When Innovation is Not Enough

Implementing and evaluating community policing in hot spots of juvenile offending

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Background

Crime is not evenly spread across cities or neighborhoods. In most cities, a small number of hot spots tend to have greater than average numbers of crime and victimization. These hot spots can be as small as single addresses, single street segments (the two block faces between two intersections), or small groups of connected segments such as a drug or prostitution market that spreads across several blocks.

Research shows that hot spot blocks are spread across cities and are often stable over time. One block in a neighborhood could be a hot spot for many years while the blocks surrounding it rarely experience any crime, suggesting that variation in crime across small places does not simply reflect neighborhood-level trends (Groff, Weisburd, and Morris 2009; Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010; Weisburd and Amram 2014; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2014; Weisburd, Morris, and Groff 2009). This research also shows that as many as half of all incidents or calls for service recorded in a city can be concentrated at a very small number of hot spots—a finding that holds both in the United States and internationally. For example, studies in Seattle, Washington; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Vancouver, Canada; and Tel Aviv, Israel, among other locations, have found that 50 percent of crime in those cities occurred at just 3 to 6 percent of addresses or blocks (Curman, Andresen, and Brantingham 2015; Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs 1988; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989; Weisburd 2015; Weisburd and Amram 2014; Weisburd et al. 2004; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).

The evidence for the importance of focusing on these "crime places" indicates that police interventions can be targeted in just a few small areas. Police interventions that focus police resources at micro places are effective (e.g., Braga and Bond 2008; Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2014; Braga et al. 1999; Groff et al. 2015; Lum, Koper, and Telep 2011; Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Sherman and Weisburd 1995; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Telep, Mitchell, and Weisburd 2014; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Weisburd and Green 1995). These approaches, which include preventive vehicle or foot patrol, crackdowns, problem-oriented policing, increasing place management, and focusing on high-risk offenders at places, also appeal to police leaders because they allow the police to deal with a large proportion of crime by tackling a smaller number of places compared to traditional beat patrol. Thus, hot spot policing can increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of policing (Weisburd and Telep 2010). Furthermore, there is little evidence that focusing police efforts at micro-places simply displaces crime to neighboring street segments. In fact, studies suggest that a diffusion of crime control benefits to surrounding streets is more likely (e.g., Bowers et al. 2011; Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2014; Weisburd et al. 2006).

Crime involving youth[1] seems to be even more concentrated at a small number of micro-places than crimes and calls for service in general, according to limited but compelling research. Weisburd, Morris, and Groff (2009) found in Seattle that just 86 of more than 26,000 street segments accounted for one-third of all incidents in the 14 years from 1989 to 2004 in which a juvenile (a person younger than 18) was arrested. Environmental approaches to crime prevention suggest that people's daily routine activities, which are determined by the types of places they frequent, shape opportunities for crime and affect people's decisions to commit crime or their risk of victimization (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1987; Felson and Boba 2010). While these ideas apply regardless of age, they suggest that the specific types of activities engaged in by young people influence the types of places in which they are likely to spend time and thus commit crime (Felson 2006).

1. In this report we define youth suspected of or arrested for a crime as individuals aged 25 and younger unless otherwise stated. While the juvenile justice system focuses on youth younger than 18, there is increasing recognition that the 18–25 age group should also be considered "youth" given that the "teen brain" is not fully developed until around age 25 (e.g., Steinberg 2008).

For example, juveniles are required to be in school at certain times, and crime involving juveniles tends to cluster around schools during the times when students are arriving or leaving (Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and Weisman 2001; Roman 2002, 2005). Young people's routes of travel to and from school tend to be more predictable and specifically defined than the commutes of adults and can produce opportunities for crime when potential victims and offenders cross paths (Brantingham and Brantingham 1995). Juveniles, to a much greater extent than adults, are also subject to restrictions in where they congregate—they cannot go into bars, or they may be subject to a curfew during certain times of day. These factors also determine patterns of crime involving juveniles at particular places and times—a bar district at night is unlikely to experience a high rate of juvenile offending. Weisburd, Morris, and Groff (2009) found that the Seattle street segments with the highest rates of arrests of juveniles were the types of places where young people tend to hang out without supervision or structured activity—at shopping malls, outside schools, and in public spaces—while places with a low concentration of juvenile offending were non-public spaces. These findings also fit with research by Osgood et al. (1996) showing that unstructured, unsupervised socializing is linked to higher rates of juvenile delinquency and violence.

While there is good evidence for the effectiveness of hot spot policing and problem solving, very little of this evidence has examined the application of these approaches to places where there is a high concentration of crime involving youth. Given the particular nature of these places and the types of activities youth engage in there, different policing strategies may be warranted.

Furthermore, deterrence-based hot spot policing that employs crackdowns and "busts" to clear offenders from high-crime places may not be appropriate for young people. Juveniles who are arrested and processed through the formal juvenile justice system—especially those who are suspected of less serious crimes—are more likely to reoffend than their counterparts who are diverted to needed services (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Guckenburg 2010). Arrests, court adjudication, and incarceration stigmatize youth and can lead to social exclusion from school and positive peer group influences as well as increased scrutiny from the justice system. Youth may continue their delinquency when their social ties to positive institutions such as school and the family are weakened (Lowenkamp and Latessa 2004). However, there is good evidence that community-based interventions that focus on supervision and problem-solving are effective for at-risk young people (Braithwaite 1989; Gill 2016a; Greenwood 2008; Lipsey 2009).

Along with schools and other juvenile justice agencies, police serve as one of the gatekeepers of the justice system for youth. Their exercise of discretion at the street level can determine whether a young person receives a formal referral that could ultimately increase their risk of recidivism or a non-arrest, community-derived intervention that could result in more support and the potential for better outcomes. However, there is a lack of guidance in the research literature on how to develop approaches that fit the latter category.

Community-oriented policing, which focuses on empowering street-level officers to make decisions and engage in problem-solving partnerships with the community and other government agencies and service providers, provides a useful framework for developing such an approach. And while community policing is rarely tested at micro-places (Gill et al. 2014; but see Weisburd, Davis, and Gill 2015), the high concentration of crime involving juveniles at such places suggests that these hot spots are ideal settings for intervention. Increasingly, research points to the effectiveness of developing police interventions that are tailored to the highest-risk individuals and places (Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge 1990; Lowenkamp, Latessa, and Holsinger 2006; Lum, Koper, and Telep 2011; Weisburd and Eck 2004) and involve interagency cooperation such as partnerships with third parties, multiagency working groups, and leveraging civil remedies to encourage compliance with the law (Lum, Koper,

and Telep 2011; Mazerolle and Ransley 2005; Taxman and McEwen 1995; Weisburd and Eck 2004). Furthermore, community policing is conducive to community reintegration, improved police legitimacy, and building collective efficacy among local residents, which enables them to suppress crime through informal social control rather than police intervention. Improvements in public perceptions of police legitimacy and levels of collective efficacy have been associated with lower crime rates at places (Higginson and Mazerolle 2014; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012).

Community Policing in Hot Spots of Youth Offending in Seattle

Based on the theories and research described in the previous section, the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) at George Mason University developed a pilot program to test community-oriented policing in hot spots of youth offending in Seattle in collaboration with the Seattle Police Department (SPD), the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative (SYVPI), Seattle Neighborhood Group (SNG)—a community crime prevention nonprofit group—and the City of Seattle Office of the City Auditor (OCA). Our approach integrated the principles of community-oriented policing—collaboration with community partners such as place managers, business owners, community groups, local government departments, and social service providers; problem-oriented policing; and organizational transformation such as delegation of responsibility to the officers on the street—with an evidence-based hot spot approach to crime. In other words, the project design enabled police to direct their problem-solving efforts to the specific target areas in which crime involving youth was most heavily concentrated. The goals of our pilot program were to increase the SPD's capacity to identify and reduce youth crime problems at hot spots and to increase opportunities for the SPD and the local community to work in partnership to reduce delinquency.

The pilot program operated from June 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014 with the first month focused on problem identification in the sites.[2] A detailed description of our methodology for identifying hot spots of youth offending is available in a companion publication published by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), *Identifying Hot Spots of Juvenile Offending: A Guide for Crime Analysts* (Gill, Vitter, and Weisburd 2015). We initially selected three target sites in downtown Seattle (the SPD's West precinct). One of these was a street block where a youth treatment center offering both inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment was located. A number of the incidents involving youth on the block were reported at that address, and the staff was not receptive to working with police to reduce the number of calls despite the nonarrest focus. In early July this site was replaced with another street segment adjoining one of the other two hot spots (3rd Avenue between Pike and Union Streets). However, after several months project operations were also discontinued at this location. Crime problems on this block were largely attributed to shoplifting and other incidents at several corporate retail locations, and the stores could not or did not want to collaborate with the SPD due to their individual loss prevention policies. The other two sites are briefly described in the sections that follow (more detailed descriptions of these sites are available in Nelson-Zagar 2013 and Nelson-Zagar 2014). For comparison, each site was matched with another downtown street segment that did not receive any specialized attention and was not revealed to the officers working on the project. We randomly selected which site would be the treatment site and which would be the control within each pair.

Site descriptions

Westlake Park

Westlake Park is a small, triangular public plaza in the center of Seattle's downtown business and shopping district, off the intersection of two major streets (4th Avenue and Pine Street). It is surrounded by stores on its diagonal side. The park is heavily used by pedestrians and for various public events and protests and features benches and tables where shoppers, tourists, and employees from nearby businesses eat lunch or wait for buses,

2. The conclusions in this report do not account for reforms that the SPD has made under its Consent Decree with the Department of Justice, many of which took place after the period of this pilot program.

a children's play area, an information desk and concierge stand, and a fountain. The park also attracts a large number of homeless and transient individuals, many of them juveniles and young adults, who stay in the park throughout the day to talk, skate, sleep, or use drugs or alcohol. The park is technically closed after 10:00 p.m. (although there is no way to prevent people entering the space), so the police can require individuals sleeping rough in the park at night to move on. Nelson-Zagar (2013) provides a detailed description of environmental risk factors that may be relevant to crime and disorder in Westlake Park.

3rd and Pike/Pine

The second hot spot target area is the segment of 3rd Avenue between Pike and Pine Streets. It is approximately one block away from Westlake Park (although the park is not visible from this street segment) in a busy central area of downtown Seattle. The segment features a number of chain and local stores including a 7-11 convenience store and "smoke shops," restaurants and fast food outlets, and entrances to office buildings and apartments. Just around the corner on Pine Street is an entrance to Westlake Station, an underground transit hub featuring light rail and a bus tunnel. On our ride-alongs we observed large groups of young people congregating outside the station entrance; from there they would head to Westlake Park or the McDonalds on the corner of 3rd and Pine, which has an entrance on the target segment. 3rd Avenue itself is also the major bus transit route connecting the downtown area to the city's north and south suburbs, and there are numerous bus stops where commuters congregate, especially at rush hour. The nature of the businesses and the routine activities of people at this location have made it a long-term hot spot for a variety of crime and disorder incidents. Nelson-Zagar (2014) provides a detailed description of environmental risk factors that may be relevant to crime and disorder at this location (that report also includes details of the 3rd and Pike/Union hot spot that was dropped from the study, which is the adjacent block to 3rd and Pike/Pine).

Staffing the pilot project

The pilot was carried out by a team comprising a sergeant and six officers, all of whom had been specifically selected for the project based on their prior community policing experience. The officers had previously been members of a bicycle patrol team in the downtown area of the West precinct. The entire team was assigned to the day shift (10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.). Officers were assigned in pairs to one of the three treatment sites, but there was some overlap across the sites. The two officers assigned to the children's home and subsequently 3rd and Pike/Union began working at Westlake Park after their site was dropped from the pilot, and the officers assigned to 3rd and Pike/Pine would occasionally join the rest of the team at Westlake Park as well because of the larger amount of activity at that site.

We also convened a core team of representatives from the various grantees and other agencies. The agencies and their roles are as follows:

- **CEBCP.** This was the primary grantee and research partner from George Mason University.
- **SPD.** The captain who oversaw the officer team assisted with project planning at a strategic level.
- **SNG.** This group conducted Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) assessments under subcontract with SYVPI and wrote reports and also conducted community appearance surveys.
- **SYVPI.** This group helped to identify key service partners and contracted to SNG for CPTED assessments.
- **City of Seattle OCA.** The OCA's research liaison assisted officers with problem-solving planning and facilitated connections between the SPD and other city agencies.

Throughout the project the police team and core team also collaborated with a number of other agencies and groups, including the Downtown Seattle Association; the Seattle Metropolitan Improvement District (MID); the city council and the mayor's office; and the Departments of Public Works, Transportation, and Parks and Recreation. The success of these collaborative efforts varied, as we discuss in "Research Findings" beginning on page 15.

Training

We developed a 1.5-day training program specific to this initiative that was delivered in late April 2013, a little more than a month before the intervention period began. The agenda and training materials are available online (see CEBCP 2013a). The core team members and the project officers and sergeant attended the training, along with representatives from a number of different city departments and the COPS Office.

The first day of the training program was primarily informational, intended to introduce officers to the project background and the approaches they would be expected to carry out. In the first half of the day, following an introduction to the project delivered by the captain, the research team delivered several presentations on the theory and research basis behind hot spot policing and community-based nonarrest policies for juveniles and youth and an introduction to the problem-solving process. In addition to the presentations, officers were provided with copies of the COPS Office systematic review summary on formal system processing of juveniles (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Guckenburg 2013).

The presentation on problem-oriented policing (POP) was specifically designed for the unique political context in the SPD. In the mid-to-late 1990s, then chief Norm Stamper and his command staff introduced problem-oriented policing and the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) model to the SPD, with the goal of rewarding systematic problem solving and responses to crime problems in partnership with the community. However, for a number of reasons the approach—and members of the leadership team who implemented it—became highly unpopular among more traditional officers, and after former Chief Stamper stepped down the idea of POP and SARA became synonymous with broader dissatisfaction about his leadership.[3] Despite the fact that few officers from that time still worked for the SPD, there remained a strong culture of distrust around problem-solving concepts and the SARA model in particular. Thus, several members of the SPD's command staff in the West precinct as well as Stamper himself advised the research team to avoid "the language of POP and SARA" in the training. Consequently, we adopted the language used in the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) initiative (Skogan, Hartnett, and Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium 1995), which is largely the same as the SARA model but avoids that specific acronym:

1. Identify and prioritize problems
2. Analyze problems
3. Design response strategies
4. Implement response strategies
5. Assess the success of response strategies

3. Historical information in this paragraph comes from a telephone conversation between the research team and former Chief Stamper in January 2013. Reed (1999) also provides a thorough description of community policing in Seattle during the same era.

Within step 1 we also recommended the CHEERS (community, harm, expectation, events, recurrence, similarity) test for problem identification, as proposed by Clarke and Eck (2005) in their COPS Office guide to problem solving and crime analysis. For step 3 we introduced evidence-informed approaches such as situational crime prevention, civil remedies, and community partnerships and presented examples from prior studies in which similar responses were implemented.

The second half of the first training day involved a series of panels and discussions intended to introduce officers to the types of resources they would need to draw upon in developing their problem-solving responses at the hot spots. The West precinct's crime analyst discussed the types of "tactical" data analysis he could provide to assist officers on a regular basis or on demand. While the research team provided initial crime profiles of the hot spots (i.e., "strategic" crime analysis), we did not have the same capacity to produce daily or weekly briefings. We also convened a panel of local government representatives from city departments including Human Services, Code Compliance, Public Health, Neighborhoods, Public Utilities, and Economic Development, who described their department's functions and how they might be able to assist with problem solving.[4] This was followed by a community resources panel featuring YouthCare, an organization that assists homeless youth in the city; the SNG; and SYVPI. In the evening officers attended a panel with young people identified by SYVPI who spoke about their experiences with safety and the police.

The second half-day training session was a practical working session in which officers worked through real-life case studies of previous problem-solving initiatives in the city and applied what they had learned on the first day. They also received a data starter kit for a real-life hot spot in Seattle (although not one that was included in the project) and worked through the CAPS problem-solving model with that information. The second day concluded with an extended discussion about the project facilitated by the captain, in which officers had an opportunity to raise questions and concerns about the project plans.

The community policing and problem-solving intervention

Working in pairs at each treatment site, the officers spent the first few months of the intervention period in the problem identification and analysis stages with the goal of developing a logic model or "road map" for their site. The road map (figure 1) visually depicts the problem solving process, indicating the key crime problem(s) at the hot spot; the specific local conditions (risk factors that exist at the specific location that appear to drive the crime problem); the proposed intervention(s), which should be non–arrest based and prevention-focused and fall within one or more of four broad areas with some basis in research evidence; and the anticipated outcomes of the intervention(s), including short-term changes and longer-term reductions in the primary crime problem.

4. Although the project focused on youth, we did not include schools or education partners in the panel because our target areas were not located near schools or residential neighborhoods, nor were the problems at our hot spots driven primarily by school-aged youth. However, in hindsight it may have been useful to include representatives from Seattle Public Schools to provide officers with a broader understanding of issues facing young people.

Figure 1. Problem-solving road map



Source: City of Seattle OCA

The four broad areas for interventions were as follows:

1. **Increasing supervision and structure.** Based on the research relating to juvenile and youth routine activities, discussed in "Background" beginning on page 1, interventions in this category seek to increase police supervision or the availability of structured activities for young people to reduce opportunities for involvement in crime (or both).

2. **Changing the physical environment.** People's routine activities are influenced by features of the places where they spend time. Environmental approaches focus on changing how a place looks and feels to encourage people to behave positively. They can include reducing disorder (e.g., cleaning up trash and graffiti), improving lighting, and CPTED approaches.

3. **Changing policies and rules.** These approaches are related to environmental strategies, but rather than changing the look and feel of places they focus on changing—or better enforcing existing—civil regulations and laws to encourage people to behave positively and contribute to community safety or to hold people accountable who contribute to crime by breaking the rules. Examples include park regulations against alcohol consumption, smoking, or frequenting the park after dark and holding store owners accountable for selling alcohol to minors.

4. **Building collective efficacy.** As we discussed in "Background," building collective efficacy—trust and relationships between community members that increase their willingness to intervene for the common good and maintain informal social control—can be effective for longer-term crime reduction at places and ties in with the research suggesting that community-focused prevention approaches are more effective for young people than criminal justice approaches.

To assist in their problem-solving efforts the research team provided the officers with data reports on juvenile and adult crime at the hot spot in the previous year (CEBCP 2013b).[5] The officers combined information from the data reports with their own experiences of working in the downtown area to identify the primary crime problems at each hot spot. The officers recorded their initial ideas about the problem and their first impressions of the hot spot on Problem Identification and Problem Solving worksheets specifically designed for this project (see appendix A).

As part of this process, the officers sought additional data to learn more about the local conditions at each site that were driving the problems they had identified. As discussed in the training, the West precinct crime analyst provided weekly data reports throughout the project. These reports were not focused on the specific street segments but provided context for crime and other police activity going on in the areas surrounding the hot spots. The SNG conducted a Community Appearance Survey (see appendix B for the survey instrument) and CPTED assessments at Westlake Park and the two adjoining 3rd Avenue street segments (Nelson-Zagar 2013, 2014), which identified disorder and other environmental risk factors for crime. Finally, although a full community survey was outside the scope of the research project, the research team assisted the officers in developing a brief community survey that could be used during officers' interactions with residents, business owners and employees, and members of the public at their hot spots to understand the community's perceptions of the key problems (see appendix C for the survey instrument). These surveys were used throughout the intervention period whenever officers had an opportunity to engage the community for an extended period of time.

Approximately halfway through the intervention period, in late November 2013, the entire project team as well as local stakeholders came together for a full-day "halfway meeting" in which the officers presented their logic models and the work they had done so far to develop interventions. The goals of the meeting were to assess progress so far; identify actions, goals, and needs (e.g., data, other city agencies that could assist) for the remainder of the project; identify and share best practices; discuss challenges and how to resolve them; connect with stakeholders; and assess other activities that were happening in the hot spots. The latter goal was crucial because of a number of other initiatives unrelated to the project that were taking place at the hot spots, particularly in the 3rd Avenue area. For example, the bus stops on 3rd Avenue, which contributed significantly to the routine activities of individuals using the space, had recently been temporarily closed for renovations, and there were several initiatives to improve the space (such as a trial of a "mobile street lounge," the impact of which was documented by researchers from the Department of Sociology at the University of Washington).

The halfway meeting resulted in a frank discussion of the difficulties officers had faced in getting their proposed interventions up and running and was followed by efforts to refine the road maps, in collaboration with the research liaison from the OCA. The final road maps for each site, following these refinements, are presented in figures 2–4. In consultation with the officer teams we also updated the activity reports on which they reported their weekly actions. This update had been done on the problem-solving worksheets (appendix A) in the first half of the intervention period, but the officers did not find the sheets helpful after the initial problem identification phase and had stopped using them, instead recording their activity on blank documents. The new sheets, which were tailored to the specific interventions that had been identified for the locations, are included in appendix D. A second check-in meeting was held in February 2014, in which officers presented updates on their efforts, the University of Washington researchers presented their work on the mobile street lounge evaluation, and the SNG presented their Community Appearance Survey and CPTED findings.

5. Per our data agreement with the SPD, the data reports referenced here (which are available online) include only crimes we were permitted to report to the public. They exclude homicides and sexual offenses. However, the reports we provided to the police contained the full range of offenses, and we used the full range when identifying our hot spots.

Figure 2. Draft problem-solving roadmap for Westlake Park, February 11, 2014



Source: City of Seattle OCA

Note: HSD = (City of Seattle) Human Services Department.

Figure 3. Draft problem-solving road map for 3rd Avenue Pike to Pine, February 11, 2014



Source: City of Seattle OCA

Figure 4. Draft problem-solving road map for 3rd Avenue Union to Pike, February 11, 2014

Source: City of Seattle OCA

Research Findings

Problem solving in Westlake Park

The primary problems identified at Westlake Park were property and drug crimes involving youth, particularly the 18–25 age group. Specific issues included drug dealing, drug and alcohol use and intoxication, fighting, and numerous park code violations such as littering, animals off leashes, loud and abusive language, and camping. As previously noted, the park attracted a large number of homeless and transient individuals, many of them under the age of 25.

The officers identified two key local conditions as driving the problems in the park. First, the physical features of the park inhibit natural guardianship. For example, the park contains large sculptural elements, such as a fountain, an archway, and a number of large geometric planters that double as seating areas. These features and the problems they create are described in more detail by Nelson-Zagar (2013). These elements inhibit natural surveillance and guardianship by police, business owners and employees, and members of the public passing through—meaning that individuals can engage in behaviors prohibited by law or the park code—and encourage loitering. Second, related to the loitering issue, a large number of homeless and transient individuals were considered "regulars" in the park. While they did not necessarily commit crimes, they did sometimes engage in antisocial behaviors of the types described here. One individual in particular, a homeless man who used a motorized wheelchair, was a popular figure in the park and would "hold court" outside local businesses each day, attracting a large entourage of other homeless youth.

The Community Appearance Survey conducted by the SNG and the citizen surveys obtained by the officers provide additional support for the problems identified by the officers. Figure 5 shows disorder scores ranging from 2.3 to 2.7 out of 4 for each street segment making up the park, indicating "some" to "a lot of" disorder. Detailed descriptions of the survey findings, shown in figure 6, indicate that litter—including trash associated with drug and alcohol use and evidence of individuals living in the park—graffiti, poor maintenance, and run-down infrastructure were all problems in the park that might contribute to crime and perceptions of disorder.

Figure 5. Community Appearance Survey results for Westlake Park



Source: SNG

Figure 6. Community Appearance Survey detail for Westlake Park

Litter—Litter on ground in park and on structures (food, newspaper, general trash), cigarette butts, empty liquor bottles, crack baggies on ground, personal belongings stacked various places along the street and in park (some stacked bags, some dumped in piles).

Street and gutter—cigarette butts in gutter, garbage in gutter.

Sidewalk—gum on sidewalk, some pavers broken, many are uneven and loose, and all are filthy—some graffiti made out of some kind of hard sticky foam on sidewalk.

Utility and other infrastructure—paper boxes filthy, some broken and derelict looking, light poles stripped of paint, chipped paint, stickers on them, really dirty looking, hangers on them where signage used to be. Signage in similar condition to poles, especially dirty looking (stains) and with stickers and residue of removed stickers now collecting grime, all infrastructure covered in scratch and graffiti. Fountain is dirty. A light pole base is broken. Trash cans dirty and rusted. Sculpture arch has stickers, dirty.

Graffiti—on newspaper boxes, light poles, signs, sidewalk.

Smell—urine smell especially around paper boxes and planters.

Litter—cigarette butts, syringes, bird waste, piles of personal belongings, litter under benches.

Facades—awning over walkway dirty, dark area in doorway unlit, hard to see into, some facades have scuff marks from shoes, a bit dirty, debris on awning.

Street and gutter—adjacent alley dirty/smelly (urine) cigarette butts everywhere, garbage.

Sidewalk—broken, loose pavers, pavers dirty, gum on pavers.

Utility and other infrastructure—lights dirty, trees' blue bark fading, dirty, sculptures dirty, drains filthy and clogged with cigarette butts, drug paraphernalia, disorderly looking utility boxes in tree pits.

Graffiti

Smell—urine smell near south end in doorway, urine smell near alley entrance, urine smell by arch.



Litter—garbage; newspapers, beer can, food containers, food on ground, cigarette butts, bird droppings and food garbage in fountain water (see *utility and other infrastructure*).

Street and gutter—cigarette butts in street.

Sidewalk—pavers dirty, gum covered, cracks between pavers have garbage in them, especially cigarette butts.

Utility and other infrastructure
street signs have stickers, graffiti, and are dirty.
fountain hosts pigeons and their droppings down the sides—it goes from structure into water, unidentified things in fountain water, food waste and cigarette butts in fountain water.
blue trees looking dingy because paint is dirty and coming off, also have some unknown residue on several of them.
fire hydrant and light poles dirty, chipped paint, banner hangars on lamp poles empty, looks neglected.
lights very dirty.
street furniture dirty and graffiti-covered.

Graffiti—on street furniture, street signs.

Smell—fountain water smells bad, smell of urine along street.

Source: SNG

The officers working at Westlake Park collected 30 community surveys from employees, residents, and members of the public between November 2013 and May 2014. Figure 7 shows that majority of individuals surveyed stated that they worked at the location, with respondents also stating that they shopped, took transit, or walked or rode through the park. Just one respondent lived at the location (likely in the high-end condos above the park's stores). A majority (63 percent) of respondents said they felt very or somewhat safe in the park during the day, but only about 20 percent also felt safe at night. About half of the respondents said that they felt somewhat or very unsafe during the night (figure 8). Social problems such as drug dealing and use, homelessness, and mental illness were considered to be the biggest challenges at Westlake Park by the respondents, followed by violations of park rules (e.g., smoking, skateboarding, off-leash pets), physical appearance (such as trash, graffiti, lack of cleanliness), and finally violent crime, which was seen as a small to medium problem (figure 9). While these surveys are likely not representative of the full spectrum of individuals using the park on a daily basis and do not take into account change throughout the intervention period, they provide a useful insight that corresponds with the officers' own impressions and the findings of the SNG.

Figure 7. Activities of community survey respondents at Westlake Park



Figure 8. Feelings of safety among community survey respondents at Westlake Park



Figure 9. Perceptions of problems among community survey respondents at Westlake Park



The officers identified four responses for Westlake Park, which fell primarily within the "changing the environment," "changing policies and rules," and "building collective efficacy" intervention categories. The major intervention area focused on making physical changes to the site, which was also intended to have the secondary effect of providing more supervision of youth in the park. To this end, the officers met with the Department of Neighborhoods, the Department of Parks and Recreation, and Seattle Public Utilities to discuss ideas for redesigning the park. The CPTED report prepared by the SNG provided a detailed plan for improving the space, and as noted earlier they engaged a number of relevant agencies in a CPTED working group meeting to start prioritizing interventions.

A key need identified as a result of these meetings was to change the position of the benches that were positioned around the outer perimeter of the park. These benches were double-sided, with a set of seats facing outward to the roads and bus stops and another set directly behind those seats, which faced into the park. Maintenance crews in the park reported that the young people who frequented the park often engaged in drug dealing and drug use on the inward-facing side of the benches and were shielded from view by the commuters sitting on the outward-facing side or standing on the sidewalk waiting for buses. The officers and representatives from the Department of Parks and Recreation identified city funding to install benches that only faced out toward the road. The officers and maintenance crews immediately reported that the drug problem—and associated disorder—was reduced. In fact, the maintenance crews even reported that youth in the park had complained to them that they no longer had a place to deal drugs. More information about this intervention is included in appendix E, which describes in detail the successful strategies developed in this study.

Another intervention, also described in detail in appendix E, involved collective efficacy building and information sharing within the police department and between the police and service provider communities. The officers felt that there was insufficient information sharing between them and their colleagues who worked different shifts about the activities of the "park regulars." Furthermore, they recognized that a number of the individuals who hung out at the park, such as the young man with the wheelchair described earlier, had significant social challenges and needs including housing and mental and physical health problems. The MID provided outreach and efforts to connect these individuals with services, as did other organizations in the city, but persuading the youth in the park to accept the services was often a challenge, and even when they were accepted into shelters they would often return to the streets within a matter of days. The officers felt that they needed to better engage with social service providers to provide a coordinated response to these individuals. The young man with the wheelchair proved to be an important test case for this approach. Over a period of five months, the officers at Westlake worked hard to develop relationships with outreach workers from the MID, housing service providers, and the man himself. While he was initially reluctant to accept services, he began to trust the officers as they made the effort to engage with him consistently whenever he was in the park. Once a service plan was in place, the officers were able to bring in outreach workers and transportation to persuade him to move to sheltered housing. One of the CEBCP researchers was present during these final efforts and noted that while the man remained reluctant to be moved, it was the officers—along with a street outreach worker—who were ultimately successful in persuading him to go in a gentle and compassionate manner.

Perhaps the most ambitious intervention planned at Westlake Park was the officers' efforts to ban smoking in the park. All of Seattle's parks have a rule prohibiting smoking unless the smoker is at least 25 feet away from other park users. The officers noted that smoking was highly prevalent among the individuals who loitered in the park as well as other park users (e.g., individuals on lunch break from nearby businesses). Smokers were using both tobacco and marijuana; the latter was legalized for recreational use in Washington in December

2012, although it remains illegal to smoke it in public. Staff members from the Seattle OCA were active partners in this research. They conducted 13 observations of smoking activity on 10 separate days during April and May of 2014 in support of the project and the officers' bid to the Parks Board to implement a smoking ban. They found that on average 41 percent of park users smoked, many of them in or near a small fenced-off children's play area. An average of 39 percent of smokers in the park used the park only for smoke breaks, and 21 percent of all smokers were smoking marijuana, either alone or in large groups of juveniles and youth who spent long periods of time in the park (Jones, Gross Shader, and Sabin-Lee 2014).

The park smoking rules presented a significant challenge for enforcement. The small size of the park and the heavy pedestrian traffic at all times of the day meant that it was usually not possible to be more than 25 feet away from another individual, yet the large number of smokers prevented the police from taking action against any of them. Thus, enforcement of the rule was impractical. Furthermore, the SPD had recently been placed under a consent decree related to use of force, and there was a reluctance among officers in general to take enforcement action against minor infractions. In addition, signage in the park was poor. Signs informing users of the smoking rules were small, difficult to read, and placed high above people's heads. Many homeless or transient individuals who had come to Seattle from other places were simply unaware of the local rules. The play area had a larger sign showing specific regulations for use of the playground but did not mention smoking. The officers believed that banning smoking completely within the park boundaries would give them more power to enforce the rules and discourage large groups of people from loitering. With assistance from the OCA—including the data collection described earlier—the officers attempted to make the case to the Parks Board to implement the ban. However, after a number of hearings (several of which were postponed), no agreement was reached during the project period. The ban failed to gain political traction in large part because the intervention period fell during a hotly contested mayoral election in the city. The new mayor, who had defeated the incumbent, took office in January 2014. The officers struggled to find champions for the ban within the city government prior to the election, and once it was over the new leadership team required several months to transition into the role, by which time the intervention period was over. However, the efforts of the officers were not completely in vain. A complete smoking ban in all of Seattle's parks was finally passed in late May 2015, almost two years after our intervention started, and was presented as an initiative of the new mayor (Beekman 2015).

In addition to working on the four interventions, officers at Westlake Park reported engaging in more traditional law enforcement and community outreach activities, including patrolling the hot spot on foot or bicycle; responding to incidents that occurred in the park; and talking to or intelligence gathering with local residents, business employees and owners, and other individuals and groups involved in improving or providing place management such as the MID downtown ambassadors, the park concierge, and city maintenance workers.

Problem solving at 3rd and Pike/Pine

As in Westlake Park, drug crimes featured heavily among the problems identified by officers on 3rd Avenue between Pike and Pine Streets. The block served as an open-air drug market centering on the bus stops and the nearby bus tunnel and light rail station entrance. The officers observed a number of other problems related to this location, including drug use and intoxication, buying and selling of stolen goods and prescription medication, gang activity, fights and disturbances, and other disorder such as jaywalking, littering, public drinking, and interfering with pedestrians. There were also some problems with robberies and gang activity at this location. Both youth and adults were involved in the drug market and associated activities.

The officers believed that the physical features of the block were the primary drivers of the problems they observed. The site simultaneously provided ideal conditions for individuals associated with gangs and the drug trade to gather and conduct their business and a large number of escape routes—by road, alleyway, or public transit—for those individuals to avoid detection and enforcement. The SNG's Community Appearance Survey, which also included the adjacent block of 3rd Avenue between Pike and Union Streets that was initially included in the pilot, indicates the extent of the disorder observed at the location. The west side of the street received a disorder rating of 2.6 out of 4, and the east side of the street was rated 2.4 out of 4, indicating moderate disorder (figure 10). The SNG observed trash, maintenance issues with street infrastructure, graffiti, urine smell in business entryways, and evidence of drug use including marijuana smoke and discarded crack baggies (figure 11).

Figure 10. Community Appearance Survey results for 3rd Avenue



Figure 11. Community Appearance Survey detail for 3rd Avenue



Source: SNG

The officers working at 3rd and Pike/Pine collected 14 community surveys between November 2013 and May 2014. A further eight surveys were collected at 3rd and Pike/Union during the same period, and the two sets of results are combined in figures 12–14. As in Westlake Park, the majority of individuals surveyed worked on one of the blocks (figure 12). A smaller proportion shopped, took transit, or walked or rode through the sites, and nobody lived there. Perceptions of safety were much lower on 3rd Avenue than in Westlake Park. Despite the two blocks (especially between Pike and Pine Streets) being heavily populated during the day, 40 percent of respondents said they felt somewhat or very unsafe there during the day and 84 percent of those who answered the question said they felt somewhat or very unsafe at night (figure 13). All four of the issues officers asked about—violent crime, social problems, violations, and physical appearance—were rated as at least medium problems by a majority of respondents; social problems and violent crime were most likely to be rated as large problems (figure 14). Again, while these findings are based on small and nonrepresentative samples, they reflect the officers' assessments of the problems on the blocks.

Figure 12. Activities of community survey respondents on 3rd Avenue



Figure 13. Feelings of safety among community survey respondents on 3rd Avenue



Figure 14. Perceptions of problems among community survey respondents on 3rd Avenue



In addition to these data collection efforts, a sociology undergraduate research class from the University of Washington led by ManChui Leung also conducted a use study of a larger area of 3rd Avenue and an evaluation of city efforts to improve the site during October and November 2013. On learning of their efforts, the project team began collaborating with the class, and they presented their findings at the halfway meeting. They found that suspicious activity along the street, such as soliciting, suspected shoplifting, and drug dealing, occurred at all times of the day. They also noted that there was a substantial gap between actual and perceived crime on the street (although not between actual and perceived social disorder) but that this discouraged people from using the street for non-crime reasons. Finally, in line with SNG and the officers' findings, they recommended physical changes to the location to reduce disorder and improve user experience on the street (Leung et al. 2013).

Through no fault of their own the officers working on 3rd Avenue struggled to develop interventions for the site. As previously discussed, they stopped working at 3rd and Pike/Union altogether when collaborating with store managers proved challenging, even though drug problems and homelessness on that block were contributing to shoplifting—primarily of health-related items such as deodorants. The Pike/Pine block was also problematic because the drug market was so entrenched that it required a more targeted law enforcement response to shut down the market before community-oriented and problem-solving efforts could take hold. With the agreement of the project team, part of the intervention plan at 3rd Avenue involved collaborating with the SPD's narcotics team to conduct buy-busts to identify and arrest key drug dealers at the location. In keeping with the spirit and goals of the pilot project, it was agreed that the buy-busts would target adults only. Adults were primarily responsible for the drug-dealing, while juveniles and youth tended to be secondary players in those operations.

Other interventions focused on environmental changes, encouraging compliance through enforcing policies and rules, and building collective efficacy by strengthening relationships between business owners and improving collaboration between the SPD and the Metro Transit Police, who had jurisdiction over the bus stops

and transit tunnel. Again, these efforts largely failed to gain traction. The officers planned to address disorderly conduct at the bus stops through increased enforcement against adults involved in disorder, improving signage, and potentially rerouting some bus lines to reduce crowding. However, they believed that the new policies on stop-and-frisk introduced as a result of the consent decree limited their authority to detain individuals for minor infractions, and interagency collaboration between the project officers and the transit police was slow to develop. The officers made some efforts to connect with businesses and property owners in an effort to improve natural guardianship on the block, as recommended in the CPTED report (Nelson-Zagar 2014), but on both blocks many of the major businesses were chain stores that did not have the same ability or incentives to engage as smaller, locally owned stores.

A further complication on 3rd Avenue was that the area had already been identified by the city as a site for potential development. Many of the proposed ideas, such as rerouting bus lines and improving street furniture, aligned with the officers' and SNG's suggestions for improvements at the location. During October 2013 the city temporarily relocated the bus stops on 3rd Avenue between Pike and Pine Streets while the bus stops and benches were refurbished. The officers reported that this substantially altered the activity on the street, and while the research team was unable to conclusively establish any changes in crime on the block because of relatively low numbers of incidents, the officers and other community members they spoke to reported anecdotal evidence of a temporary reduction in crime. However, in part because of the political climate in the city described earlier and in part because plans were already under way to make improvements at the site, the team found it difficult to get any of the recommended environmental changes off the ground.

Analysis of crime incidents

Figures 15 and 16 show the trend in the number of recorded crime incidents per month in Westlake Park and its control site and 3rd and Pike/Pine and its control site respectively. We examined monthly trends beginning in January 2011, 18 months before the intervention started, and ending in December 2014, 6 months after it ended. The figures show all crime events that resulted in a police report being taken, regardless of whether the suspects or arrestees were youth or adults.

Figure 15. All incidents at Westlake Park and control site, January 2011–December 2014



Figure 16. All incidents at 3rd Avenue and Pike/Pine Streets and control site, January 2011–December 2014



Figures 15 and 16 indicate that both treatment locations generally had higher numbers of incidents than their comparison sites in the months prior to the intervention, with a few exceptions. By the start of the intervention in June 2013 there was parity in the number of incidents between each treatment site and its comparison. However, by the end of the intervention each treatment site once again had a higher number of crimes than the comparison sites.

Figures 17 and 18 show the same graphs for incidents involving youth up to age 25 as arrestees or suspects. Due to lower numbers of incidents involving youth at each site the graphs show considerably more variation. At Westlake Park the treatment site started and ended the intervention with a higher number of incidents than the comparison site, but the gap had widened by the end of the intervention. Only at 3rd and Pike/Pine do the two sites end the intervention period at parity—but there were slightly more incidents in the comparison site than the treatment site at the start of the intervention.

Figure 17. Youth incidents at Westlake Park and control site, January 2011–December 2014



Figure 18. Youth incidents at 3rd Avenue and Pike/Pine Streets and control site, January 2011–December 2014



We conducted difference-in-differences analyses using Poisson regression to examine pre-post intervention differences between each treatment and control site. More information about our methodology, including the full models, can be found in appendix F. In Westlake Park, the intervention was associated with a 9 percent increase in total crime incidents, although this was not statistically significant (incidence rate ratio (IRR) = 1.089, $p \leq .484$)), and a statistically significant increase of 69 percent in incidents involving youth (IRR = 1.692, $p \leq .021$). We caution that while the latter result seems large, the overall number of incidents involving youth is very small. On average there were only 10.8 incidents involving youth per month in the treatment site during the entire study period and 7.1 in the comparison site.

At the 3rd and Pike/Pine treatment site we found an 18 percent decrease in total crime incidents relative to the comparison site (again, this was not statistically significant: IRR = .819, $p \leq .150$). Although the treatment site ended up with a higher number of incidents at the end of the intervention period, there was a slight downward trend in this site over the whole study period and a slight upward trend in the comparison site. The findings for incidents involving youth were similar—a non–statistically significant decrease of 17 percent (IRR = .828, $p \leq .386$) Again, the number of incidents involving youth was low overall: 8.7 in the treatment group and 6.0 in the control group.

Discussion of findings

Overall, our analysis reveals few promising results despite the documented efforts of the officers. At Westlake Park we found a slight increase in recorded crime incidents in the treatment areas relative to the comparison areas during the intervention period and a statistically significant increase in the number of incidents involving youth. At 3rd and Pike/Pine, both total and youth-involved crime incidents did decline, but these findings were not statistically significant and may be partially explained by a corresponding increase in crime in the comparison site and an overall downward trend in crime starting in 2011.

We note that there are a number of limitations in our analysis. Most important, we only examined two small locations, and the number of incidents recorded at each location is therefore limited. It can be more difficult to discern a statistically significant effect when numbers are small, so the full impact of the program (particularly at 3rd and Pike/Pine, where crime decreased by almost 20 percent) may not be captured. Nonetheless, we found a statistically significant *increase* in incidents involving youth at Westlake Park, even though the mean number of monthly incidents was barely in double figures. However, our analysis should still be interpreted with caution. We also lacked full information about other variables that might have driven crime trends at each location (beyond simple seasonal variations) and the impact and timing of other activities going on in the areas (such as the bus stop remodeling on 3rd Avenue), so our models do not control well for alternative explanations for changes in crime rates.[6]

However, our findings also point to potential failures in the pilot project. The reasons why interventions fail to be successful can be categorized in one of three ways (Ekblom and Pease 1995; Rosenbaum 1986):

1. **Theory failure.** The idea behind the program and theory about why it would work (i.e., that community policing in hot spots for youth would be effective because of combination of crime and place research and successful interventions for youth) is incorrect.

2. **Measurement failure.** The evaluation is unable to detect the true effect of the program because of an inappropriate research design, other "confounding" events that prevented us from measuring effects, etc.

3. **Implementation failure.** The idea behind the program is sound, but in practice it was not implemented correctly. Ekblom and Pease (1995) state that this is the most common reason why program evaluations fail to show positive effects.

We think theory failure is an unlikely explanation for the lack of positive results. As discussed in "Background," there is considerable empirical support for the theoretical basis behind and effectiveness of many of the elements of our program—POP, hot spot policing, multiagency partnerships, collective efficacy building, and community-based interventions for youth have all been found to have positive effects for crime reduction. While these elements have not previously been fully combined into a community policing intervention at hot spots of youth offending, we would be surprised if such an approach did not have any potential to be effective.

It is possible that we were examining the wrong outcomes or using incorrect data and research methods to conduct our evaluation—i.e., that the lack of success is attributable to measurement failure. As we noted earlier, there are a number of limitations to this evaluation. This was a small pilot project in two locations with relatively

6. Indeed, as shown in appendix F, the R^2 for each of our models ranges from .06 to .21. While the upper end of this range is not dissimilar from the findings in many other criminological studies (Weisburd and Piquero 2008), these statistics indicate that the variables included in our models only explain a small portion of the variance.

small numbers of crimes. As such, our outcomes are more susceptible to random "noise." In other words, an increase in the number of recorded incidents from 2 to 4 from one month to the next represents an increase of 100 percent, even though 4 is still a small number. Thus, there may be large relative changes in the number of incidents from month to month in the hot spots that have nothing to do with the intervention. Thus, we cannot really say that the community policing program *caused* the unsuccessful effects; however, the patterns are not in the direction we would expect given the theory.

It is also possible that the increased number of incidents we see in Westlake Park could be attributed to increased police activity as a result of the intervention. In this case, the increase may not be a failure but a reporting effect. If police are spending more time at the location they may be more likely to see crimes in progress; they are also immediately on hand if citizens want to report a crime, and they may be more inclined to take an incident report. Furthermore, community-oriented efforts may increase citizen trust in the police, which in turn may lead to increased reporting. The fact that recorded incidents increased in Westlake Park, where the officers engaged in some successful prevention efforts and were joined by the other project officers who had less to do at their own hot spots, but decreased at 3rd and Pike/Pine, where officers struggled to get their interventions off the ground, lends some support to the reporting effect explanation. Unfortunately it was not possible to test for this reporting effect directly in the data we collected. Given more resources, we could have conducted community surveys to measure trust in police, fear of crime, and victimization at multiple time periods and compared changes in these outcomes to changes in police activity and citizen calls for service. If both trust and police activity and calls increased while at the same time reported fear of crime and overall victimization levels decreased, we might deduce that the increase in police activity could be attributed to a reporting effect rather than an increase in crime. We recommend that future research on community policing programs take steps to test for these reporting effects.

However, while we cannot rule out a reporting effect, we also think that some of the failure of the intervention to show positive effects can be attributed to implementation failure. As previously documented, the officers faced a number of challenges in implementing all the responses they had planned for the hot spots, and both activity logs completed by the pilot team and our meetings and conversations with the project partners indicated that there was frequently little to no police activity in the treatment sites. Notwithstanding the successful interventions with the young homeless man using a wheelchair and the changes to the park benches (which were not made until the very end of the intervention period), overall there was insufficient dosage of police problem-solving activity to address the problems they identified.

The SPD assigned special call signs, unique to the project, to the pilot team officers for the duration of the intervention period so that we could track police activity. We could therefore assess the extent to which the project officers responded to calls and "on-views" (officer-initiated activities) in the treatment sites and compare this to the standard police response to calls in the comparison site. Our findings are striking. Figure 19 shows the number of police-initiated activities at Westlake Park compared to the comparison site. Note that police activity in Westlake Park is consistently much greater than in the comparison site throughout the analysis period. However, despite a steep and steady increase in activity at Westlake Park in the 18 months leading up to the start of the intervention, activity began to drop as soon as the intervention started and fell consistently throughout the intervention period until it was almost back at the previous year's level. Note that this is not simply a decline in incident reports being taken but a decline in officers logging any activities in the street segments that comprise the hot spot into the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. Interestingly, this decline was followed by a sharp uptick in activity of about 100 calls in the few months after the intervention period ended.

Figure 19. Police-initiated activity at Westlake Park and control site, January 2012–September 2014



Figure 20 shows a similar pattern for 3rd and Pike/Pine. Police activity was somewhat higher in the comparison site than at Westlake's comparison site. In the summer prior to the intervention there was a very sharp increase in activity at the treatment site, but activity quickly returned to normal levels by the beginning of 2013. However, there was no corresponding increase in activity when the intervention started, and activity levels actually fell in several of the intervention months. As in Westlake, police activity quickly picked up again after the intervention ended. There were no clear patterns of activity in either comparison site during the project period.

Figure 20. Police-initiated activity at 3rd Avenue and Pike/Pine Streets and control site, January 2012–September 2014



We used the same difference-in-differences statistical techniques as in our crime outcomes analysis to assess these changes. Appendix F provides additional details about the models. In Westlake Park, controlling for seasonality and trends, there was a 28 percent decrease in police activity during the intervention period relative to the control group and non-intervention period (IRR = .724, $p \leq .369$). This was not statistically significant. At 3rd and Pike/Pine, police activity declined by a statistically significant 57 percent (IRR = .425, $p \leq .003$).

The police activity analysis provides good evidence that the lack of promising outcomes from the project may be due to implementation failure. However, it is also important to note that community policing officers are expected to be proactive, not necessarily to respond to calls, so it is possible that the decline in police activity in these areas was matched by an increase in community engagement, problem solving with business employees, and collaborating with other agencies. As noted earlier, we were not able to measure this directly, and such activities were not frequently reported in the officers' activity logs. Furthermore, the project officers were required to use their special call signs to log their time spent in the hot spots in the CAD system regardless of whether they were responding to incidents or engaging with the community. Thus, these activities should be captured indirectly in the preceding analysis.

Nonetheless, although the intervention failed to have an overall impact on crime, we have documented several efforts that appeared to be successful and model good practice in community-oriented, multiagency problem solving in response to youth crime issues. The most notable of these efforts are the interventions with the young homeless man using a wheelchair and the park bench replacements. To provide additional insight into how these approaches were organized for the benefits of other agencies who may wish to replicate them, we have produced a research brief that documents the two interventions (appendix E).

Lessons Learned

While our pilot intervention did not produce the desired impact for crime reduction, the challenges of developing and delivering the program provide a number of useful lessons for police agencies who wish to establish or extend existing community policing and problem-solving efforts and for researchers who want to better integrate theory and practice or develop evaluations of real-world practices. In particular, the challenges we faced offer important insights into the role of organizational transformation in community policing, the integration of police departments with local government, and the difficulties of achieving collaboration across different agencies to effect change when no centralized structure exists to facilitate it.

Organizational transformation and community policing

Organizational change, along with community partnerships and problem solving, is a fundamental element in the definition of community policing (COPS Office 2014; Skogan 2006). It is this element that (in theory) distinguishes community policing as an agency-wide philosophy rather than a specific policing strategy. A "true" implementation of community policing requires full organizational commitment and changes to leadership, structures, information sharing, decision-making processes, and so on, allowing authority for day-to-day problem solving with community members to shift from the higher levels of the hierarchy to the officers on the ground who work with the community (COPS Office 2014; Cordner 1999; Trojanowicz et al. 1998; Weisburd et al. 2003).

Thus, we faced a significant challenge by trying to engage officers in community policing and problem solving within an organizational context of strong resistance to the central elements of these approaches. While the SPD does engage in some community policing efforts—the officers on the project team said they had previously worked on community policing assignments (although these may only have met what Gill et al. [2014] describe as the "minimum definition" of community policing, such as bicycle patrols and general crime prevention education)—there did not appear to be a strong community-oriented culture throughout the organization.[7]

Furthermore, the intervention period coincided with a period of rapid change for the SPD. Former chief John Diaz had stepped down in April 2013, a couple of months before the intervention started. Two interim chiefs served during our implementation period before current chief Kathleen O'Toole took office in June 2014. These changes in leadership took a significant toll on the department, particularly the command staff. Several senior officers (not connected to the project) were demoted—some of whom were then re-promoted under the next interim chief—and there were numerous reshuffles in the command. The West precinct captain who had championed our project was reassigned during one of these shake-ups, and the second half of the project proceeded under the auspices of a new captain who, while willing to assist, was unfamiliar with the project. By the end of the intervention period, even the sergeant who oversaw the team had been moved to another assignment, and the six officers working in the hot spots were the only remaining members of the original SPD team. In a department going through such rapid and significant upheaval, especially to the extent that institutional networks were weakened and there was fear and mistrust throughout the entire organization, the appetite for innovation was substantially weakened. This period also partially coincided with the department being placed under a consent decree, which the city vigorously contested. Thus, officers we spoke to (both from our project team and on

7. As indicated in the Background section, the conclusions in this report do not consider reforms that the SPD has made under its Consent Decree with the Department of Justice, many of which took place after the period of the pilot program that is the subject of this report.

other assignments) were understandably nervous about being involved in anything new or different, and some were afraid to take any enforcement action at all, especially when an unexpected shift in leadership could result in their actions being seen in a different light.

Nonetheless, our project was not the only pilot intervention or research initiative going on in the SPD during this period. Two other initiatives that were implemented around the same time and in the same precinct—Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD), a prebooking diversion program for individuals arrested for drug and prostitution offenses (Beckett 2014) and an "early warning" experiment that identified "hot spots" of potentially problematic police activity (such as use of force) and incorporated procedural justice and LEED (Listen and Explain with Equity and Dignity) principles into supervisor meetings with officers working in those areas (Owens et al. 2015)—produced successful results. How did these projects differ from our approach?

The LEAD evaluation (Beckett 2014; Collins, Lonczak, and Clifasefi 2015) shows how community policing is highly dependent on the intersections between local structures. In that initiative, a wide range of state and local government agencies, including police, prosecutors, public defenders, corrections agencies, external service providers, and oversight organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union collaborated for a number of years to craft and implement the intervention. This collaboration, which was successful despite what Beckett (2014) describes as "adversarial relations" between many of the parties at the outset of the project, came about because of an extended period of strategic planning and assessment and because of strong leadership at the higher levels of the organization. Our project did not devote sufficient time to identifying who needed to be at the table and what their roles should be, nor were those individuals directly involved in the brief planning process for the intervention. Furthermore, while we built on our existing relationship with the precinct captain to implement the intervention, we did not have contact with more senior leadership in the SPD, so our team was isolated within the organization without high-level oversight or a high-ranking "champion."

The importance of political capital—having the right people on board with the project—also seems to have been a key determinant of the success of the early warning experiment (Owens et al. 2015). In that project, the research team worked directly with a deputy chief to whom all project efforts were accountable. In our project, although the captain and sergeant understood the theory of the project and were keen to be involved in innovation, they lacked influence within the organization to assume full oversight over the project. Compared to the strong top-down leadership evident in both of these successful projects, it is clear that we were not successful in engaging the individuals in the SPD who had the most political capital. The leaders we worked with had insufficient pull within the department to bring together the various city departments and other stakeholders who needed to be involved. While the relationships between the police department and these stakeholders were not necessarily adversarial, as they were at the beginning of the LEAD approach, there was little history of collaboration, and the external stakeholders were not fully aware of why the police were (as they may have seen it) suddenly asking them for help. Furthermore, while the early warning project was innovative, the innovation (procedural justice and LEED principles) was incorporated into the traditional hierarchical policing structure. The senior commander gave supervisors a list of officers whom supervisors were expected to call into a meeting. The officers then met with their first-line supervisors, who delivered the intervention. Thus, the context was familiar and the hierarchy was respected. Our approach skipped the hierarchy and required the supervisor and officers to change their behavior and normal methods of operation completely. Weisburd, McElroy, and Hardyman (1988) note that community policing requires very different supervision strategies from traditional policing, and as we discuss later in the report we did not equip our supervisor with the tools and empowerment he needed to be innovative.

The key takeaway from these observations is that a culture of innovation—as was evident in the precinct captain's and other midlevel leaders' enthusiasm to collaborate with us on the pilot—is not enough to truly achieve organizational transformation and implement community policing successfully. A culture of implementation is needed. Furthermore, this culture needs to be transmitted from the top down in order to fully empower line officers. Because we were not fully engaged with the department's leadership, our project was isolated from the overall department culture and had no chance of making an impact on that culture. Consequently, when the leaders we worked with moved on, our project was unable to withstand the change and the officers on the ground—who also saw the value of the innovative approach but lacked the capacity to actually make it happen—felt unsupported. We return to this point in "Recommendations," beginning on page 39.

The role of first-line supervisors

As we have noted, first-line supervisors are as important to the success or failure of implementation efforts as top-down leadership. In our project, the first-line supervisor (the sergeant in charge of the team) was not sufficiently involved in training, strategizing, or developing the vision for the project. This lack of involvement was in part an oversight by the research team and in equal part an oversight by the department. The sergeant ended up missing a great deal of the project training days for various reasons, one of which was that he had been tasked by his superiors with ordering and picking up lunch for the attendees. We did not pay sufficient attention to developing the role of the sergeant for the project. The training focused on the activities the officers on the ground would be doing but not how the sergeant would facilitate those efforts. For example, we invited the crime analyst to talk about what kinds of data were available to assist the officers with their problem solving, but we did not train the sergeant to support the officers in ensuring they were asking the right questions of the data or in using the information to move their efforts forward. In particular, all of the officers remained in their normal day shift pattern and the sergeant did not use information about "hot times" for crimes to ensure they were deployed most effectively or follow up with night shift officers on issues that spilled over to the next shift. While operationally it was not feasible to ask the officers to switch their normal shift patterns, it would have been useful to also have a team of night shift officers involved in the project.

The result of the lack of engagement of the sergeant was that the project officers did not seem to be empowered to take action in many cases. The officers frequently asked why the research team could not simply tell them what to do to make the project work at the hot spots. To their credit, the officers achieved several successful interventions. However, these took a long time to get off the ground and their problem-solving and intervention development processes were largely guided by an external person (the research liaison from the OCA). This ensured that the work got done, but the fact that the supervision came from an external individual rather than the sergeant is not a sustainable position. Such an approach could potentially create negativity among patrol officers who are used to making decisions directly.

The need for strategic planning

Finally, as previously noted, our effort lacked a substantial planning process in terms of ensuring other agencies were on board with the approach. While representatives from city agencies and local service providers attended the training in an informational capacity, we did not give sufficient consideration to how or whether they would be fully integrated into the planning process (and indeed they were not), nor to who specifically should be at the table. The external stakeholders who were in a position to provide support and services to ensure the officers could implement their planned interventions should have been involved from the beginning as equal partners in the planning process. Instead, they only attended the training and occasional check-in meetings and simply introduced the broad functions of their agencies rather than providing practical guidance for the officers throughout the project.

Particularly given that there was minimal history of collaboration between the police and these other agencies, we were naïve to expect the partnerships and roles to be immediately clear and effective. As Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994) note,

> Addressing [the role of other agencies] in planning helps in anticipating problems with turf battles, red tape, and all the other obstacles associated with trying to deal with agencies; otherwise, line-level personnel can easily burn out trying to be all things to all people, leaving them less and less time for their law enforcement duties. (24)

Another important benefit of integration is that city agencies and service providers needed to be educated on the purpose of community policing and the role of the police. In our project they did not appear to know *why* the police officers were making direct contact and requesting sometimes major changes to public services (such as the smoking ban or the park bench replacement). It is important for these agencies to understand why it should make sense for the police to be the facilitators of these multiagency partnerships—because, as Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994) again point out, no other profession provides leadership for public safety efforts, nor do they have the full range of tools and powers at their disposal to stabilize places and engage in problem-solving efforts as the police do. But ultimately, the police cannot make all of the necessary changes on their own, even if they have oversight of the problem-solving process. They need the support of the city. The smoking ban is an excellent example of this—despite the officers' belief that it could solve a number of problems in Westlake Park and make their enforcement role easier, it lacked vital political support and impetus for change elsewhere in the city.

Finally, the lack of a problem-solving culture both in the SPD and elsewhere in the city hindered the ability of the police to conduct a systematic assessment of the problems. Many interventions that arise from the problem-solving process may be "low-hanging fruit"—quick and straightforward changes that the police can do that could have a substantial impact. However, without first assessing and analyzing the problems, it is difficult for the police to identify even the low-hanging fruit. Building their capacity and ability to engage in this assessment process—especially from scratch—takes a lot more time, effort, and leadership than a single training session and a few months of work.

Recommendations

We conclude this report with a set of recommendations that summarize our experiences and lessons learned. These recommendations aim to guide police agencies that seek to implement or expand community policing or problem-solving efforts and to provide points for discussion and consideration as these efforts are planned. They may also be relevant to researchers seeking to design evaluations and develop theoretical perspectives around some of the less studied elements of community policing.

Do not underestimate the organizational transformation element of community-oriented policing

What is striking about our project is that there are concrete examples of the police team engaging in many of the types of activities described as "community-oriented policing" by policing scholars and organizations such as the COPS Office (Gill et al. 2014; Skogan 2006; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994; Weisburd and Eck 2004). There was also evidence that these activities were directed at hot spots of crime involving youth. On the ground, police team members were certainly "doing" community policing. That they were ultimately unsuccessful in fully engaging key city stakeholders and reducing crime lends strong support for the neglected element of organizational transformation in community policing. The community-oriented policing philosophy is about much more than just what police officers do on the ground.

That said, while the empowerment of and decentralization of decision making to line officers is usually identified in the policing literature as a hallmark of organizational transformation, our experiences suggest that top-down leadership is still needed to communicate the vision of community policing throughout the agency. Organizational transformation is about whole-department change. As we discovered, a small specialized unit trying to do community outreach and multiagency partnerships and problem solving in a broader environment that lacks experience of and support for these approaches—and where there is fear of doing anything new or different—will struggle to implement change.

Furthermore, when we discuss decentralization and empowerment of line officers as an element of organizational transformation we must also extend these concepts to first-line supervisors. There is a distinct lack of research on the role of first-line supervisors in policing in general (e.g., Fridell, Maskaly, and Cordner 2011), but they play a vital role in the diffusion of innovation and cultural values throughout the agency—in many ways they are the "gatekeepers of innovation" (Gill 2016b). In turn, they can impact the implementation and effectiveness of community policing. If supervisors are disillusioned or do not support or understand the overall goals of community policing (which may result from a lack of guidance or support from their own supervisors when implementing community policing; e.g., Lord 1996), they can potentially sabotage organizational change (Rosenbaum, Yeh, and Wilkinson 1994). Furthermore, Allen (2002) finds that line officers may simply go through the motions of community policing if their supervisors do not champion the approach.

Thus, while higher-level leadership is important, the attitudes and activities of both line officers and their supervisors are important predictors of successful community policing implementation and organizational transformation. Kelling and Bratton (1993) suggest that police leaders should involve first-line supervisors in the planning of new strategies and be willing to allow them to be flexible and creative when working with communities even if the outcomes of these approaches are not successful (see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994). Police chiefs should promote a clear vision of the organizational philosophy and clear expectations of supervisors so that they feel supported (see also Skolnick and Bayley 1988).

Develop specific training protocols for community policing and problem solving

Community policing often requires officers to draw upon nontraditional, non–law enforcement strategies to solve crime problems. Police leaders and researchers should not assume that officers automatically know where to look or whom to contact to access these resources. They need specific training about what is available in their community and who in each agency can assist them. As we noted above, this needs to go beyond simply providing examples of what is on offer. Officers need a clear guide on where to turn and how.

In our project we proceeded as if we expected the officers to know what to do after the initial information session and brief workshops on sample community policing problems. It would have been better to start with describing the problem-solving steps and then feeding in information about community resources and services once specific problems are identified (which we did to some extent, but it was piecemeal). A follow-up workshop after the road maps were developed, in which service providers and other agencies were invited to collaborate so that everyone was on the same page about problems and possible solutions, would have been a useful addition. Again, we attempted to do this with the halfway meeting, but the purpose was not clearly defined and the process was not systematic.

The lack of training specific to community policing and problem solving is a common problem. In many agencies, problem-solving skills and community engagement strategies are not emphasized in the academy (e.g. Bradford and Pynes 1999; Gill 2016b; Grieco 2014; Rahr and Rice 2015), and even if they are, these skills are not always reinforced during field training (Haarr 2001) or throughout officers' careers.

We recommend that police leaders who wish to enhance their community policing and problem-solving practices consider how these skills are taught in the academy and during field training and that researchers of community policing collaborate with agencies to translate the theoretical principles of these approaches into practical, actionable training curricula. As our experience shows, simply describing the philosophy of community policing is not enough; training must focus on the "procedural" elements of community policing—equipping officers with the tools they need to do it in practice—in line with any other form of police training (Mastrofski 1999; Palmiotto, Birzer, and Unnithan 2000; Paoline, Myers, and Worden 2000). Problem-oriented policing strategies and the SARA model of problem solving provide a useful framework for training and have been described as the "tactical" element of community policing (Cordner 1999), making them more actionable for officers in the academy than the broad philosophical principles of community policing. In addition, community policing training should provide guidance to officers on how to take ownership of a space and its problems and the benefits and challenges of collaborating with other agencies (Palmiotto, Birzer, and Unnithan 2000).

Research has shown that officers' positive attitudes toward community policing fade over time as they become more experienced in the field, so follow-up training in the field is also crucial to maintain and reinforce community policing practice (Grieco 2014; Haarr 2001; see also Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994). Field training officers (FTO), like first-line supervisors, are important gatekeepers of organizational values and practices. Lewis, Rosenberg, and Sigler (2013) suggest that FTO support for community policing can be encouraged through the FTO's performance evaluation process.

Encourage community policing through performance evaluation

Related to the previous point about FTOs, the performance evaluation structure in police departments should not be overlooked as a means of supporting and reinforcing community policing practice. Many officers in Seattle were afraid to be creative or innovative because frequent changes in leadership meant that there was no clear vision of the agency. They may have been fearful that aligning themselves to a "pet project" of a particular chief or commander, or deviating from accepted departmental norms, could harm their careers (as the experiences of former chief Stamper, described above, show). These problems can be avoided if police departments develop a clear vision for their community-based values and back it up through at all levels of the organization—particularly in administrative processes and a performance evaluation structure that rewards officers and supervisors for conforming to the vision (e.g. DeJong, Mastrofski, and Parks 2001; Melekian 2012).

Community policing and problem solving–related performance indicators are difficult to develop because they are harder to quantify than traditional measures such as the number of arrests made, tickets written, and so on. However, several scholars have attempted to develop lists of community policing activities that reflect officer performance and can be quantified, such as crime and disorder rates in the officer's target areas, number and type of contact with external agencies, community meetings and personal contacts, information gathering, and documentation of successful projects (Skolnick and Bayley 1988; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1994). What these authors could not have envisaged in the 1980s or 1990s is the importance of social media and other electronic forms of communication, which provide an unprecedented opportunity for police departments to engage with the public they serve and gather information about public perceptions. Some agencies have started to include e-mails they receive from community members (containing both positive and negative feedback) into the performance reviews and personal files of individual officers.

CompStat can also be used to reinforce community-related values and reorient organizational values toward community policing by including systematic reporting of community problems, encouraging citizen involvement in identifying and solving problems, and using crime data to prioritize policing service in an equitable way (Willis 2010; Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel 2010). Some departments may even consider inviting community members to observe or participate in certain parts of the CompStat process.

Identify the necessary political and administrative structures to make interventions happen

As we have noted, the police cannot be expected to solve all of the problems on their own. As the park bench intervention example in Westlake Park shows, a problem that appears to be a police issue (drug dealing) was easily abated simply by changing the design and placement of the benches. But the officers were not in a position to actually replace the benches themselves. In the same way that the police organizational context of community policing is as important as what the officers do on the ground, our project revealed that the city's role as what Gross Shader (2016) describes as "super-controller" can determine the success of community policing efforts. Super-controllers are "the people, organizations, and institutions that create the incentives for controllers to prevent or facilitate crime" (Sampson, Eck, and Dunham 2010, 40). When the individuals and agencies controlling crime lack incentives to function effectively, they become ineffective controllers and increases in crime can result. Gross Shader (2016) suggests that the city could act in a formal super-controller role by exercising regulatory, legal, or supervisory authority over all of the individuals and agencies (including the police) who contribute to crime rates at a particular place.

Thus, it is crucial at the outset of problem-solving efforts to identify who needs to be at the table—including representatives from city leadership as well as service providers and local government agencies who directly facilitate problem solving (such as the Department of Parks and Recreation in the benches example). In community policing, government agencies and service providers should be treated as community members. They should be involved in identifying, prioritizing, and responding to problems, not just responding.

There is very little guidance in the academic literature about who exactly should be at the table in community policing efforts in a general sense.[8] An exception is Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994), which, while dated, is still relevant given our experiences in Seattle. They recommend that community policing and problem solving efforts need to include "the big six:"

1. The police department (personnel at all levels)
2. The community: informal and formal leaders, organizations and activities, and citizens on the street
3. Elected civic officials: mayor; city manager; council members; state, county, and federal officials from any agencies that can influence policing
4. The business community
5. Other agencies, such as code enforcement, social services, and nonprofit organizations
6. The media

Our project suggests that elected civic officials play a much more important role than Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1994) suggest. They imply that elected officials play a more passive, primarily budget-related role. However, our experience suggests that they also need to be at the forefront of a concerted effort to ensure that all other city agencies that fall under their purview are aware of and on board with the community policing initiative.

This point is also related to our recommendation that top-down leadership is still important in an overall environment of delegated authority to line officers. We found that the officers on the ground often lacked the legitimacy and experience to draw upon assistance from some of the key "big six" partners (especially the political entities and city agencies, as the smoking ban experience suggests). Thus, we recommend that the police chief continue to lead the charge in terms of convening these organizations and developing relationships where they do not currently exist as well as providing sustained leadership throughout the process.

One of the problems with our approach may be that we attempted to develop these relationships as outsiders (researchers) in the absence of these key leaders. While community policing needs to be decentralized in its day to day operation, it cannot start from a place of decentralization. We also lacked the legitimacy to make connections on behalf of the police department. The OCA research liaison was perhaps best placed to get things done (and was instrumental in a number of the interventions that did work out), because her role provided her with an overview of all the various city departments and the relationships between them as well as an objective position. However, as we have noted, she was still an outsider from the police department's perspective, and the project would not have been sustainable within the police department alone. We lacked the support of the

8. The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (http://www.popcenter.org) is another exception that provides extensive guidance for a variety of police-led and community collaborative problem-solving efforts. However, in many cases police departments still need guidance and support to identify their specific problems before identifying appropriate POP guides to assist their efforts.

police chief largely because there was so much transition (in terms of both the police chief and the election of the new mayor); thus, the chief and the mayor's office were not in close collaboration. To the extent that we were starting from scratch, the timing was not right to simply jump into the project "cold" and start working.

Do not ignore the political context of implementation.

Our final recommendation relates to the need to identify the political players in the community policing process. To effectively engage in multiagency problem solving, police agencies need the support of the city itself. Without central leadership, vision, and oversight that spans across all agencies it is difficult to get the structure recommended above in place. In our project, the mayor and the city council were not at the table, but they alone had the power to bring all of the agencies together and explain why the project made sense.

This is a challenging proposition given the relatively short time frame of political appointments (including the police chief). As we have described, one of the biggest threats to the success of our project was the mayoral election and change of mayor in the middle of the intervention period, just at the point where it became clear that we would need the support of elected officials to implement many of the officers' recommendations. Prior to the election, we were advised by their staffers that the officials would be willing to support the project but only after the election when they knew which positions they would need to follow. After the election, we had to wait out the transition and settling-in periods, by which time the project was nearly over and we were competing with every other interest group seeking attention from the city government.

Nonetheless, we think it is vital that the police department establish a culture of collaboration and coordination with the mayor and city council (or equivalent entities), especially if the police department does not already have a history of collaboration and legitimacy to approach agencies directly. This does not have to be a one-way outreach effort: the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing offers a useful guide, produced in collaboration with the COPS Office, that provides specific guidance to mayors, city managers, and county executives on understanding the role of police in their jurisdiction, effective policing strategies, and how the government can support problem-solving and community policing efforts (Plant and Scott 2009). Bureaucracies move slowly, and community policing necessitates dealing with multiple bureaucracies. Based on our experiences in Seattle, we believe that the development of a clear, shared vision for community engagement and problem solving between the police department and city government with the support and involvement of all parties needed to make implementation happen is a necessary precursor to successful community policing efforts.

Appendix A. Initial Problem Identification and Solving Worksheets

This appendix has been edited and reformatted to adhere to COPS Office publication standards and to enhance accessibility.

Community Policing in Juvenile Hot Spots Study Initial Problem Identification Worksheet

Hot Spot Location: (3rd Pike/Pine, 3rd Pike/Union, Westlake Park)
Date:
Officer Name:

1. Describe the main juvenile crime problem(s) at this hot spot.
2. How did you identify the problem(s)? Check all that apply and briefly explain:
    a. Data from crime analysis
    b. Other (non-crime) data
    c. Personal observation/experience of location
    d. Speaking to residents/business owners/community groups
    e. Other
3. What additional information do you need to collect to analyze and solve the problem?
4. Rate the current condition of the hot spot in the following categories:
    a. Overall crime problem (1=not serious; 5=very serious)
    b. Juvenile crime (1=not serious; 5=very serious)
    c. Physical appearance/disorder (1=poor, lots of disorder; 5=excellent, no disorder)
    d. Community engagement/involvement (1=poor, 5=excellent)
    e. Community's relationship with the police (1=poor, 5=excellent)
5. On the Community Contact Sheet, note any local contacts you have made who will assist with problem solving.

Community Contact Sheet

Name	Role/ Organization	Contact Type (business owner, employee, local government, juvenile, police, resident, service provider, visitor)	Date	Contact Details	Notes

Community Policing in Juvenile Hot Spots Study
Problem Solving Worksheet

Hot Spot Location: (3rd Pike/Pine, 3rd Pike/Union, Westlake Park)
Date:
Officer Name:

1. Which stage of problem solving does this worksheet refer to? Check all that apply.
    a. Analyze
    b. Design response
    c. Implement response
    d. Assess
2. Describe the main juvenile crime problem(s) at this hot spot.
3. How has the problem changed since your last observation? (if applicable)
4. What information have you obtained about the problem? Check all that apply and briefly describe what the information shows:
    a. Data from crime analysis
    b. Other (non-crime) data
    c. Personal observation/experience of location
    d. Speaking to residents/business owners/community groups
    e. Other
5. What additional information do you need to collect to analyze and solve the problem?
6. Are additional street blocks/locations contributing to the problems in this hot spot?
    a. Yes (please explain)
    b. No
7. How would you say the hot spot has changed since your initial observation?
    a. Overall crime problem (1=much worse; 5=much better)
    b. Juvenile crime (1=much worse; 5=much better)
    c. Physical appearance/disorder (1=much worse; 5=much better)
    d. Community engagement/involvement (1=much worse; 5=much better)
    e. Community's relationship with the police (1=much worse; 5=much better)
    f. On the Hot Spot Action/Planning Log, describe what actions you or others have taken or plan to take at the hot spot.

Hot Spot Action/Planning Log

Date	Action Planned/ Taken	Status of Action (not started, in progress, ongoing, complete)	People/ Organizations Involved	Notes	Success Rating (completed actions only) 1=not successful, 5=very successful

Enforcement Actions

Date	Time	Type of Action (alcohol enforcement, arrest, park exclusion, street check, verbal persuasion, other [describe in Notes])	Age of subject (juvenile [under 18], youth [18–25], adult [over 25], not sure)	Notes

Appendix B. Community Appearance Survey Instrument

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Community Appearance Index—Physical Inventory

1810 E. Yesler Way, Seattle, WA-98122, www.sngi.org

SEATTLE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUP

Community/Project Name:
Date(s) of Index:
Scorer Name:
Contact Info/ Phone:

	Score 1 = no disorder 2 = slight disorder 3 = disorder 4 = extreme disorder	Notable Conditions/ Indicators of Physical Disorder (Examples of Physical Disorder: Graffiti , Abandoned Buildings, Broken Windows, Weeds, Litter, Boarded Windows, Illegal Dumping, Unkempt Vacant Lots, Junk Cars, Buildings with Structural Defects
1400 block 3rd Ave EAST		
1400 block 3rd Ave WEST		
1500 block 3rd Ave EAST		
1500 block 3rd Ave WEST		

Appendix C. Community Stakeholder Survey Instrument

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SPD West Precinct Juvenile Crime Hot Spot Pilot
Stakeholder Questionnaire

Location:
Date:
Officer Name:
Stakeholder Name:

On a scale from 1 to 6 (1 = Not a problem, 2 =Small problem, 3 = Medium problem, 4 = Large problem, 5 = Very large problem, 6 = Don't know/No opinion):

1. Do you think violent crime is a large or small problem at this location? (Robbery, assaults/fights, etc.)
2. Do you think social problems are a large or small problem at this location? (Drug dealing/use, homelessness, mental illness, etc.)
3. Do you think violations are a large or small problem at this location? (Smoking, skateboarding, off-leash pets, etc.)
4. Do you think physical appearance is a large or small problem at this location? (Trash, graffiti, general lack of cleanliness, etc.)
5. Do you feel safe or unsafe walking in this location during the day?
6. Do you feel safe or unsafe walking in this location at night?
7. What do you do at this location (circle all that apply)?
    a. Live here
    b. Work here
    c. Take transit
    d. Shop here
    e. Walk/ride through
    f. Other (please list)
8. Is there other information would you like to share?

Thank you.

Appendix D. Revised Activity Tracking Worksheets

This appendix has been edited and reformatted to adhere to COPS Office publication standards and to enhance accessibility.

Tracking worksheets were tailored to the specific problems identified and interventions proposed for each site; not every problem or intervention was listed on every report form.

Community Policing in Youth Hot Spots Weekly Activity Report

Name:
Dates (Sunday-Saturday):
Furlough days (check): Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat

1. In the past week, has there been any change in the problems you identified at_____?

	Got better	Stayed about the same	Got worse
Property crimes			
Drug crimes among adults			
Drug crimes among youth			
Violent crimes among youth			
Possible gang-associated people gathering at bus stops			

2. Have you received any new information about these problems? If yes, please describe.

    a. Are there any new problems? If yes, please describe.

3. Please describe any progress made on the proposed interventions from the 3rd Avenue and Pike/Pine roadmap for each day this week (leave blank if furloughed; write "none" if no activity).

    (This can be action you have taken or information you receive from other people/agencies.)

    a. Parks smoking rule change

    b. Install clear park signage

    c. Site changes to bus stops/locations

    d. Other physical changes/CPTED recommendations

    e. Information gathered regarding subjects

    f. Institutionalize information sharing among SPD

    g. Institutionalize information sharing between SPD and Metro Transit Police

    h. Institutionalize information sharing between SPD and street outreach

    i. Increase use of Metro no-trespass orders for disorderly conduct

    j. Buy-busts for adults selling drugs at bus stops

4. Please describe any other activities in the hot spot this week that do not fit into the categories above.
5. What information/resources have you used this week? (Select all that apply.)
    a. CAD data
    b. Police reports (GO data)
    c. Crime maps
    d. Information from subjects
    e. Information from shoppers/commuters
    f. Information from business owners/employees
    g. Other (describe):
6. Was this information useful? If so, how?
7. What additional information/resources would be helpful?

Effective Problem-Solving in Crime Hot Spots: Two Examples from Downtown Seattle's Westlake Park

Research Brief | City of Seattle Office of City Auditor | September 2015

Once you have identified a crime hot spot in your jurisdiction, how can you determine what will be the most effective strategies for reducing crime in that hot spot? This research brief describes two innovative problem-solving strategies used to address juvenile crime in Westlake Park in downtown Seattle: **Focusing on Hot Spots within the Hot Spots**, and **Police-Assisted Outreach**.

For Seattle, much was already known about its concentration of juvenile crime in the city. Dr. David Weisburd and his colleagues had found that over one third of all juvenile crime in Seattle was concentrated in just 86 street segments over a 14-year period (See: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231575.pdf). Moreover, juvenile crime hot spots tended to occur in areas that included shopping areas, schools, and activity centers.



Indeed, one of the juvenile crime hot spots selected for the project, Westlake Park in downtown Seattle, fits this description precisely. Located in the city's downtown commercial core, Westlake Park serves as an activity space and transit hub, and it is bordered with shops restaurants and businesses. Analysis of crime data showed that Westlake Park suffered from heavy concentrations of drug crime, assaults, thefts, and disturbances among juveniles and young adults.

COPS Office Juvenile Crime Hot Spot Project

In 2013, the Seattle Police Department and George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, received funding from the U.S. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office to address hot spots of juvenile crime in downtown Seattle using a community-policing approach.

A team consisting of six patrol officers and a sergeant from Seattle's West precinct (includes downtown) was assigned to the project. Hot spots of juvenile crime were selected for the project based on crime data from 2012.

The police team worked with the researchers, City agencies, and community organizations to analyze the unique conditions and develop appropriate interventions to reduce juvenile crime in these hot spots.


4th Ave. & Pine St./ Westlake Park
Mayflower
Park Hotel
Nordstroms
STEWART ST
OLIVE WAY
Westlake Center
5TH AVE
Starbucks
Macy's
4TH AVE
PINE ST
Westlake Park
3RD AVE

Appendix F. Data Analysis

Following the methodology described in Kondo, Keene, Hohl, MacDonald, & Branas (2015), and recommendations by Berk & MacDonald (2008), we used a difference-in-differences modeling approach using Poisson regression with robust standard errors to estimate the effects of the intervention in each site on crime incidents. The robust standard errors provide a more conservative estimate of statistical significance, given overdispersion in the model and the dependency between pre- and post-intervention observations in each treatment and comparison site.

The unit of analysis for the study was the number of recorded crime incidents (i) per month in each treatment and comparison site (t) from January 2011 to December 2014 (48 months). Each model includes, at least, a crime outcome, an intervention active/inactive term, a treatment assignment term, and a difference-in-differences interaction term, $P_{it} \times A_{it}$, where P_{it} indicates whether the intervention period was active (1) or inactive (0)[9] and A_{it} indicates assignment to the treatment (1) or comparison (0) condition. Some of the models below also control for time trends or seasonality through the inclusion of a monthly indicator variable. However, where these controls did not significantly improve model fit or predictive value we opted for the simplest model, so many of the tables below only include the active/inactive, treatment assignment, and difference-in-differences terms. In the following tables, coefficients from the Poisson regression models are exponentiated to give the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR)—the ratio of crime incident counts in the treatment area to crime incident counts in the comparison area. We used the same methodology to assess the impact of the intervention on police activity, as discussed in Section 3.4. The timeframe for the police activity analysis was January 2012 to September 2014 (33 months). All analyses were conducted in Stata 14.

Westlake Park

Descriptive statistics

Table 1. Westlake Park mean crime incidents by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	28.51 (8.93)	35.91 (9.38)	32.21 (9.82)
Active	18.85 (6.28)	25.85 (7.03)	22.35 (7.45)
Total	25.90 (9.30)	33.19 (9.83)	29.54 (10.20)

Table 2. Westlake Park mean youth crime incidents by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	8.34 (4.25)	11.57 (5.00)	9.96 (4.89)
Active	3.77 (2.13)	8.85 (4.20)	6.31 (4.16)
Total	7.10 (4.29)	10.83 (4.91)	8.97 (4.96)

9. We assess data through December 2014. Since the intervention ended in June 2014, the months from July to December 2014 are also coded '0' rather than '1.' Thus, this term is more accurately described as capturing whether the intervention period was active or inactive, rather than pre/post intervention.

Table 3. Westlake Park mean police-initiated activities (on-views) by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	7.30 (7.32)	170.40 (112.7)	88.85 (114.16)
Active	11.62 (8.48)	196.38 (98.57)	104.00 (116.51)
Total	9.00 (7.96)	180.64 (106.53)	94.82 (114.44)

Poisson difference-in-differences models

Table 4. Westlake Park difference-in-differences Poisson regression on total crime incidents controlling for seasonality and trend

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	.947	.131	-0.39	0.694	.723	1.241
Intervention Active	.597	.064	-4.82	0.000	.484	.736
Assignment x Intervention	1.089	.132	0.70	0.484	.858	1.382
Month (Jan reference)						
Feb	.817	.105	-1.58	0.114	.635	1.050
Mar	.874	.124	-0.94	0.345	.662	1.155
Apr	.764	.130	-1.58	0.114	.547	1.067
May	.818	.107	-1.54	0.123	.633	1.056
Jun	1.027	.129	0.22	0.829	.804	1.313
Jul	.957	.143	-0.29	0.771	.714	1.283
Aug	.937	.133	-0.46	0.646	.709	1.238
Sep	.875	.107	-1.09	0.275	.688	1.112
Oct	1.000	.137	0.00	0.999	.765	1.308
Nov	.894	.115	-0.87	0.385	.695	1.151
Dec	.985	.151	-0.10	0.920	.729	1.329
Trend	1.006	.002	2.55	0.011	1.001	1.011
Constant	27.699	3.274	28.10	0.000	21.972	34.920

Log pseudolikelihood = -336.078 Pseudo R2 = 0.184 Wald chi2(15) = 91.39 ($p < .0000$)

Table 5. Westlake Park difference-in-differences Poisson regression on youth crime incidents

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	1.387	.155	2.92	0.003	1.114	1.727
Intervention Active	.452	.078	-4.58	0.000	.321	.635
Assignment x Intervention	1.692	.384	2.32	0.021	1.084	2.641
Constant	8.343	.712	24.87	0.000	7.058	9.861

Log pseudolikelihood = -279.465 Pseudo R2 = 0.120 Wald chi2(3) = 46.00 (p < .0000)

Table 6. Westlake Park difference-in-differences Poisson regression on police activity controlling for seasonality and trend

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	17.311	7.595	6.50	0.000	7.326	40.907
Intervention Active	1.418	.471	1.05	0.292	.740	2.718
Assignment x Intervention	.724	.260	-0.90	0.369	.358	1.464
Month (Jan reference)						
Feb	1.104	.657	0.17	0.868	.343	3.547
Mar	.780	.396	-0.49	0.625	.288	2.110
Apr	.893	.480	-0.21	0.833	.311	2.562
May	1.014	.538	0.03	0.979	.358	2.871
Jun	.987	.516	-0.02	0.980	.355	2.747
Jul	.867	.475	-0.26	0.794	.296	2.535
Aug	1.059	.489	0.12	0.901	.429	2.616
Sep	1.072	.447	0.17	0.868	.474	2.426
Oct	1.278	.471	0.66	0.506	.621	2.630
Nov	1.002	.366	0.00	0.996	.490	2.050
Dec	1.132	.420	0.33	0.739	.547	2.342
Trend	1.009	.011	0.82	0.410	.988	1.031
Constant	6.503	2.731	4.46	0.000	2.855	14.812

Log pseudolikelihood = -1181.075 Pseudo R2 = 0.732 Wald chi2(15) = 474.40 (p < .0000)

3rd and Pike/Pine

Descriptive statistics

Table 7. 3rd and Pike/Pine mean crime incidents by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	19.51 (6.42)	35.03 (11.21)	27.27 (11.97)
Active	19.62 (6.92)	28.85 (7.08)	24.23 (8.32)
Total	19.54 (6.48)	33.35 (10.56)	26.45 (11.14)

Table 8. 3rd and Pike/Pine mean youth crime incidents by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	6.14 (3.37)	9.37 (3.76)	7.76 (3.90)
Active	5.54 (3.13)	7.00 (2.77)	6.27 (2.99)
Total	5.98 (3.28)	8.73 (3.64)	7.35 (3.72)

Table 9. 3rd and Pike/Pine mean police-initiated activities (on-views) by treatment status and intervention active/inactive

	Mean (SD) Control	Mean (SD) Treatment	Mean (SD) Total
Inactive	52.25 (50.36)	219.15 (114.92)	135.70 (121.71)
Active	64.38 (42.36)	114.85 (52.23)	89.62 (53.22)
Total	57.03 (47.06)	178.06 (107.44)	117.55 (102.43

Poisson difference-in-differences models

Table 10. 3rd and Pike/Pine difference-in-differences Poisson regression on total crime incidents controlling for seasonality and trend

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	1.795	.138	7.61	0.000	1.544	2.087
Intervention Active	1.005	.110	0.05	0.962	.811	1.246
Assignment x Intervention	.819	.113	-1.44	0.150	.625	1.075
Constant	19.514	1.075	53.94	0.000	17.517	21.739

Log pseudolikelihood = -361.589 Pseudo R2 = 0.205 Wald chi2(3) = 69.43 ($p < .0000$)

Table 11. 3rd and Pike/Pine difference-in-differences Poisson regression on youth crime incidents

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	1.526	.174	3.71	0.000	1.221	1.907
Intervention Active	.902	.160	-0.59	0.558	.637	1.275
Assignment x Intervention	.828	.180	-0.87	0.386	.542	1.267
Constant	6.143	.564	19.75	0.000	5.130	7.355

Log pseudolikelihood = -253.728 Pseudo R2 = 0.059 Wald chi2(3) = 20.08 ($p \leq .0002$)

Table 12. 3rd and Pike/Pine difference-in-differences Poisson regression on police activity controlling for seasonality

	IRR	Robust SE	z	95% Confidence Interval p	95% Confidence Interval Lower	95% Confidence Interval Upper
Assignment to Treatment	4.194	.927	6.49	0.000	2.720	6.467
Intervention Active	1.123	.275	0.47	0.635	.695	1.814
Assignment x Intervention	.425	.123	-2.96	0.003	.241	.749
Month (Jan reference)						
Feb	.822	.283	-0.57	0.570	.418	1.615
Mar	.922	.290	-0.26	0.796	.498	1.708
Apr	.848	.236	-0.59	0.553	.491	1.464
May	.871	.267	-0.45	0.653	.477	1.590
Jun	1.744	.501	1.94	0.053	.994	3.062
Jul	1.728	.484	1.95	0.051	.998	2.992
Aug	1.505	.492	1.25	0.212	.792	2.858
Sep	1.399	.444	1.06	0.290	.751	2.606
Oct	1.904	.496	2.47	0.013	1.143	3.173
Nov	2.043	.544	2.69	0.007	1.213	3.441
Dec	1.751	.538	1.82	0.068	.959	3.196
Constant	40.771	12.814	11.80	0.000	22.020	75.486

Log pseudolikelihood = -1125.623 Pseudo R2 = 0.608 Wald chi2(15) = 175.46 ($p < .0000$)

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Community policing, which focuses on preventing crime through collaborative police-community relationships and the use of problem-solving techniques, can be effectively combined with place-based, targeted law enforcement strategies commonly referred to as hot spot policing of locations with high concentrations of crime. However, little empirical work has been done exploring how different types of interventions might be appropriate for different types of hot spots.

This report presents the results of a pilot program conducted by the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University and the Seattle Police Department. Conducted from June 2013 through June 2014, the program trained police officers to divert young people who commit low-level offenses into rehabilitation programs. In addition to describing the implementation process and findings, the report provides recommendations for training officers in the application of community policing to locations of concentrated juvenile offending.

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