in a high-density shopping area, finding that the intervention significantly reduced auto burglaries. He is currently implementing yet another experiment to test how virtual reality training may inform future police training. Potts has also contributed significantly to evidence-based policing beyond his agency and has been an integral part of the advancement of the American Society of Evidence-Based Policing. He is an alumni of the National Institute of Justice LEADS (Law Enforcement Advancing Data and Science) Scholars program.
Testing Cruise Lights on Patrol: An Illuminating Experience

BY JEREMIAH P. JOHNSON

Jeremiah Johnson is a sergeant in the Darien Police Department. This article builds on his work in the National Institute of Justice LEADs Program, an initiative to encourage more research evidence generation and use by police leaders.

Policing researchers have historically focused their efforts on studying large, high-crime, and urban jurisdictions (Lum & Koper, 2013; Walker, 1983). This has improved in recent decades with smaller cities, suburbs, and even rural communities receiving more scholarly attention. As a veteran officer serving an affluent, low-crime community situated on Connecticut’s “Gold Coast,” I sometimes struggled to find evidence-based policing strategies that could be generalized to my jurisdiction. What proportion of evidence-based research speaks to a community that hasn’t had a Uniform Crime Reporting-classifiable homicide since the 1980s and has no street gangs? However, while violent crime is a rarity in my jurisdiction, property crime is stubbornly persistent. Interestingly, most larcenies and burglaries in town lack the characteristic of forced entry. Residents frequently leave their homes and vehicles unlocked with cash, valuables, and even vehicle keys ripe for the picking. I have come to see this as a public safety paradox: Where perceptions of neighborhood safety are high, crime prevention behaviors may be infrequent or altogether absent. This in turn invites criminal victimization.

It was in this context that my police chief (since retired) directed every supervisor in the department to submit a proposal on how the agency should address overnight car crime. Many of my peers favored enforcement-based strategies to target offenders, such as bait cars and additional staffing to patrol in unmarked or “soft” cars to catch criminals “in the act.” The desire to ensnare rather than deter is firmly rooted in the DNA of American policing (Johnson, 2017). As much as I love catching bad guys, there is a rich supply of potential offenders who pursue crime based on disparate motives (e.g., poverty, addiction, sneaky thrills, etc.). For this reason, pure enforcement-based strategies do not guarantee crime reduction, especially in the long run. By shifting the strategic gaze beyond traditional enforcement, it became possible to see a constellation of alternative police interventions oriented toward crime prevention.

I devised a strategy that might seem counterintuitive to some practitioners—increasing the visibility of patrol units on the night shift using vehicle light bars. Our vehicle light bars are capable of several different lighting schemes; I proposed that officers patrol their beats with static red and blue cruise lights activated. This innovation is hardly new; 15 years prior, Charles Ramsey adopted a similar strategy in Washington, D.C., after observing Israeli police units patrolling with flashing lights activated (Fahrenthold, 2003).

Enhancing patrol visibility more generally is intended to place the community and potential offenders on notice that police units are present in their neighborhood. From a theoretical perspective, this tactic is congruent with aspects of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997), general deterrence (Sherman, 1990), the routine activities of places (Sherman, et al. 1989), and hot spots policing (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995). When I presented this intervention to my former police chief, I freely admitted to him that there was no research that would provide an empirical basis for this specific approach, although targeted presence was generally supported by existing research evidence. I could point to a handful of other organizations that had adopted the cruise light strategy, yet the approach had never been rigorously tested. However, I also pointed out that the agency’s go-to approach—using unmarked cars on crime—was not backed by extant evidence, either. In addition to crime prevention goals, I was motivated to test the relationship between patrol visibility and crime using this patrol light approach.

Unfortunately, the chief did not select my intervention. Following that chief’s retirement, the incoming chief was faced with the same persistent crime problem. I surmised that the new chief might be more receptive than his predecessor and resurrected my old proposal. This time I brought “back up” in the form of BetaGov, a research consortium that facilitates fast and free randomized controlled trials for public sector organizations. I was pleasantly surprised when I not only gained the support of my own chief, but also of three additional area police departments who were experiencing similar property crime challenges.

In total, the multisite study included three low-crime residential towns and one small city, all located along or within a few miles of the Connecticut shoreline. Since most of the agencies only ran their night shifts with a handful of patrol units, I quickly dismissed the idea of randomizing visibility by patrol sector. Like other prominent RCTs, I decided to randomize cruise light use by shift. (See an example of this in Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015.) Since all of the participating agencies were low-crime jurisdictions, it was important from a statistical standpoint to set the trial for a period long enough to capture a sufficient number of crime events. A trial of four months (122 days) was established based on historical crime data. This allowed for 61 “lights-on” nights and 61

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1 See Ratcliffe, Taylor, Askey, Grasso, & Fisher (2017), who have since found that marked patrol cars are associated with decreased property crime at predicted hotspots, while unmarked units had no effect.
“lights-off” nights. Additionally, because crime occurred unevenly across the week, I decided to stratify the calendar by day of the week before randomly assigning treatment and control shifts. In addition to providing participants with a calendar schedule, officers on the midnight shift were advised at rollcall whether their shift would run with lights on or lights off.

Officer safety was another consideration. Officers might argue that increasing visibility can reduce or eliminate their tactical advantage, so it was important to give officers some leeway to deactivate their cruise lights when responding to burglar alarms or other calls for service that could imperil their safety (e.g., domestic disputes). Conversely, cruise lights might serve to increase officer safety in certain contexts, so discretion was provided for both treatment and control conditions. While this and the allocation of treatment and control conditions raise challenges of fidelity and contamination, these options were needed to create flexibility in the implementation of the intervention.

The experimental intervention met with varying levels of support across the agencies. While I experienced strong backing from all of the police chiefs involved in the study, along with the civilian and sworn personnel designated to handle the data collection, the commitment by shift supervisors to the implementation of the program varied within and across agencies. Some shifts have stronger supervision and accountability than others, and this variability affected the fidelity of the program’s test.

For example, while the simplicity and low burden of the cruise light intervention appear appealing, the very fact that lights are manually activated introduced some uncertainty as to how much of the shift officers spent with cruise lights activated. Perhaps officers forgot to engage their lights for a portion of the shift, while others may have been reluctant to implement their intervention. Fortunately, I had been placed in charge of the overnight shift for three quarters of the experimental period and could maintain modest oversight within my own agency. In one of the partner agencies, the chief of police made unannounced visits to his town during two “lights-on” nights and observed full compliance of both occasions. However, direct measurement of treatment fidelity was not possible for all four agencies, and attempts at collecting data from officer self-report surveys largely fell flat due to low response rates. Ultimately, based on information from observations and answered surveys, one of the four agencies was dropped from this analysis because of fidelity concerns.

Once the data were collected, regression analysis produced a variety of nonsignificant results. Specifically, it did not appear that “lights-on” nights produced statistically significantly lower amounts of property crime than “lights-off” nights. While the nonsignificant findings might be the result of challenges of fidelity and contamination bias already mentioned, the findings are still encouraging, as the effects were in the right direction. Specifically, auto burglary and auto theft were 16 percent and 44 percent lower, respectively, for “lights-on” nights. Additionally, the number of motor vehicle accidents, pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and criminal arrests were also lower during “lights-on” nights.

Conclusion

Despite the lack of strong findings from this study, this intervention may yet be promising. More tests of this very low-cost, low-risk intervention, under way by BetaGov in nine jurisdictions across two different countries, will hopefully help to better understand the effects of patrol vehicular lights in a variety of settings, including hot spots.

References


Building a Beautiful Safe Place for Youth in Rainier Beach, Seattle

BY THE ABSPY CORE TEAM

The ABSPY Core Team comprises Rainier Beach community members and organizations, including the Rainier Beach Action Coalition; and institutional partners, including the Boys and Girls Clubs of King County, City of Seattle agencies, Seattle Police Department, and the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy.

They say it takes a village to raise a child. The residents of Rainier Beach, a neighborhood in southeast Seattle, Washington, are embracing that role in partnership with a team of grassroots community organizations; partners from the City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department, and Seattle Public Schools; and researchers from the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP). Known as Rainier Beach: A Beautiful Safe Place for Youth (ABSPY), this collaboration is a community-led, nonarrest, place-based, data-driven initiative to improve public safety and collective efficacy in hot spots of youth violence—and all signs are pointing to its success.

Seattle has a long history of community-led, place-based, and data-driven research-practitioner partnerships to address public safety, including the Weed and Seed initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods. To researchers, the city is also known as the setting for the first study to establish that crime concentrates at small places over long periods of time, conducted by Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang (2004). The seeds for ABSPY were sown in 2011 when Seattle’s history of intervention and research converged with two community processes: the Rainier Beach Neighborhood Plan Update (RBNPU) and the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative (SYVPI).

The RBNPU, actively stewarded by the Rainier Beach Action Coalition (RBAC), is a strategic plan that prioritizes community health through changes to the physical environment, economic development, community building, and youth empowerment. Its goal is to rebrand the neighborhood—a vibrant, diverse community (167 languages are spoken in the surrounding zip code) that has been stereotyped in the city as having high crime and limited opportunities for economic development—as a beautiful, safe place. SYVPI was a multidisciplinary initiative of the City of Seattle that brought together the Departments of Neighborhoods, Human Services, and Parks and Recreation; Seattle Police Department (SPD), Seattle Public Schools, the Boys and Girls Clubs of King County; and other providers to provide outreach and services to young people in the city. SYVPI’s Southeast Network had strong ties to Rainier Beach through the Rainier Vista Boys and Girls Club. Leaders from RBAC and SYVPI attended a talk organized by the Office of City Auditor (OCA) and led by CEBCP researchers Cynthia Lum and Charlotte Gill on crime and place research in Seattle in 2011. As a result, the evidence for a “hot spots” approach to community safety was incorporated into the RBNPU.

In early 2012, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) released its first solicitation for the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grant program (now called Innovations in Community-Based Crime Reduction), which called for research partnerships with communities to develop community-led, place-based, and data-driven strategies. It was the perfect opportunity. SYVPI led the development of a successful grant proposal that brought together all the threads—CEBCP, RBAC, OCA, the city, the Boys and Girls Club, SPD, and others—in a three-year planning and implementation effort that became ABSPY. Early in the planning phase, the Seattle Neighborhood Group (SNG)—a community crime prevention nonprofit organization—was identified to take on a coordination role, and the group of partners became known as the Core Team. ABSPY was funded by BJA through 2016 and has been supported by the City of Seattle since 2016.

ABSPY is both a community partnership and a problem-solving framework. At the outset, the Rainier Beach community itself was at the forefront of identifying place-based risk factors for youth crime in hot spots and developing their own innovative and evidence-informed strategies. The Core Team identified five hot spots of juvenile and youth crime in the neighborhood, based on SPD data—several of which were hot spots in the original studies by Weisburd and colleagues. SNG, along with the city’s Public Outreach and Engagement Liaisons, developed a culturally and linguistically inclusive outreach strategy to recruit residents, business owners, and other stakeholders from the hot spots to a Community Task Force (CTF).

In October 2013, more than 100 CTF members participated in a daylong training session on systematic problem-solving, using a framework inspired by the Communities That Care prevention science model (Hawkins, Catalano, & Arthur, 2002); the SARA problem-oriented policing model (Goldstein, 1990); and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) Strategic Prevention Framework,1 and adapted for place-based problems by the ABSPY team in collaboration with a technical assistance partner, Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA).2 Over the following six months, the CTF met regularly to delve deeper into each stage of the framework, asking the following questions:

2 https://www.cadca.org
This process ultimately led to the development of a logic model and intervention plan for each of the five hot spots.

We encouraged the CTF to be creative in developing approaches that were tailored to their hot spot’s specific risk factors, but the strategies were also grounded in research evidence. While police-led interventions at hot spots are effective (see Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2014), community-focused problem-solving may be more appropriate than deterrence-based hot spots policing interventions for young people, given that juveniles who are arrested and formally processed through the juvenile justice system are more likely to reoffend than those who are diverted to services (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Guckenburg, 2010). While SPD are key members of the Core Team, they did not lead the problem-solving process, and the CTF were directed to develop nonarrest strategies that addressed the social and environmental drivers of unstructured, unsupervised activities among young people and focused on creating opportunities for guardianship, education, volunteer opportunities, and community empowerment.

ABSPY has several signature interventions, including Corner Greeters and Safe Passage. The Corner Greeters program is a series of pop-up events and activities organized by young people from the community with support from RBAC. The events feature safety surveys, information sharing, neighborhood beautification through litter pickup, and social media posts intended to change the narrative of the neighborhood from the inside out. A week before each event, the team carries out a “scouting session” where they visit local businesses to alert them about the events, conduct safety surveys, and post on social media. The events and scouting sessions are designed to build relationships and collective efficacy among residents, spread positive messaging about the neighborhood, and provide guardianship in the hot spots. They are specifically planned to coincide with the peak days and times for crime in each hot spot. The Safe Passage team provides guardianship and encouragement for students on their way to and from Rainier Beach schools—a crucial partnership given that four schools and the community center are concentrated in just one of ABSPY’s five hot spots. Instantly recognizable in bright blue jackets with “Be Safe” emblazoned on the back, the Safe Passage team, which is made up of local residents, is empowered to step in and break up fights and other issues between students, but primarily offers a friendly face and a high five to young people. Business engagement and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) also feature strongly in the place-specific approaches. SPD and SNG, with support from community volunteers, have reached out to small, often immigrant-owned businesses in the hot spots to provide crime prevention education, community clean-ups, and property repairs.

ABSPY is achieving its goals! CEBCP researchers have been involved throughout the ABSPY process, rather than simply coming in to evaluate it at the end. Thanks to SPD and continued support from the City of Seattle after the federal funding ended, we have been able to collect seven years of crime and calls for service data (starting in 2011) and four waves of community survey data (2014; 2016-18). We evaluated the effects of ABSPY on crime and community perceptions of safety, collective efficacy, and the police using a quasi-experimental design in which we matched each of the five ABSPY hot spots to a similar location elsewhere in SPD’s South Precinct. Our first evaluation report, in 2016, showed that the hot spots were becoming less “hot” over time, particularly in terms of violent crime, and there were promising improvements in residents’ perceptions of collective efficacy, the police, and changes in crime (Gill, Vitter, & Weisburd, 2016). Our most recent evaluation update (Gill, Jensen, & Prince, 2018) shows high levels of satisfaction with the ABSPY interventions. ABSPY hot spot residents are significantly more likely than comparison site residents to believe that crime has gotten better in the past year, and their satisfaction and perceived legitimacy of the police are significantly higher. Community perceptions of collective efficacy and social cohesion in Rainier Beach are also significantly higher than they were in the first round of surveys, in 2014. Calls for service and police incidents have been higher in the ABSPY hot spots while the interventions are active, but given the positive survey findings, we think this could be explained by higher collective efficacy, which leads more people to look out for problems and call the police.

The ABSPY Core Team is excited to build on and sustain these successes as we look to the future. We have already been successful in leveraging continued funding from the City of Seattle, thanks to preliminary data gathering and a pitch from Core Team members and young people from Rainier Beach to the City Council in 2015. In addition, we have built new partnerships and opportunities, including a Comprehensive School Safety Initiative grant from the National Institute of Justice to build links between the Rainier Beach community and its schools based around Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) and restorative practices. To keep the momentum going, our evidence and experience shows that we need to prioritize meaningful, inclusive community engagement to lift up and empower all community members in Rainier Beach and continue to promote the neighborhood as “A Beautiful Safe Place”—for youth and adults alike.
Studying Open Drug Markets to Inform Practice and Develop Evidence-Based Drug Policing in Sweden

BY MIA-MARIA MAGNUSSON

Mia-Maria Magnusson is a narcotics detective in the Stockholm Police Department. She is also a doctoral student at Malmö University, studying open-air drug markets.

Drug use and distribution in public places have been a struggle for police agencies and communities in many countries, with Sweden being no exception. Even when crime hot spots are known to the police and other authorities, responses and effects still vary, and successful recipes to address the multifaceted problems at these locations often elude police and researchers. The long and ongoing debate on how to respond to these drug crime hot spots with long-term effects is evident in research (Weisburd & Green, 1995; Connolly, 2006; Corsaro & Brunson, 2013; McNeil, Shannon, Shaver, Kerr, & Small, 2014).

As a drug detective attempting to work within an evidence-based policing framework (see Lum and Koper, 2017), I have found that the lack of research and knowledge on open drug markets in Sweden and the complex problems linked to them made crafting a response challenging. Thus, I sought to build research in this area as part of my doctoral studies at Malmö University (supported by the police agency in Stockholm) to improve my agency’s response. So far, I have carried out the three studies, described in the sections that follow, which provide examples of evidence-based policing in practice in Sweden.

Mapping of Open-Air Drug Scenes

First, I conducted a study of mapping open-air drug scenes to gain knowledge about their characteristics. Open-air drug scenes are defined as geographically durable places where the use and selling of drugs take place in the open and are perceived as problematic by the police and/or authorities (Magnusson, in press[b]). To begin, I created a user-friendly web survey for officers who were working in these areas to fill out. I designed the survey to be easy to complete, without unnecessary stops or time-consuming formats, to accommodate officers from different shifts with busy schedules. I administered the survey to officers in the local police departments of two large cities in Sweden—Stockholm and Malmö. The survey contained many questions about the characteristics of open-air drug scenes, such as where the scenes were located, who were involved, how drugs were being distributed, what types of drugs were being distributed, and the various types of police responses and collaborations at the locations. All local police departments except one had open-air drug scenes and answered the survey. Once I had collected this information, I carried out descriptive analysis of the results and also mapped the areas identified using the geographic information system software ArcGIS. Additionally, I added crime statistics and citizen survey data to these officer perceptions and experiences to explore the intersection between crime patterns and neighborhood safety issues with officer knowledge. This analysis was the first collection of data and information on how many open-air drug scenes existed in these regions, where they were situated, and their characteristics and patterns.

Results from the survey and data analysis revealed 48 open-air drug scenes in Stockholm and 13 in Malmö, often located at transportation nodes mostly close to or on train stations (commuter trains or subway trains) and within neighborhood communities. Most of the scenes were 5 to 10 years old, or older, but some were also younger. High concentrations of crime, which included outdoor violence and shootings, also marked the drug scenes. Finally, the overlay of citizen-safety survey data revealed that residents in the neighborhood considered these places unsafe.

For example, in Stockholm, the well-established open-air drug market at the city’s central square—Plattan—dates back to 1965, when the square was built. Over time, many different actions have been taken in Sweden on places like Plattan. These have included crackdowns using repressive actions against sellers, as well as harm-reduction initiatives where addicts are approached and referred to health care. Even recurring surveillance and enforcement actions on drug-selling networks have been conducted from time to time, but mostly these actions only hold on for a couple of weeks at a time and show no long-lasting effects. These experiences are likely similar to those addressing open-air drug markets in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, few of these interventions have been rigorously evaluated, with studies only showing vague or short-term results (see Goldberg, 1993; Ekenvall & Siipo, 1995).

A Randomized Controlled Test of a Drug-Market Intervention

To examine what type of intervention might work to reduce open-air drug markets, I began a randomized controlled trial at the well-established drug and crime hot spot Plattan. The aim of the experiment was to evaluate Motivational Interviews (MIs), one of the tactics being used on drug offenders. MIs involved officers speaking with drug offenders, with the aim of motivating the offenders to seek help. In addition to these motivational talks, officers would also offer to transport offenders away from the drug market to rehabilitation and health care centers. The tactic is used in relation to arrests and reporting of drug use, and the goal of MIs is to have an impact on drug abuse, which is illegal in Sweden. Many officers at the time expressed frustration with the tactic, complaining that it was time-consuming and ineffective. Following an evidence-based policing approach, I proceeded to test the model, randomly
allocating drug offenders to receive MIs and measuring the tactic’s effects. In collaboration with 25 police officers working at Plattan, I designed the experiment to align with officer daily procedures and routines.

The full study is reported in Magnusson (in press[a]), but in short, officers randomized the use of the tactic in a convenient but standardized way during their everyday work. Overall, the study indicated that MIs with drug offenders resulted in only small differences in recidivism compared to offenders who had not received the talks. This challenged the use of the tactic, providing the police department with justification to reconsider using MIs and to consider other approaches.

To explore the dynamics of the experiment’s implementation, I also surveyed participating officers about their experience with the study. Specifically, I examined the experimental design using a case-study approach and utilizing the randomized controlled-trial guidelines set out by Sherman (2010). The results of this meta-study show positive perceptions of research by officers when they are steered by practitioners with academic skills (i.e., “pracademics”) (Magnusson 2018). The findings showed that research designs can be more practical and receptive when researchers have policing experience or come from within an agency, and when they can help to motivate officers engaged in experimental research. Additionally, officers were more receptive to the experiment because they felt it was being conducted from their concerns and perspectives. In the survey, the officers expressed that the care taken to form the research questions helped them be more receptive to answering the survey. Officers were also motivated to test an intervention that, from their experience, didn’t seem effective. The relevance of the academic research was approved by the officers in this study, and their participation in all steps of the randomized control trial process was valued, creating loyal experimenters (Magnusson 2018).

**Lessons Learned from Research**

The process of surveying officers to map open-air drug scenes required local police departments to collect new knowledge and think carefully about the characteristics of their most-troubled areas. This effort helped to kick-start local analysis and knowledge gathering at participating departments. Agencies also distributed patterns and descriptions of the findings to officers and chiefs, and many presentations were given on the findings or distributed through the agency’s intranet. The knowledge was also communicated and implemented directly to all the police officers responsible for community collaborations at specific open-air drug scenes.

Since I was a member of a regional strategic group consisting of representatives from corrections, customs, the Stockholm county administration, the County Council, and the strategic level of the regional police department, the results of the analyses were communicated widely. This effort also resulted in the prioritization of open-air drug scenes in the Stockholm regional strategy. The conducted research was used as a basis for a guidebook on how to collaborate locally in these open-air drug scenes. This guidebook was then communicated to all participating institutions and reinforced by collaborative presentations and lectures given by various stakeholders. This allowed the research to reach the police officers, business owners, tube-station employees, and others working at drug scenes, such as employees from health care, social services, correctional care, and municipal offices.

While I led the studies, the collaboration of officers on the streets made the work possible. By providing the officers with reasonable justification and including them in all aspects of the research process, I saw an increase in the receptivity of the officers to be involved with the research.

I believe that the continuous translation between the academia and the practice is the main ingredient in getting both the research community and police departments on board with research. Translation is also needed between the street-level officers and chiefs to make sure changes and knowledge are implemented and understood by both groups. This organizational translation could be done by communicating research results consistently and often at all levels. Strong internal dissemination of research findings, combined with information of their practical relevance, led to the success of these projects.

**References**


COMMENTARY

Should We Have Seen the Opioid Crisis Coming?

BY DANA HUNT AND JOHN CARNEVALE

Dana E. Hunt is a principal scientist at Abt Associates in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

John Carnevale is the president of Carnevale Associates in Washington, D.C.

The recent President's Commission on the opioid epidemic emphasizes that data can help us foresee and prepare for serious challenges. But to be effective, we need to pay attention to and use the data long before a crisis, coordinate across multiple sources, and have a clear understanding of what trends mean. Drug policy, in contrast, has been historically reactive, addressing crises long after they are in full swing.

The opioid problem is now well entrenched, with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reporting more than 47,000 opioid-involved deaths in 2017, a number that is five times higher than in 1999, with heroin-related deaths increasing fivefold from 2002 to 2004. All eyes are now on these soaring rates, especially among persons who are less than 25 years old, since the rate among those who are 18 to 24 years old has tripled since 2002. Data from the government’s Treatment Episode Data Set, which provides data on all persons entering publicly funded treatment programs, show admissions for opioid treatment increased 93 percent from 2004 to 2014; by 2017, opiates were the most frequently cited reason for treatment admissions. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) has shown similar trends with the number of persons self-reporting heroin use from 2002 to 2017 more than doubling to almost 900,000 individuals. This past year, 11 million Americans reported misusing opioid prescription pain relievers, and more than 3 million of these people are between 12 and 25 years old. These statistics may be conservative counts since they rely on self-reports.

Many of these opioid users are persons misusing prescription opioids, and, as these figures indicate, heroin use is not far behind. It is estimated that 80 percent of those who now use heroin began their addiction using prescription opioids. While addiction to prescription opioids is new, heroin has typically remained a persistent, but less common, drug-use choice compared to marijuana or cocaine. From 1979 to the mid-2000s, the number of persons ages 12 and older who said they had used heroin hovered each year around 1 percent. The highest concentrations persisted in large urban areas and mostly involved older users.

But these trends began to change. The CDC points to “waves” of the rising opioid death toll, with initiation in the 1990s from overprescribing opioids, followed by a rapid increase in heroin-related deaths in 2010. A decade ago, the typical heroin users were Americans living in urban cities in their 40s and 50s—often holdovers from an earlier surge. But today, the average user is younger, and death rates from opioid overdoses among rural populations are keeping pace with rates of overdoses in large, metropolitan areas.

What explains these changes in cycles over time? Drug researchers and historians have suggested a number of trends or events that have preceded a rise in opioid use in the past: generational forgetting of adverse consequences, decreased stigma, economic trends, marketing shifts in supplier countries, and, notably, new formulations of opioids. History reminds us of the power of these reformulations; in the 1800s, opium—distributed in many forms—was reformulated into morphine, and then from morphine, heroin was formulated. Beginning in the late 1990s, synthetic opiates like Oxycodin or Vicodin appeared. Each new formulation was touted as safer and less addicting or even nonaddicting compared to the prior product, opening a door for new users. Now, of the more than 47,000 opioid overdose deaths reported to the CDC in 2017, 60 percent involved synthetic opioids.

There are predictors of a new crisis. When rates of heroin and other opioid use increase, especially for people under the age of 25, there is a real possibility of a new “epidemic.” In nonexpansion times, the pool of users tends to remain relatively steady, with some recruits introduced who remain and become the smaller core of older users of tomorrow. Again, these users appear in predictable places—large urban areas, areas suffering from unemployment and poverty, and places with an established heroin market. There are clear canaries in the coal mine: A gradual influx of young users, larger than expected and occurring in areas not associated with opioid use, and increased production of the illegal substance should signal danger.

The good news is that data and other tools can be used to predict these problems before they get much worse. The following recommendations can be helpful at predicting and combatting increases in drug use.

1. Track patterns of use among new populations, especially younger users. The 2016 NSDUH results reported that 11.8 million persons ages 12 or older misused prescription pain relievers in the prior year. Almost 900,000 of those individuals were 12 to 17 years old. This represents 3 percent of all 12 to 17-year-olds and 7 percent of 18 to 25-year-olds. New users are typically young and include suburban and rural individuals. Also, the Office of National Drug Control’s Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM II) survey of all male arrestees in 10 U.S. counties at booking began to see a statistically significant rise in 18 to 24-year-olds testing positive for opiates in 2007.

2. Look for use in places not seen in the past. The rise of young users in ADAM II appeared not only in cities with long-standing traditions of heroin use like New York and Chicago, but also in new sites such as Charlotte, North Carolina; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Denver, Colorado; and Indianapolis, Indiana. Thus, the gradual appearances of heroin and opiate overdoses in more rural states like West Virginia, Tennessee, and New Hampshire are examples that should set alarms off early on.

3. Look at where there is a disproportionate number of prescriptions for opioids. Systems like state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) and retail pharmacy audits contain the number and location of where opioid products are dispensed. Both the overall rise and the increasing prescription opiate distribution in rural areas, specifically, are signs of problems ahead. In 1996, the number of opioid prescriptions dispensed in U.S. retail pharmacies was 94 million. Between 2006 and 2017, more than 233 million opioid prescriptions were filled in retail pharmacies in the United States each year. While this is a problem everywhere, the highest population-adjusted numbers of prescriptions written now are concentrated in Alabama, West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Oklahoma.

4. Look at supply side information. Law enforcement data can warn of potential trouble to come. The amount of heroin seized coming into the country has gradually increased over the last decade, resulting in an abundant growth in further demand for the drug. Seizures of heroin in the United States steadily increased by 80 percent from 2010 to 2015. During this same period, the purity of the product increased, and the price per gram decreased, making it particularly attractive to users who could now snort it as well as inject it, thus appealing to an even greater number of individuals.

Rise of Cocaine Use

We are now facing similar warnings that may indicate an early phase of another rise of cocaine use, which had been declining over the last decade. Again, data show rising numbers of initiates and increased use among young adults. In 2016, the number of persons reporting they initiated cocaine use in the past year increased 12 percent in just one year to 1.1 million Americans, with 21 as the average age of initiates. Fatal overdoses involving cocaine increased from less than 3,000 in 1999 to more than 13,000 in 2017. Finally, Colombian coca production more than tripled between 2012 and 2016, reaching 910 metric tons of export-quality cocaine in 2016. During the same time period, prices of cocaine fell 23 percent while point-of-sale purity increased approximately 20 percent, indicating a rising street supply and mimicking the increased availability and purity that was evident in the heroin market.

Currently, one of the largest seizures of cocaine in history was made in the port of Philadelphia—16.5 tons in June 2019 and more than 39,000 pounds were seized off the West Coast in July.

The rise of heroin and the likely resurgence of cocaine are not simply political issues, and the need to continually track sources and coordinate them in a way that signals a change before a crisis is critical. We are now facing the problem of how to treat users with a reduced addiction treatment workforce. The bulge in users may, unfortunately, move forward into the coming decades, with not only problems with recovery but also a myriad of related health and social support needs, and it would be prudent for practitioners to be cognizant.

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13 Drug Enforcement Administration, Press Release. Vice President attends $569 million offload in Coronado. July 11, 2019; U.S. Attorney EDPA@USA_EDPA.
IN MEMORIAM


BY ANTHONY PETROSINO

Anthony Petrosino, pictured at left with Jeremy Richman (right), is the director of the WestEd Justice & Prevention Research Center and a CEBCP Senior Research Fellow.

Many thanks to Pamela MacDougall of WestEd’s JPRC for her suggestions.

On March 25, we learned of the death of Jeremy Richman, the cofounder of the Avielle Foundation. Jeremy was one of our presenters during the September 2016 Congressional Briefing on Violence, jointly hosted by the CEBCP and WestEd’s Justice & Prevention Research Center (JPRC). He also served as an adviser to the JPRC.

Jeremy was a neuroscientist by training. He worked at Boehringer Ingelheim, a pharmaceutical company, where his primary task was to help develop drugs for depression and Alzheimer’s. His world, by his own words, came “crashing down” on December 14, 2012, when his daughter Avielle, 19 of her classmates, and six of her educators were murdered at Sandy Hook Elementary School. From that day on, he and his wife, Jennifer Hensel, “were living someone else’s life.”

Given that both Jeremy and Jennifer were scientists (Jennifer’s training is in immunology), they looked to science for answers about why violence occurs. Shortly after their daughter’s death, they started the Avielle Foundation to educate others about brain health, particularly the role of the brain in the development of both violence and aggression, as well as compassion and empathy. Because so much about the brain and its relationship to behavior is unknown, Jeremy became a powerful advocate for investing in brain science to “make the invisible visible.”

Jeremy argued that the lexicon needed to change from “mental health” to “brain health,” because the stigma associated with “mental health” kept many people from seeking help. As Jeremy put it, “people do not feel stigmatized getting their liver or their heart checked out. Treating the brain like the organ it is and getting help for it should also not be stigmatizing.” His commitment to changing the language was evidenced by his candid conversations in 2013 with then-President Obama and then-Vice President Biden, who were visitors to Newtown, Connecticut, after the massacre. President Obama was starting a new initiative to address gun violence—Now Is the Time—that would include funding to support programs for mental health screening and treatment of young persons. Jeremy petitioned both Obama and Biden to change the language in the new policy to “brain health.” Although he was unsuccessful, he never gave up convincing others how important this change in language would be.

Our paths first crossed in 2014. At that time, I began to organize an annual event in WestEd’s Boston office with the goal of bringing in outside speakers who would challenge and inspire us in our work. William Modzeleski, former director of the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, had spent significant time with the Sandy Hook parents after the shootings and had gotten to know Jeremy quite well. Bill strongly recommended Jeremy to me, and not one to ignore Bill’s advice, I reached out to invite him. We talked several times on the phone, sometimes for hours, and his energy was infectious. Jeremy also had a way of making a person feel like a lifelong friend, even though we had not yet met in person. When we finally met in June 2015, I stuck out my hand to shake his, but instead, he embraced me in a big hug, saying, “This is the Sandy Hook greeting” as a way of expressing how frequent those hugs had become in his town.

His presentation at WestEd was riveting. I do not think I have ever heard a speaker have a more powerful case to legitimacy than when Jeremy said, “I am coming before you today from two perspectives. One is as a scientist. The other is as a crime victim.” And from that point on, he weaved those two perspectives together to highlight brain science and, also, the impact of violence on a family. My JPRC colleague, Sarah Guckenburg, who closed the event, said “I want to start by saying you are a great teacher,” underscoring how Jeremy was able to explain neuroscience to a lay audience. Because of Jeremy’s knowledge and engaging presentation style, Cynthia Lum, director of the CEBCP, and myself identified him as our first choice to present at the 2016 Congressional Briefing. He spoke just nine minutes almost three years ago, but I can still remember Jeremy’s plea that we invest more resources to learning about the brain and its relationship to behavior (the invisible part). In fact, Jeremy’s words about how much scientists know about the surface of Mars—and how our knowledge of the brain pales in comparison—have stayed with me to this day.

The logo for the Avielle Foundation includes the words “you can imagine.” It was on some of Jeremy’s slides he presented at the briefing. I once thought he was referring to imagining a world without violence, in which people would voluntarily seek help to understand “structure and chemistry” issues with their brain. But, no, Jeremy corrected me about this. He said that well-meaning people would come up to him and say, “I can’t imagine what you and your wife are going through.” But his retort was, “You can imagine. Think of your child dying the way Avielle did. Think of how you would feel.” His point was that only by imagining that pain and loss would we become as energized as he was, and Jennifer is, to make a difference and see a change in addressing violence.

1 https://www.wested.org/wested-news/science-of-violence-compassion
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2vrAXSA7Wk&feature=youtu.be
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References


